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IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN*
This Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with the constitu-
tional structure have become too fixated on the concern for political accountability.
As a result, those efforts have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legiti-
macy: the concern for administrative arbitrariness. Such thinking is evident in the
prevailing model of the administrative state, which seeks to legitimate agencies by
placing their policy decisions firmly under the control of the one elected official
responsive to the entire nation-the President. This Article contends that the "pres-
idential control" model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a
mistaken assumption about the sufficiency of political accountability for that pur-
pose. The assumption resonates with the premise, familiar in constitutional theory,
that majoritarianism is the hallmark of legitimate government. This premise,
brought to the fore by Alexander Bickel, now is questioned among constitutional
theorists. Moreover, majoritarianism is not enough to legitimate administrative
decisionmaking under our constitutional structure for the reason that it does not
reliably address the concern for arbitrariness. This Article argues for a more direct
focus on the concern for arbitrariness-an approach that has at its core a concern
for good government, not simply "accountable" government in the post-Bickel,
majoritarian sense of that word. The Article demonstrates how a more direct ap-
proach suggests new possibilities for resolving the time-honored problem of agency
legitimacy and new ways of understanding the perennial puzzles of administrative
law.
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INTRODUCTION
From the birth of the administrative state, we have struggled to
describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child of a consti-
tutional democracy. That is, we have sought to reconcile the adminis-
trative state with a constitutional structure that reserves important
policy decisions for elected officials and not for appointed bureau-
crats.1 In this Article, I argue that we have become so fixated on the
concern for political accountability lately that we have overlooked an
I Some scholars, frustrated with grand efforts to legitimate administrative discretion,
have abandoned such efforts for a more direct focus on the ills of administrative power.
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1299,
1303 (1997) ("Discretion, like so many other terms and concepts, reflects our effort to
describe our government in non-administrative or anti-administrative terms. This is a drug
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important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administra-
tive arbitrariness. Perhaps more accurately, we have relegated this
ubiquitous concern to "ordinary" administrative law-such as the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA)2-rather than "constitutional" ad-
ministrative law-such as the nondelegation doctrine. We have
bifurcated the routine concerns about agency policymaking from the
legitimacy concerns, consigning issues of arbitrariness to the former
while conserving issues of accountability for the latter.
Indeed, this dichotomous thinking has colored the recent schol-
arly turn toward a model of the administrative state that seeks to legit-
imate agencies by placing their policy decisions firmly under the
control of the one elected official responsive to the entire nation-the
President. In this Article, I argue that the "presidential control"
model cannot legitimate agencies, for a reason no critic of that model
ever has explored. 3 I claim that the model rests on a mistaken as-
sumption about the appropriate role of political accountability in the
constitutional scheme. The presidential control model misleads us
into thinking that accountability is all we need to assure ourselves that
that often makes us feel better, but, in the long run, we always pay a price for our
indulgence.").
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
3 There are many critics of the presidential control model, though perhaps diminishing
in number as the model captures both Democratic and Republican hearts. See, e.g.,
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 988 (1997) [hereinafter Farina, The Consent of the Gov-
erned] (arguing that presidentialism is "premised upon a fundamentally untenable concep-
tion of the consent of the governed"); Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through
the New Presidentialism, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 227, 227 (1998) [hereinafter Farina,
Undoing the New Deal] (arguing that "new presidentialism" is "a profoundly anti-regula-
tory phenomenon"); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a
Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144
U. Pa. L. Rev. 827, 841-57 (1996) (arguing that very singularity and visibility of presidency
may exaggerate its flaws); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J.
1725, 1729 (1996) (arguing that unitary executive is incorrect as matter of original under-
standing); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61
U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 187-95 (1994) (arguing that unitary executive is incorrect as matter of
constitutional interpretation); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory
Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 462-63 (1987) (arguing that presidential
control interferes with agency independence); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a
System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark.
L. Rev. 161, 212-14 (1995) (arguing that presidential review of rulemaking disrupts "dia-
logue, openness, and responsiveness" important to system of checks and balances); Sidney
A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 Admin. L.
Rev. 1, 24 (1994) (arguing that presidential control interferes with agency expertise); Peter
L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 968 (1997) (arguing that
presidential involvement in rulemaking "insufficiently respects the tension inherent in the
Constitution between Congress's power to create the instruments of government and allo-
cate authority among them and the fact of a single chief executive at the head of the agen-
cies thus created, with intended and inevitable political relationships with all").
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agency action is constitutionally valid. Moreover, by focusing on ac-
countability purportedly to resolve the tension between the adminis-
trative state and the constitutional structure, the model overlooks the
ever-present risk of arbitrariness. I suggest that a focus on the avoid-
ance of arbitrary agency decisionmaking lies at the core of both a the-
oretical justification of administrative legitimacy and a practical
evaluation of administrative law doctrines. The presidential control
model contains no such focus.
Of course, the presidential control model is not the first theory of
the administrative state to fall short in some respect.4 Several theories
predate it, and tracing their evolution helps to illuminate exactly
where we went astray. I will contend that-contrary to the conven-
tional account-the early models of the administrative state, though
flawed, reflected a more accurate picture of the constitutional pitfalls
of agency lawmaking. They better balanced the concerns about ac-
countability and arbitrariness, as well as using both "ordinary" admin-
istrative law and "constitutional" administrative law to legitimate
agency policymaking. The difficulty with the early models was that
they described a government that, while perhaps legitimate, simply
did not exist. Agencies did not merely implement legislative direc-
tives, as the "transmission belt" model posited, or merely execute
technocratic judgments, as the "expertise" model supposed. 5
But rather than repair those models, we replaced them with (or at
least subordinated them to) models fixated on accountability. This
development, I will show, tracks closely a similar development in con-
stitutional theory: the preoccupation with majoritarianism as a first
premise of legitimate government, exemplified and popularized by
Alexander Bickel. 6 In the 1960s, Professor Bickel introduced his fa-
mous "countermajoritarian difficulty" to explain a prevailing scholarly
4 For the classic account of the models of the administrative state through the 1970s,
see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667 (1975).
5 See id. at 1675-78 (describing these models and their shortcomings); infra Part I.A
(same).
6 On the "fixation" or "obsession" with majoritarianism in constitutional theory, see
generally Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L.
Rev. 531 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, pt. 1:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, The
Road to Judicial Supremacy]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, pt. 3: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383 (2001) [hereinafter
Friedman, The Lesson of Lochner]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, pt. 4: Law's Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, pt. 5,
112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession];
Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 Yale L.J. 2165 (1999).
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queasiness with judicial review of legislative decisionmaking. 7 Bickel
cast judicial review as "deviant" precisely because it undermines pol-
icy decisions made by government officials who represent and answer
to the people. 8 And Bickel thereby inspired a generation of scholars
to embrace the legitimacy of judgments made by popular majorities
and the presumptive illegitimacy of nonmajoritarian judgments when
the two conflicted. Although many constitutional law scholars have
challenged Bickel's conclusion about the narrow role for judicial re-
view, few have challenged the essential premise underlying the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty-namely, the primacy of majority
preference in conferring legitimacy within our constitutional order.9
Administrative law scholars, for their part, have said little about
matters of such "high" constitutional theory. This does not mean,
however, that they have not reflected its mood. In fact, the
majoritarian premise almost intuitively explains the transition from
the early models of administrative law to the most recent ones. It is
no accident that the model emerging contemporaneously with the
countermajoritarian difficulty was the "interest group representation"
model, which consciously characterized the administrative process as a
perfected legislative process for the formulation of policy. 1° That
model transformed the administrative process to fit the majoritarian
premise-the primacy of popular preference. Put simply, it ensured
that administrative decisionmaking reflected the policy preferences of
participants in agency proceedings. Furthermore, it understood judi-
cial review as consistent with the majoritarian premise to the extent
such review facilitated the access of representative parties-for exam-
ple, by requiring agencies engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking
to provide the type of notice and paper "record" parties needed to
participate effectively in that process as well as to challenge the out-
come of that process.11 Judicial review, in this way, was not
countermajoritarian but promajoritarian. It was a kind of "represen-
7 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2d ed. 1986).
8 Id. at 18.
9 See Brown, supra note 6, at 551 (noting that after Bickel introduced his counterma-
joritarian difficulty, "[t]he challenge for academics was now to see who could 'justify' judi-
cial review in spite of its indisputable 'countermajoritarian' or 'undemocratic' nature," and
collecting sources).
10 See infra Part I.B.
I1 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (reflecting devel-
opment of "paper record" requirement); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.) (same); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.) (same); Richard B. Stewart, The Develop-
ment of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmen-
tal Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 713, 731-33 (1977)
(coining term "paper hearing procedure").
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tation reinforcement." to borrow John Hart Ely's words. 12 This model
failed not because of its focus on majoritarianism, but because it relied
on an overly optimistic conception of the administrative process.
Viewing the interest group representation model in this light
helps to explain the model of the administrative state that subse-
quently emerged and continues to flourish today-the presidential
control model. That model places administrative policymaking under
the direction of the government official who, it is said, is the most
responsive to the people. 13 The President represents and answers to a
national constituency, which makes him even more responsive to the
people as a whole than Congress. 14 While bringing administrative
decisionmaking within this potent form of political-and hence popu-
lar-rule, the presidential control model also casts intrusive judicial
review of agency action as illegitimate interference with political-and
hence popular-determinations. 15 Courts have no business second-
guessing administrative agencies (particularly executive branch agen-
cies) when they make policy decisions. The presidential control model
thus calls for great judicial respect of administrative decisions. 16
The difficulty is that the whole premise on which this model is
based has come under scrutiny in constitutional theory-that is, con-
stitutional theorists no longer assume that majoritarianism best ex-
plains the features of our constitutional structure. 17 Given the
burgeoning debate in constitutional theory, administrative law schol-
ars should not be complacent about the dominance of majoritarianism
as a constitutional value. At a minimum, they must question whether
it is enough that agencies respond to majoritarian preferences.
I argue that it is not. The reason is that majoritarianism fails to
account for an additional concern of paramount constitutional signifi-
cance: the risk of arbitrary administrative decisionmaking. This con-
12 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87-88 (1980) (understanding judicial re-
view as "representation reinforcing" because it ensures adequate representation and no
more); Brown, supra note 6, at 532 & n.2 (describing Ely's representation reinforcing the-
ory as "paramajoritarian").
13 See infra Part I.D.
14 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
15 See infra text accompanying note 310.
16 See infra text accompanying note 310.
17 See generally Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power (1993); Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-
Government (2001) [hereinafter Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government]; Brown,
supra note 6; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitu-
tion]; James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Law-
rence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893 (1990). Others have
challenged the majoritarian premise as a matter of original understanding. See, e.g., Fa-
rina, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 1007-18.
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cern was reflected in the earliest models of the administrative state. 18
Those models recognized that tampering with the constitutional struc-
ture of government raises potential risks of arbitrariness, and that the
administrative state must find a compensating means to protect
against those risks. The concern for arbitrariness did not abate with
the discovery that the earliest models did not describe the government
we have realistically. Some of the most prominent administrative law
scholars-Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, Judge Henry J. Friendly,
and Professor Louis L. Jaffe-pressed for solutions to the problem of
arbitrary administrative decisionmaking beyond legislative direction
or agency expertise. 19 And well-known judges, such as Judge Harold
Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit, worked to incorporate those solutions
into the law.20
But these efforts at preventing arbitrariness mainly have been
taking place under the rubric of "ordinary" administrative law rather
than "constitutional" administrative law. As such, they have been un-
derstood as important to the project of improving the quality of
agency policymaking, but not its legitimacy. The only major place (in
recent times) that the concern for arbitrariness has been an acknowl-
edged part of "constitutional" administrative law is procedural due
process.21 Indeed, a recent effort to address that concern in another
area of "constitutional" administrative law was met with bewilder-
ment and, ultimately, rejection. Judge Stephen F. Williams, another
respected judge of the D.C. Circuit, attempted to reconfigure the con-
stitutional nondelegation doctrine to permit agencies rather than Con-
gress to supply the standards that prevent arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking under broad delegating statutes22-something Profes-
sor Davis and Judge Leventhal themselves proposed.23 However, the
18 See infra Part L.A (describing transmission belt and expertise models as concerned
with risk of arbitrariness).
19 See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969); Henry J. Friendly,
The Federal Administrative Agencies (1962); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Adminis-
trative Action (1965).
20 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59 (D.D.C.
1971) (Leventhal, J., for three-judge panel).
21 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970) (holding that Due Process
Clause requires hearings before termination of welfare benefits to allegedly ineligible
recipients).
22 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-38 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified
in part and reh'g en banc denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd in part sub nom.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
23 See Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 758-59 (finding that requirement of
subsidiary administrative standards "blunts the 'blank check rhetoric"' of nondelegation
doctrine); Davis, supra note 19, at 58 ("The slight change I suggest in the non-delegation
doctrine merely moves from a requirement of guides furnished by a legislative body, which
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Supreme Court found illogical the suggestion that agencies possess the
power to render their own power constitutional. 24
This divide between "ordinary" and "constitutional" administra-
tive law has obscured an essential point: The possibility that the con-
cern for arbitrariness, a staple of administrative law, actually emanates
from the constitutional structure. The concern for arbitrariness can be
seen as one of the primary evils at which our traditional checks and
balances are aimed. So understood, the concern must be addressed,
not only as a matter of agency quality, but of agency legitimacy. That
does not mean it must be addressed under constitutional law. But it
can be addressed there without the idea seeming so illogical. Further-
more, the concern can be addressed under nonconstitutional adminis-
trative law without the idea seeming so inconsequential. Many think
that administrative law occupies a second-class status in legal theory
precisely because administrative law attends to matters of arbitrari-
ness rather than accountability. They are wrong. If the concern for
arbitrariness stems from the constitutional structure, then the princi-
ples that speak to it-whether grounded in administrative law or con-
stitutional law-enjoy first-class status. Thus, any hierarchy between
"ordinary" and "constitutional" administrative law, or between arbi-
trariness and accountability, is artificial if our goal is truly as we have
presented it to be: squaring the administrative state with the constitu-
tional structure.
Part I of this Article describes the past and present models of the
administrative state, showing a shift in the emphasis of those models
from preventing arbitrariness to promoting accountability, and linking
this shift to the emergence of the majoritarian paradigm in broader
constitutional theory. Part II argues that the presidential control
model, premised on the majoritarian paradigm, is inadequate to ad-
dress the abiding concern for arbitrary administrative decisionmaking,
and that efforts to rectify its shortcomings must fail. Part III advo-
cates an account that better addresses the arbitrariness concern, show-
ing how that account solves many of the conventional puzzles of the
law in this area and sketches the outlines of future developments.
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I
THE MODELS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: FROM
ARBITRARINESS TO ACCOUNTABILITY
The twentieth century saw the emergence of the modern regula-
tory state and, with it, a series of models attempting to explain that
state in a constitutional structure that was designed without anything
resembling modern government in mind. Scholars are careful to note
that these models did not so much succeed each other as "bleed into
each other"-that is, each model still exists today in some combina-
tion with the other models.2 5 What scholars often fail to note, how-
ever, is that these models have shifted in emphasis over time. Most
scholars describe the models as if each viewed the principal obstacle
to administrative legitimacy as the accountability deficit. But the
early models focused on a different problem: the arbitrariness danger.
It was not until the later models that the concern for arbitrariness be-
came the recessive theme and the concern for accountability became
the dominant one.
Section A shows that the early models focused primarily on the
concern for arbitrariness, not accountability. Section B demonstrates
that the interest group representation model inverted the order. In
this, Section C explains, the interest group representation model reso-
nated with a contemporaneous trend in constitutional theory-an in-
creasing preoccupation with Alexander Bickel and the
countermajoritarian difficulty.26 After Bickel, scholars more than
ever came to regard majoritarian decisionmaking as the key to politi-
25 Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1276, 1284 (1984); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2254
(2001).
26 1 am not the first to observe a connection between the early models of administrative
law and the prevention of arbitrary administrative decisionmaking. Nor am I the first to
observe a transformation in later administrative law theory. In his seminal article review-
ing the course of administrative law through the mid-1970s, Professor Richard Stewart
described the origins of the early transmission belt model and the expertise model, which
together comprised what he called the "traditional model" of administrative law, as efforts
to prevent arbitrary administrative lawmaking. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1671-81. He
also described the adoption of the interest group representation model in the 1970s as a
shift in theory to "the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair represen-
tation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decision." Id. at
1670. Other scholars have described the early models of the administrative state as aimed
at preventing arbitrary administrative decisionmaking or protecting individual liberty. See,
e.g., Frug, supra note 25, at 1282; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public De-
liberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 Yale L.J. 1617, 1618-19 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein.
Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va. L. Rev. 271, 277
(1986). Other scholars have noted a transition from expertise to politics as a justification
for agency rulemaking. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Trans-
formation of American Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 755-60 (1996).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
May 20031
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 2003
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cal accountability, and political accountability as the key to govern-
mental legitimacy. Part D documents the influence of this logic on the
subsequent and still prevailing model of the administrative state: the
presidential control model.
A. The Early Models
The early models of administrative law were premised on a con-
stitutional theory that understood the aim of constitutional structure
as the protection of individual liberty from arbitrary governmental in-
trusions. Thus, when scholars worried about the legitimacy of the new
administrative state, they expressed those worries in terms of the risks
of arbitrary regulations, not antimajoritarian ones. Consider first the
"transmission belt" model, named as such by Professor Richard Stew-
art in his seminal article describing the early models of the administra-
tive state.27  That model conceived of agencies as merely
implementing clear legislative directives. 28 Understood this way,
agencies, given administrative procedures and judicial review to en-
sure compliance with legislative directives, posed minimal risks of ar-
bitrary action. The absence of statutory controls was problematic
because it "would deprive citizens of effective protections against the
abusive exercise of administrative power. ' 29 Legislative directives
protect individual liberty by confining administrative decisionmaking
within identifiable and determinate bounds. Simply put, they reduce
opportunities for arbitrariness by providing agencies with specific in-
structions rather than general licenses.30
Of course, the transmission belt model had other salutary effects.
For example, it "legitimate[d] administrative action by reference to
higher authority." 3' It addressed the concern that the constitutional
structure provides no "inherent" authorization of administrative
power over individuals by tying such authority back to the legisla-
ture. 32 In addition, the transmission belt model met the conditions of
the contractarian theory of Hobbes and Locke, under which "consent
is the only legitimate basis for the exercise of the coercive power of
government. ' 33 Because private individuals only consent to the exer-
27 See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1675 ("The traditional model of administrative law thus
conceives of the agency as a mere transmission belt for implementing legislative directives
.... ").
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1673 (arguing that transmission belt model "curbs officials' exploitation of the
governmental apparatus to give vent to private prejudice or passion").
30 Id. at 1673-75.
31 Id. at 1673.
32 Id. at 1672.
33 Id.
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cise of legislative power, they only consent to the exercise of adminis-
trative power that is legislatively authorized.
The transmission belt model, however adequate in theory, was
inadequate in practice. It simply did not describe the government we
had after about 1930. Regulatory statutes designed to stimulate the
economy in the wake of the Depression did not contain the type of
legislative rules, standards, or even goals that would (or could) control
administrative discretion in the ways that the transmission belt envi-
sioned. 34 Instead, they provided broad grants of legislative authority
with little guidance or limits on the administrative exercise of such
authority. Thus, the transmission belt model failed to explain the util-
ity of bureaucratic government and, more importantly, failed to legiti-
mate that government because it could not deliver on its promise. It
could not tie administrative action to legislative directives as a means
for protecting individual liberty from arbitrary intrusion: "Insofar as
statutes do not effectively dictate agency actions, individual autonomy
is vulnerable to the imposition of sanctions at the unruled will of exec-
utive officials .... "35
A new model soon arose to describe the virtues of bureaucratic
government and to legitimate that government in the absence of legis-
lative directives. That model also conceived of the legitimacy problem
as how to prevent arbitrary exercises of administrative discretion. But
rather than employing external constraints for this purpose, the model
relied on internal ones. It conceptualized agencies as professionals or
experts, disciplined in their craft by "the knowledge that comes from
specialized experience. '36 The expertise model was the brainchild of
the New Dealers who offered science and economics as a solution to
the market failures that created the Depression. 37 By remitting deci-
sions to administrative expertise, the model afforded protections
against arbitrary action:
For in that case the discretion that the administrator enjoys is more
apparent than real. The policy to be set is simply a function of the
goal to be achieved and the state of the world. There may be a trial
and error process in finding the best means of achieving the posited
goal, but persons subject to the administrator's control are no more
34 Id. at 1676-77.
35 Id. at 1676.
36 Id. at 1678.
37 Id. Of course, James Landis was responsible for much of the characterization of
agencies as experts and the reliance on their professionalism to solve the nation's economic
woes without inviting the abuse of discretion (indeed, without involving the use of discre-
tion whatsoever). See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 10-17, 33, 39, 46-47,
98-99 (1938).
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liable to his arbitrary will than are patients remitted to the care of a
skilled doctor.38
The principal purpose of the model, again, was to dampen con-
cern over discretion. The model also achieved distance from politics
by creating a realm of administrative decisionmaking in which insula-
tion from politics was both explicable (i.e., political judgment simply
was not implicated) and justifiable (i.e., political judgment would only
serve to disrupt technocratic judgment). 39 But it was the distance
from discretion, rather than distance from politics per se, that pur-
ported to address the constitutional concern of the time.40
From the start, the expertise model attracted criticism, but not
about the lack of political accountability. The earliest academic com-
mentators thought that the model focused on agency competence to
the exclusion of agency procedures. However expert administrators
were, they too often decided matters without a hearing, on the basis of
matters outside their purview, with preformed biases, and without re-
gard to the combination of functions that might impugn their imparti-
ality-such as the combination of rulemaking, investigation, and
prosecution. 4' Every one of these actions had the potential to affect
individual liberty in the most basic sense. If they did not pose literal
threats to constitutional due process, they raised the same sorts of
concerns for fairness and participation.
It was these concerns that the Administrative Procedure Act
principally addressed.42 The APA, despite the many political com-
promises that its vague language manifests,43 intended overall to
guard against overreaching or unfair regulation by providing affected
parties increased hearing and participation rights. 44 It also intended
to prevent tyranny by fortifying judicial review of administrative deci-
38 Stewart, supra note 4, at 1678.
39 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-
making in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 90 n.34 (1994)
(noting that subsidiary issue for New Dealers in creating expert agencies was to insulate
them from politics, and collecting sources).
40 See Landis, supra note 37, at 48-50; Stewart, supra note 4, at 1678.
41 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev.
1189, 1264 (1986) (describing comments of Roscoe Pound, chairman of special committee
of ABA on administrative law, published in 1938).
42 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 (2000)). The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) grew out of a report by a spe-
cial committee appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's attorney general to address
"the need for procedural reform in the field of administrative law." S. Doc. No. 8, at 1
(1941) [hereinafter Attorney General Committee's Report] (internal quotations omitted),
available at www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1941 report.html; Rabin, supra note 41, at 1265
(describing origins of APA).
43 See Rabin, supra note 41, at 1265 n.244, 1266.
44 As the introduction to the Attorney General's Committee Report stated:
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sions and reducing agency discretion to satisfy private or selfish inter-
ests at public expense. One need not reduce the APA to a single set
of purposes to note that, whatever else the statute set out to achieve, it
aspired to strengthen administrative procedures and judicial review to
prevent arbitrary agency action.
But the APA provided only a "brief respite" from skepticism
over the ability of expertise to constrain the arbitrary exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion.45 Scholars continued to argue that agencies
performed poorly, notwithstanding their professional abilities and
procedural reinforcements. Some contended that agencies failed to
use rulemaking to establish clear regulatory standards that would fa-
cilitate planning and promote consistency, choosing instead to pro-
ceed through case-by-case adjudication. 46 Others maintained that
agencies also failed to afford adequate procedural protections when
they did engage in adjudication.47 For example, agencies did not pro-
vide hearings often enough before depriving individuals of govern-
mental entitlements. These complaints also sounded in administrative
arbitrariness and individual due process.
Courts revealed their doubts about the effects of expertise on
agency power, intensifying the scrutiny and enforcement of agency
procedures designed to control broad administrative discretion. 48 For
example, they performed more searching review of the substantiality
of the evidence supporting agency factfinding and required more
hearings prior to the deprivation of property. 49 Most significantly,
they began to insist that agencies provide a reasoned explanation for
It is well recognized that the purpose of Congress in creating or utilizing an
administrative agency is to further some public interest or policy which it has
embodied in law .... But everyone also recognizes that these public purposes
are intended to be advanced with impartial justice to all private interests in-
volved and with full recognition of the rights secured by law. Powers must be
effectively exercised in the public interest, but they must not be arbitrarily ex-
ercised or exercised with partiality for some individuals and discrimination
against others. Procedures must be judged by their contribution to the
achievement of these ends.
Attorney General Committee's Report, supra note 42, at 2; see also Robert A. Anthony,
The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 Admin. L.J. 1, 1
(1996) (quoting Justice Jackson, who as then-attorney general supervised special commit-
tee that wrote report on which APA was based, for point that APA "created safeguards
even narrower than the constitutional ones, against arbitrary official encroachment on pri-
vate rights"); Rabin, supra note 41, at 1265 (describing origins of APA); Sunstein, supra
note 26, at 271 (same).
45 See Rabin, supra note 41, at 1286 (describing two groups of critics).
46 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 19, at 5-6; Rabin, supra note 41, at 1286.
47 See Rabin, supra note 41, at 1286: Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J.
733, 751-56 (1964); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1681-82.
48 See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1679.
49 Id.
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their policy decisions. 50 The "reasoned consistency" requirement
forced agencies to substantiate their decisions with a public rationale
to prevent deviation for nonpublic purposes.5' In addition, it forced
agencies to render consistent decisions or at least explain departures
from past practice to promote predictability and fairness.52
The purpose of these judicial innovations was to prevent arbitrary
administrative decisionmaking. The purpose "was, and is, simply to
ensure that the agency's action is rationally related to the achievement
of some permissible societal goal, and to promote formal justice in
order to protect private autonomy. ' 53 Confronting the reality that
delegating statutes involved-and agencies exercised-policy rather
than technical judgment, or at least some combination of the two,
courts prodded agencies to exercise their judgment in ways that recog-
nized and safeguarded individual rights. That is not to deny the other
effects of these innovations, for example, to increase or ensure partici-
pation in the administrative process. Rather, it is to emphasize the
initial motivation for these developments-to prevent arbitrariness.
In this way, judicial review came to reinforce administrative decision-
making as the main protection against abuse of discretion.54
50 Id. at 1679-80.
51 Id. Judge Harold Leventhal supplied the more common label for the requirement
that agencies offer reasons "that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative
intent"-that is, "reasoned decision-making." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 39, at 134 (defining
"reasoned decisionmaking" as requirement that agency "justify its policy decision in terms
of the goals underlying the statute[s]" it implements, and arguing that such requirement
"will make the agency think twice before pursuing a special interest agenda").
52 See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1680.
53 Id.
54 Stewart notes that courts sometimes used doctrine designed to restore putative legis-
lative control. For example, he points to the Supreme Court's use of the clear statement
canon of statutory construction in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), to preclude the
Secretary of State from exercising authority in a manner that threatened individual liberty.
Id. at 1680-81. This form of review had a constitutional legitimacy dimension. It kept the
agency faithful to its legislative principal and functioned as part of the checks and balances
that attach, in our constitutional system, to the exercise of policymaking authority. See
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administra-
tive State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 486-87 (1989).
Rabin notes that Congress also played a direct role in policing administrative discre-
tion during this time. For example, in 1969, Congress enacted the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(2000)), which requires federal agencies to "give focused consideration to the impact of
their decisions on the environment." Rabin, supra note 41, at 1287. NEPA requires agen-
cies to engage in a specific process with a specific mandate in mind prior to making major
regulatory decisions. Id. at 1287. In 1970, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA),
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000)), which directs
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set air quality standards by specified dead-
lines. Rabin, supra note 41, at 1288-89. Rabin writes:
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B. The Interest Group Representation Model
By the 1970s, the idea of agencies as experts had fallen apart.
Scholars came to question not only "the agencies' ability to protect
the 'public interest,' but to doubt the very existence of an ascertaina-
ble 'national welfare' as a meaningful guide to administrative deci-
sion."' 55 The reason was that "[e]xposure on the one hand to the
complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and on the
other to the corrosive seduction of welfare economics and pluralist
political analysis, has sapped faith in the existence of an objective ba-
sis for social choice. ' 56 The 1930s idealism about administrative ex-
pertise had given way to the 1970s realism about administrative
discretion.
Administrative law and scholarship reacted to this change by
reinventing the administrative process as a perfected political process,
attempting to legitimate it by affording access to a wider range of af-
fected interests. In so doing, it altered the entire focus of administra-
tive law. The concern of administrative law no longer was to prevent
the arbitrary exercise of administrative authority, as a "negative in-
strument for checking governmental power." 57 It was to ensure a
more inclusive administrative process, "'the affirmative side' of gov-
ernment 'which has to do with the representation of individuals and
interests' and the development of governmental policies on their be-
half" rather than in the service of narrow groups and interests. 58
Through an interest group representation model, agencies' decisions
would gather legitimacy "based on the same principle as legislation. '59
In the absence of an objective basis for administrative judgment, such
judgment would reflect the preferences of all affected parties.
What unites the Clean Air Act with NEPA as a real innovation in regulatory
design is congressional recourse to an action-forcing principle. The CAA, like
NEPA, rejects the prevailing New Deal wisdom that agency experts could best
bring their technical expertise to bear on problems of public policy if they were
pointed in the right direction .... NEPA was meant to widen the administra-
tor's horizons .... In setting stringent deadlines for administrative action, the
CAA questioned the very will of the regulatory agencies to act. It warned that
if air pollution controls were to be enforced by the New Deal strategy, 40 years
of experience suggested that the regulators would delay, equivocate, and gen-
erally fail to establish in any precise way what 'the public interest' required.
Id. at 1289.
55 Stewart, supra note 4, at 1683.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1687.
58 Id. (quoting Ralph F. Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administra-
tive Law Theory, 47 Yale L.J. 538, 540 (1938) and citing Attorney General Committee's
Report, supra note 42, at 76).
59 Id. at 1712.
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Courts implemented the interest group representation model
through a variety of clearly perceptible doctrinal changes. Lower
courts, confronting a huge shift from formal adjudication to notice-
and-comment rulemaking, sought to open up that process to public
participation and challenge by requiring agencies to produce a record
reflecting consideration of relevant interests and facilitating judicial
review. Some lower courts required procedures beyond those that the
APA required for record-generating purposes. 60 These courts con-
verted notice-and-comment rulemaking into a "hybrid" process some-
where between informal rulemaking and formal adjudication. The
Supreme Court foreclosed this effort in 1978, permitting more proce-
dures than the APA allowed only where Congress required them or
agencies supplied them, and not where lower courts demanded
them. 61
But lower courts also pursued a strategy for spurring agency re-
solve that the Supreme Court would embrace. Chief Judge David
Bazelon and Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit seized on the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review in the APA to require
an administrative record in notice-and-comment rulemaking. 62 They
interpreted the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to contain more
than the minimal rationality requirement it suggested. 63 Rather, they
grounded in this language the formidable requirement that agencies
articulate the factual and analytical basis for their decisions, including
their chain of logic, as well as demonstrate consideration of relevant
policy alternatives and relevant party comments. 64 This requirement,
which had begun to surface earlier, now assumed new significance. By
ensuring that agencies respond to criticisms and explain their rejection
of alternative solutions, the requirement served the now critical role
of facilitating participation as well as rationality. That is, it ensured
the consideration of party input among the relevant factors. The Su-
preme Court, which endorsed some version of this so-called "rea-
soned decisionmaking" requirement or "hard look" doctrine as early
60 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973) (requiring
limited trial-type hearing in notice-and-comment rulemaking); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruck-
elshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same).
61 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
62 See Int'l Harvester Co., 478 F.2d at 629-31 (Leventhal, J.); Harold Leventhal, Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1974);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.).
63 See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 33-37; Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 394; Int'l
Harvester Co., 478 F.2d at 629-31; Leventhal, supra note 62, at 511.
64 Judge Leventhal proposed a stronger version, under which courts also would assess
whether the agency's policy decision is substantively irrational. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d
at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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as 1971,65 adopted it officially for notice-and-comment rulemaking in
1983.66
Other doctrinal changes also underscored the importance of
broad public participation. Formal adjudication officially expanded to
afford parties possessing "new," statutorily created property rights a
hearing prior to deprivation.67 Principles governing standing, ripe-
ness, and exhaustion also expanded to allow more parties to seek judi-
cial review of administrative action more easily.68
While readily identified, the transformation occurring in adminis-
trative law was not so readily explained. Professor Stewart speculated
that the transition away from what he dubbed the "traditional" liberty
protection model might be explained in either of two ways. First, it
might reflect a "general and irremediable loss of faith in the possibility
of authoritative, generally-applicable rules or procedures for gov-
erning collective choice.''69 The traditional model and the constitu-
tional principles that underlie it were doomed from the start because
they posit a form of legislative control that administrative law cannot
produce. On this thinking, the interest group representation model is
grounded in skepticism. It does not offer another "unified model of
administrative law" in place of the older model. 70 Rather, it provides
interest group representation to courts "as a technique for dealing
with specific problems of administrative justice." 71 Courts might em-
ploy interest group representation selectively "where the desirability
of fully and formally assessing the effect of alternative policies on vari-
ous affected interests clearly outweighs the burdensome delays and
other costs involved. '72
Alternatively, the transition away from the old, traditional model
might reflect "a passing, interim phase" on the way toward a new uni-
65 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971) (requir-
ing reasoned decisionmaking for informal adjudication under arbitrary and capricious test
of APA).
66 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983) (requiring reasoned decisionmaking for rule rescission under arbitrary and capri-
cious test of APA).
67 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that Due Process Clause
requires hearings before termination of welfare benefits to allegedly ineligible recipients).
68 See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1970)
(articulating new test broadly construing components of standing); McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1969) (waiving exhaustion requirement in case of extreme
hardship); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967) (permitting pre-enforce-
ment review of regulations).
69 Stewart, supra note 4, at 1805.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1807.
72 Id.
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fying theory of administrative law.73 Perhaps a "new conception of
administrative law and its relation to political theory [was] forming
among the ruins of the old."' 74 That new conception, difficult "to see
beyond the shards of the immediate present, '75 "speaks to the condi-
tion of the age, reflecting the expansion of governmental functions
and a changed conception of the status of the individual in society. ' '76
Put simply, the new conception suggests modern circumstances have
outstripped the old model: "Given the enormous expansion of gov-
ernmental activity, not only in the regulation of private activity but
also in the provision of goods, services, and advantageous opportuni-
ties, [the traditional model] is no longer an adequate or even coherent
model. ' 77 Thus, a new understanding of the administrative state in
the constitutional structure emerged because the old understanding,
hopelessly rooted in classical liberal and common law notions of pri-
vate liberty, could not accommodate modern law notions of public
welfare.
The passage of time has proven Stewart's second explanation at
least partly correct. A new unifying theory of administrative law was
emerging. That theory revealed itself more fully in broader constitu-
tional theory and in a subsequent administrative law model focused
on majoritarian control.
C. The Majoritarian Paradigm in Constitutional Theory
The development of the interest group representation model of
administrative decisionmaking roughly coincided with the develop-
ment, in constitutional theory, of the "majoritarian paradigm. ' 7 That
paradigm reflected a "belief in the hegemony of popular control of all
governmental decisions. ' 79 It stood, at its core, for the notion that
only the people or their representatives could render legitimate gov-
ernmental policy decisions. Although the notion of majoritarianism
had been lurking in constitutional theory, it crystallized into a para-
digm when Alexander Bickel (in)famously characterized judicial re-
view of legislative decisionmaking as "countermajoritarian." 80
73 Id. at 1810.
74 Id. at 1811.
75 Id. at 1810-11.
76 Id. at 1812.
77 Id. at 1811.
78 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky coined the phrase "majoritarian paradigm." See Er-
win Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Forward: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 61 (1989).
79 Brown, supra note 6, at 538.
80 Bickel, supra note 7, at 16. Although there may be disagreement among scholars
about the precise origins of majoritarianism, there is consensus that Bickel captured an
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In his 1962 book The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel asserted
the idea of majority rule as the precondition of legitimate govern-
ment.8 The Progressives first launched that idea in the 1930s, dis-
crediting the view that courts are justified in striking down economic
legislation to protect individual liberty under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Progressives criticized
concepts such as "due process" and "liberty of contract" as lacking
any textual basis or functional constraints on the ability of judges to
substitute their judgment of sound regulatory policy for that of the
people.82 The whole notion of individual rights, they argued, consists
of nothing more than a vehicle for courts to reweigh the social policy
considerations that Congress had evaluated when enacting law. This
rights skepticism put judicial review on the defensive. Since that time,
"the central question of constitutional scholarship . . . has been...
how a court's interpretation of constitutional rights could justify the
court in striking down popularly-enacted legislation."8 3
But this early rights skepticism did not amount to a call for ma-
jority control of administrative policymaking. 84 Indeed, the Progres-
sives had demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for independent
agencies. Professor Edward Corwin, for example, criticized the Su-
preme Court for holding in Myers v. United States85 that Congress
could not limit the President's ability to remove purely executive offi-
cials.86 Corwin felt that the Court had wrongly interfered with a prac-
tical arrangement for "meeting modern conditions. ' 87 His view,
shared by other New Deal enthusiasts, had the effect of unleashing
administrative decisionmaking from political control. But neither
Corwin nor other scholars focused on this point. Instead, they con-
centrated on the notion that agencies, as experts, would provide the
anxiety about the Supreme Court that had been brewing since the New Deal. Compare
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession, supra note 6, at 237-54 (attributing mod-
ern academic obsession with majoritarianism in large part to Bickel), and Friedman, The
Lesson of Lochner, supra note 6, at 1391-92 (arguing that majoritarianism, as it is known
now, has roots arising in Progressive era), with Brown, supra note 6, at 532 (noting that
majoritarianism, as it is known now, arose with Bickel). It is not the purpose of this Article
to take a position on the history of majoritarianism but to show that, whatever the history,
the majoritarian critique of judicial review took on a life of its own after Bickel.
81 Bickel, supra note 7, at 16-18.
82 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1733, 1781-82 (1998).
83 Id. at 1787.
84 Brown, supra note 6, at 534.
85 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
86 Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitu-
tion, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 353, 355 (1927).
87 Id. at 399; see Brown, supra note 6, at 548-49.
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best answers to social problems.8 8 No one paused to consider whether
those technocrats also would provide the answers that the people
wanted. Even the critics of the new administrative state attacked
agencies not for their unmajoritarian-if not countermajoritarian-
quality, but for the inadequate protection they provided against arbi-
trary decisionmaking.8 9
The majoritarian critique of agency decisionmaking, perhaps
looming in early discussions, took flight after Bickel publicized the
link between rights skepticism and majoritarianism with respect to ju-
dicial review.90 Post-Bickel, scholars began to distrust not only judi-
cial use of individual rights to invalidate popularly enacted statutes,
but any policy decision made by unelected officials. As to judicial re-
view, "Bickel conflated very different strains of thought from Thayer
to Wechsler into a single, national, commitment to majority rule, or
'democratic faith."' 9' From this vantage, he labeled judicial review "a
counter-majoritarian force in our system" and "a deviant institution in
the American democracy. ' 92 And with that label, he encapsulated the
problem of judicial review as never before. The central question was
not just how to explain the Court's use of a few vague words in the
Constitution to strike down popularly enacted legislation, but how to
justify the very existence of judicial review in a democracy committed
to majority rule. 93
88 See Reich, supra note 26, at 1618
In the half-century prior to the end of World War I, most Americans viewed
public administrators as experts who used their experience and training to dis-
cover the best means for attaining goals established by statute. The adminis-
trator's task was merely to solve the problems identified by democratic
processes; the legitimacy of his role was no major issue.
(emphasis and citations omitted)); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next
Stage, 92 Yale L.J. 1487, 1495-97 (1983) (noting that Progressives followed "technocratic
tradition" of public administration, which relied on expert administrators rather than ad-
ministrators "directly representative of and responsive to the people," and explaining that
to extent Progressives also incorporated "democratic tradition[ ]," it was in sense that
"public administration served 'the public interest'-that is, the interest of the people" and
not that public administration aggregated preference of people); see also Linda R.
Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82
Nw. U. L. Rev. 646, 656 (1988) ("Traditional administrative theory assumed that the appli-
cation of neutral expertise in administrative regulation would achieve socially desirable
ends better than would an imperfect market."); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Jus-
tification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1518-19 (1992) (noting that
expertise model of administrative law relied on agencies to make sound policy, and in this
sense execute "'will of the people'").
89 See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
90 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty 144 (2002);
Brown, supra note 6, at 550-51.
91 Brown, supra note 6, at 550.
92 Bickel, supra note 7, at 16, 18.
93 See Farber & Sherry, supra note 90, at 144; Brown, supra note 6, at 551.
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The majoritarian paradigm, after Bickel, had a pronounced effect
on constitutional theory.94 Scholars widely accepted its premise of
popular control, while debating its conclusion about judicial review.
Some used the premise as Bickel did, to discredit anything but mini-
mal use of judicial review. Others used it to justify more intensive use
of judicial review. John Hart Ely, the leader of this latter group, ar-
gued for a judicial role in ensuring popular control of policymaking. 95
Ely called on courts to ensure that no groups systematically were de-
prived of participation in the process of popular policymaking. 96 He
offered those who did care about individual rights the tools to permit
the courts to eradicate obvious abuses in the system, like racial segre-
gation, while still characterizing such protection as "representation re-
inforcement" and thus affording them the opportunity to indulge the
seductive assumption that in a democracy it must be the people who
make all value judgments. 97
This majoritarian paradigm also had an effect on constitutional
law doctrine. Early Rehnquist Court decisions, for example, dis-
played reluctance to upset legislative determinations that impinged on
individual rights.98 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court interpreted Bill of
Rights provisions in a distinctly majoritarian manner with "a profound
majoritarian effect." 99
The majoritarian paradigm had a great effect on administrative
law theory and doctrine, though no one seemed to notice. As a theo-
retical matter, the question was how to justify the very existence of
administrative agencies in a polity committed to a single legitimating
94 See Brown, supra note 6, at 538-41 (describing influence of Bickel and his
majoritarian premise on constitutional theory and case law).
95 Ely, supra note 12, at 87-88.
96 Id.
97 Brown, supra note 6, at 539. Many other scholars followed Ely in defending judicial
review against Bickel's charge. See id. at 532 nn.1-4 (collecting scholars, including Bruce
Ackerman, Barry Friedman, Marci A. Hamilton, and Michael J. Klarman).
98 See Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 57, 61-74; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 590-609 (1993).
99 Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 57. More recent Rehnquist Court decisions on issues
such as the extent of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause or Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggest a willingness to invalidate legislative determinations that
impinge on states' rights. Of course, this might not signal a retreat from the Court's com-
mitment to majority rule but rather an attempt to perfect it. The Court might be under-
stood, whether rightly or wrongly, as recognizing that Congress frequently invents
problems or overbroad solutions to posture with voters rather than represent them. See
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 452, 479 (2002) (characterizing certain Rehnquist Court deci-
sions as efforts to invalidate purely symbolic legislation, intended more to induce public
support than honor public preferences); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress
and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 Vand, L. Rev. 309, 314-15 (2002) (discussing
problem of symbolic legislation).
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principle of majority rule. 00 Note the change in posture of this ques-
tion from the question that preoccupied the founders of the adminis-
trative state. The whole approach had shifted from the offensive
inquiry that characterized the New Deal period-why are administra-
tive agencies necessary and why do they not offend constitutional val-
ues-to a defensive inquiry that parallels Bickel's challenge for
courts-how do we justify administrative agencies, given that they are
here to stay, in a constitutional structure dedicated to their antithesis.
In a post-Bickel world, the starting place was the lack of justification
for policymaking by agencies insulated from the control of the people.
Executive branch agencies were not the primary problem because
such agencies were connected to the President, who at least had ple-
nary power to remove their heads over policy disagreements.
Independent agencies were a different matter. Such agencies, "like
courts, betray the principle that 'all of those given the authority to
make policy are directly accountable to the people through regular
elections.' "101
Notwithstanding the glaring implication of Bickel's view for the
legitimacy of administrative agencies, few scholars worried aloud
about the countermajoritarian difficulty as it affected administrative
agencies. 0 2 Most scholars who discussed it directed their energy-
some might say their obsession-to the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court.10 3 Scholars who discussed the legitimacy of administrative
agencies did not do so in terms of the countermajoritian difficulty.
Almost none cited Bickel. 10 4
This does not mean, however, that administrative law scholars did
not incorporate the majoritarian premise into their thinking. One ex-
planation, novel here, for the administrative law model emerging at
this time was the influence of Bickel. The interest group representa-
tion model appeared for the first time in the late 1960s and early
1970s, just long enough after Bickel wrote his book for it to have
taken root in constitutional theory. That model, so coincident in its
100 See Reich, supra note 26, at 1618-19 (observing that after World War II, "[b]road
grants of administrative discretion seemed inconsistent with [a] vision of society [based on
the views of the American polity] because they created the possibility that unelected bu-
reaucrats could impose their own ideas on the public").
101 Brown, supra note 6, at 541 (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 4-5
(1990)).
102 Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession, supra note 6, at 163-64 (noting that
administrative agencies, though natural targets of majoritarian critique, received little at-
tention from scholars on this issue).
103 See id.
104 But see Stewart, supra note 11, at 714-15 (citing Bickel in discussing argument that
environmental interests are "chronically undervalued because of basic structural defects in
the political process" and therefore require judicial protection).
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timing, also was coincident in its focus. It (1) took the legitimacy
question to be the central question and (2) answered that question by
substituting popular control for earlier models' reliance on procedural
and judicial control of the administrative process. In short, the inter-
est group representation model recreated the administrative process
into one that would maximize the satisfaction of popular prefer-
ences. 10 5 In so doing, it presumed that popular control is the "sine
qua non" of legitimate governmental decisionmaking.10 6
Furthermore, administrative law scholars soon began making ar-
guments that looked a lot like the arguments their counterparts were
making in post-Bickelian constitutional theory. For example, some
urged courts to intervene in the notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cess in what, I believe, might be understood as an effort at Ely-esque
"representation reinforc[ement]." 107 Specifically, they urged courts to
intervene in the process to prevent it from systematically excluding
105 See Reich, supra note 26, at 1620 (noting that interest group representation model
asked public administrator "to be accessible to all organized interests while making no
independent judgment of the merits of their claims. ... [s]ince, by this view, the 'public
interest' was simply an aggregation and reconciliation of these claims," and citing Theo-
dore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism 71 (1969)); Shapiro, supra note 88, at 1497 (noting
that under interest group representation model, "[b]ureacrats would become democrats by
reflecting the voice of the people as expressed to them by the interest groups"); Stewart,
supra note 4, at 1761 (
Such participation, it is claimed, will not only improve the quality of agency
decisions and make them more responsive to the needs of the various partici-
pating interests [citing Arthur Earl Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in
Federal Rulemaking, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 511, 511-12 (1969)], but is valuable in
itself because it gives citizens a sense of involvement in the process of govern-
ment [citing Michael E. McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Pro-
cess: Toward Increased Responsiveness, 13 Ariz. L. Rev. 835, 851 (1971)], and
increases confidence in the fairness of government decisions [citing Ernest
Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359,
361 (1972)]. Indeed, litigation on behalf of widely-shared "public" interests is
explicitly defended as a substitute political process that enables the "citizen to
cast a different kind of vote ... which informs the court that ... a particular
point of view is being ignored or underestimated" by the agency
[quoting Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of
Environmental Quality, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1070, 1099 (1970)].).
106 Although academics have not been entirely clear on this point, I understand the
majority will as distinct from the public interest. Indeed, the majority will may be adverse
to the public interest with respect to a given policy matter. The two are methodologically
distinct. Determining the former involves aggregating public preference on a policy mat-
ter, while determining the latter involves articulating a public-regarding purpose served by
the policy matter. Cf. Shane, supra note 3, at 204-05 (distinguishing "accountability to the
'public interest'" from accountability to "majority opinion" and accountability to "the
most affected parties"). For a vision of responsiveness to the public interest as distinct
from responsiveness to private interests or public preferences, see generally, Cass R. Sun-
stein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985).
107 See Ely, supra note 12, at 88.
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representative interests from transmitting their preferences and shap-
ing policy.108 Scholars also began to assume that more intensive judi-
cial review represented a dubious intrusion on the product of the
notice-and-comment process-which was, after all, an idealized legis-
lative process. The only question was whether or to what extent that
intrusion was justified. Indeed, this question still dominates the
debate. 10 9
108 See Leventhal, supra note 62, at 515-18 (describing role of courts in ensuring that
administrators give due consideration to environmental interests in cases where adminis-
trators are least likely to do so); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 59 (1975) (noting that, in absence of judicial review, com-
ments of "environmental groups may not be given the kind of detailed consideration they
deserve"); Stewart, supra note 11, at 756-62 (advocating judicial review of environmental
decisions under ordinary administrative law principles to cure interest-representation
defects).
109 Some scholars argue that intensive judicial review is unjustified because it is too bur-
densome or "ossifying." See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 49 (1993)
(finding that even "threat" of judicial review has created "complex, time consuming"
rulemaking procedures that are unable to keep pace with rapidly changing scientific ad-
vances); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 19, 199-200,
224-54 (1990) (arguing that legal review made National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration rulemaking nearly "impossible"); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deos-
sifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992); Thomas 0. McGarity, The
Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 Tex.
L. Rev. 525 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to "Hard Look"
Review, 1989 Duke L.J. 538, 549; Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke
L.J. 1463, 1471-72 (1992) (stating that ossification effects of judicial review are "wrong-
headed"); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification-A Modest Proposal, 47
Admin. L. Rev. 453, 453 (1995) (noting consensus that process of rulemaking is "too time
consuming, burdensome, and unpredictable"). These scholars argue that agencies, fearing
intensive judicial scrutiny, would devote excessive resources to insulating their rules from
reversal or refrain from issuing particular rules at all. But see William S. Jordan, I11, Ossifi-
cation Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability to Achieve Reglulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 393 (2000) (disputing on empirical grounds contention that judicial review ossifies
administrative process). Some argue, in a notably majoritarian vein, that intensive judicial
review is unjustified because it displaces "political" judgments that "unaccountable" courts
should respect rather than impede. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 71 (1995) (arguing that intensive judicial re-
view allows politically unaccountable judges to reject administrative policy decisions).
Others respond that intensive judicial review is justified because it improves the demo-
cratic quality of rulemaking. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard
Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry,
1994 Wis. L. Rev. 763; Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 599 (1997); Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483 (1997); Patricia M. Wald,
Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 659 (1997). Agencies, fearing
intensive judicial scrutiny, would consider the comments of affected parties, deliberate on
the difficult issues, and explain the basis for their decisions. Agencies also would factor out
or at least reveal inappropriate "political" considerations. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the
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The interest group representation model, for all its build-up, was
relatively short-lived in robust form. Critics claimed that agencies did
not merely aggregate the preferences of the competing interests but
served "self-interests deeply entangled with narrow private inter-
ests."'110 As a result, interest group representation "was no longer in-
herently good because, to paraphrase Orwell, some groups were far
more equal than others."'' Given this vulnerability, the interest
group representation model could not justify the considerable costs
that it imposed on the administrative process.' 12 Creating an idealized
legislative process was expensive and complicated, if done right.
Agencies had to accept comments from all who submitted them and
then sift through the materials to determine which required serious
consideration. They had to support their policy determinations on the
basis of a record sufficient to survive judicial challenge, which was a
moving target. None of this was to deprive the interest group repre-
sentation of a place in administrative law. But that place was not at
the center.
D. The Presidential Control Model
The decline of the interest group representation model created "a
void and into that void stepped the President: literally in the person
of Ronald Reagan; figuratively in the constitutional persona of the
Chief Executive." 113 President Reagan and his successors, both Re-
publican and Democrat, have asserted not only managerial but direc-
torial control of the administrative state.' 14 By bringing a large part of
the administrative bureaucracy under executive control, they have of-
fered a vision of administration that has eased pragmatic and constitu-
tional concerns while crossing partisan political lines. This vision-
compelling in its ability to address both efficiency and legitimacy is-
sues-did not, I argue, change the focus on popular control that the
Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 Duke L.J. 522,
525.
110 Shapiro, supra note 88, at 1498.
III Id.
112 See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 283-84.
113 Cynthia R. Farina, The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution,
49 Admin. L. Rev. 179, 180 (1997); see also Shapiro, supra note 88, at 1498 ("If the Ameri-
can people rejected both technocracy and group access, what choice of administrative style
was left? One answer was none. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and a host of other politi-
cians ran for office on a platform of simple opposition to government.").
114 Farina, supra note 113, at 180; Kagan, supra note 25, at 2246, 2250 (describing "era of
presidential administration" as "[t]riggered mainly by the re-emergence of divided govern-
ment and built on the foundation of President Reagan's regulatory review process" and
fortified by "President Clinton's articulation and use of directive authority over regulatory
agencies, as well as his assertion of personal ownership over regulatory product").
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interest group representation model heralded. Rather, it changed the
locus of popular control from interest groups to the one governmental
actor responsive to the entire nation.
The model that embodies this vision-the presidential control
model-grew out of three interrelated stories about the administrative
state: a pragmatic story, a political story, and a constitutional story.
The stories have been told many times, and I will only briefly recount
them here.' 15 The pragmatic story begins with the increasing criticism
of agencies as insufficiently attentive to cost-effectiveness and coordi-
nation. 1 6 On the cost side, critics charged that agencies fail to con-
sider adequately the need for cost-benefit analysis,' 17 incentive-based
regulatory strategies, and priority setting.I18 On the coordination side,
critics contended that agencies fail to avoid duplication and conflict
with each other. 19
Scholars identified the President, rather than Congress, as best
able to remedy these regulatory failures. Some focused on the unique
ability of the President to conduct centralized review of agency pro-
posals and improve agency outcomes. 20 The President, as a single
actor, could adopt particular decisional methodologies, evaluate alter-
native strategies, establish priorities, and facilitate government-wide
planning. Indeed, the President has been performing these functions
in some capacity since the New Deal. Others focused on the utter
inability of Congress to regulate beyond the selfish interests of its own
115 For excellent treatments, see Fitts, supra note 3, at 841-57; Kagan, supra note 25, at
2277-2319; Strauss, supra note 26, 760-72. For a short but compelling account of how the
political and constitutional stories reinforced each other and drove the presidential control
model, see Farina, supra note 113.
116 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs 248-51 (1992) (noting emphasis on efficient
regulation in 1980s); Shapiro, supra note 88, at 1499-1500 ("The goal is... policies that are
not only rationally cost-effective in and of themselves, but fully compatible with maximum
economic growth.").
117 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 59-78
(1981) (expressing need to adapt environmental goals to economic efficiency); Stephen
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 346-50 (1982) (expressing need to consider efficiency in
course of regulatory reform); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administra-
tive Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1256, 1261 (1981) (same).
118 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restric-
tive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 547, 582, 586 (1979).
119 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality 271 (1991) (listing duplica-
tion, overlap, and conflict among problems that Office of Management and Budget review
of agency regulatory analysis sought to alleviate).
120 See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1076-82 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelega-
tion: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 82
(1985); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 662-67 (1984); see also Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
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members. Public choice theory, now at its height, offered a view of
congressional behavior that cast doubt on the practical likelihood of
meaningful legislative regulatory reform. 121 Any improvements that
legislation would bring in regulatory programs would result, if at all,
from a happy coincidence with improvements that those statutes
might bring in congressional reelection prospects.
The political story begins with President Reagan. President
Reagan leveraged public cynicism about bloated government into a
campaign for smaller government. He deployed principles of cost-
benefit analysis-promised to promote an efficient regulatory
agenda-to support a primarily antiregulatory agenda.1 22 He issued
Executive Order 12,291,123 which required agencies to consider cost-
benefit analysis "to the extent permitted by law" 124 and to submit
their proposed major rules, along with a "regulatory impact analysis"
of the rule, for centralized White House review by the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Activities (OIRA) in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. 125 The result was to reduce the number of agency
rules that conflicted with administrative policy, as well as the number
that did not follow cost-benefit analysis.' 26 And when Vice President
George H.W. Bush became President himself, he maintained Execu-
tive Order 12,291 and its apparently antiregulatory bias.
But President Clinton demonstrated that the tools of Executive
Order 12,291 were not tied to conservative ideology. President Clin-
ton issued his own version-Executive Order 12,866 12 7-which har-
nessed cost-benefit analysis 128 and OIRA review 129 for the purpose of
reinventing government rather than reducing it. He also stepped up
the practice of issuing agency-specific directives to steer and improve
121 See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility 73 (1993) (arguing that
congressional efforts to set specific statutory guidelines and deadlines are intended actually
to delay regulation rather than improve it).
122 See Farina, Undoing the New Deal, supra note 3, at 229 (using term "anti-regula-
tory" to describe "new presidentialism" associated with President Reagan); Kagan, supra
note 25, at 2247 (noting that, during Reagan and Bush years, many administrative law
scholars came to doubt propriety of presidential control of agency decisionmaking because
of its apparently anti-regulatory effects).
123 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000).
124 3 C.F.R. 128.
125 3 C.F.R. 128-30.
126 See McGarity, supra note 119, at 22 (noting that OMB review resulted in reconsider-
ation or withdrawal of approximately 85 proposed rules each year, including some of most
significant ones).
127 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000).
128 3 C.F.R. 639, 645.
129 3 C.F.R. 640, 645.
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particular regulatory policies the way that specific legislation might. 130
These directives, typically in the form of formal and published memo-
randa to executive branch agency heads, "instruct[ed] them to take
specified action within the scope of the discretionary power delegated
to them by Congress. ' 131 While President Clinton continued the
Reagan-Bush practice of regulatory review under principles of cost-
benefit analysis, he also intervened at a much earlier stage by issuing
preregulatory directives to the heads of executive branch agencies "to
set the terms of administrative action and prevent deviation from his
proposed course."'1 32 In addition, he asserted himself at a later stage
by issuing postregulatory statements designed to present "regulations
and other agency work product, to both the public and other govern-
mental actors, as his own, in a way new to the annals of administrative
process."1 33
Despite some antiregulatory moves,134 President George W.
Bush made few changes to the main architecture of presidential con-
trol. He made only minor amendments to Executive Order 12,866,
now Executive Order 13,258.135 And he has continued to issue official
directives to agency heads. 36 Whether, in the final analysis, he will do
so with the vigor of President Clinton remains to be seen.
The constitutional story begins with a renewed emphasis on the
role of the unitary executive in controlling administrative action. 137
130 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2290-99 (describing President Clinton's increased use of
directive authority).
131 Id. at 2290.
132 Id. at 2249.
133 Id.
134 President George W. Bush, upon taking office, attempted to reverse many end-of-
term Clinton decisions. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec-
utive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001). Perhaps this is a pre-
dictable response to a change in presidential political affiliation. There is some evidence,
however, that it is a return to an antiregulatory agenda. Under President Bush, OMB has
rejected proposed rules at the highest rate since President Reagan's first term. See
Stephen Power & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Redrawing the Lines: Bush's Rules Czar Brings
Long Knife to New Regulations, Wall St. J., June 12, 2002, at Al (providing graphic dem-
onstrating percentage of rules reviewed by OIRA that were returned to agencies at high of
2.5% in 1980 and 2000).
135 Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28, 2002).
136 See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489,
1494-95 (2002) (noting that under Bush, "OIRA has issued a series of prompt letters"
directing agency heads to issue regulation); Kagan, supra note 25, at 2318 (providing exam-
ple of Memorandum on Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 216 (Jan. 29, 2001), which reinstated ban lifted by President Clinton on federal fund-
ing for private organizations engaged in abortion-related activities).
137 Farina, supra note 113, at 181 (noting "renaissance of structural constitutional the-
ory" in 1980s).
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Unitary executive theory looked like a return from something modern
and unpredictable-interest group pluralism-to something old and
dependable-separation of powers. As such, it squarely addressed
the question of where exactly a federal bureaucracy fit in our three-
branch structure. The answer: under the middle branch. To make
this claim, advocates of the unitary executive theory did not need to
rely on creative constitutionalism. They could point to the original
understanding of the constitutional structure that contains only three
branches and not an unenumerated fourth: 138 Once Congress relin-
quishes the power to determine the details of regulatory policy, the
President must assume it because the Constitution permits no other
option. Other scholars defended unitary executive theory as a matter
of "translation" necessary to maintain fidelity to the original constitu-
tional commitments to accountability and energy in the executive
branch: 139 Once Congress relinquishes the power to determine the
details of regulatory policy, the President should assume it because
the Constitution requires an elected, focused governmental official to
exercise that power rather than a bunch of bureaucrats. In either
case, unitary executive theory responded powerfully to the accounta-
bility concerns raised by the administrative state. It promised a gov-
ernment run by the one official who speaks for all the people.
These three stories-pragmatic, political, and constitutional-
separately and together contemplate a form of presidential control
that extends beyond coordination or oversight. They confer on the
President "not simply some ultimate managerial responsibility for
how well the government runs," but "an independent role in shaping
domestic public policy. ' ' 140 Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush
asserted their power in a relatively understated fashion, accomplishing
a "[q]uiet [c]onstitutional [r]evolution.' 14 1 President Clinton em-
braced it unabashedly, fairly proclaiming "an era of presidential ad-
ministration. ' 142 He announced his intention to make administrative
policy decisions his own rather than those of the executive branch
agency purportedly charged with the task. 143 President George W.
138 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994).
139 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994).
140 Farina, supra note 113, at 180.
141 Id. at 179.
142 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2246.
143 Id. at 2248 (
Whether the subject was health care, welfare reform, tobacco, or guns, a self-
conscious and central object of the White House was to devise, direct, and/or
finally announce administrative actions-regulations, guidance, enforcement
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Bush also has been vocal about his connection to at least some admin-
istrative policy decisions. 144
Whether exercised subtly or stridently, the independent role in
shaping administrative public decisions is at the root of the presiden-
tial control model. That model purports to legitimate the administra-
tive state by bringing its decisions (or a large many of them) under
political-and therefore popular-control. Submit to popular control,
the model says to the administrative state, and shed your constitu-
tional troubles. At one level, the model makes a purely formal claim.
It contends that popular control legitimates administrative agencies by
ensuring that those agencies answer to a governmental actor who is
accountable and enumerated, even if they themselves are not. Head-
less fourth branch solved.
But the model, as most often advanced, runs deeper than this for-
mal claim. The presidential control model seeks to ensure that admin-
istrative policy decisions reflect the preferences of the one person who
speaks for the entire nation. In this way, it attempts to legitimate ad-
ministrative policy decisions, through presidential politics, on the
ground that they are responsive to public preferences. 145 Advocates
of the model have been quite forthcoming about its aim, and rightly
so. 146 It is this aim that has allowed the model to meet efficiency and
strategies, and reports-to showcase and advance presidential policies. In exe-
cuting this strategy, the White House in large measure set the administrative
agenda for key agencies, heavily influencing what they would (or would not)
spend time on and what they would (or would not) generate as regulatory
product.).
144 See supra note 136.
145 It is worth noting that cost-benefit analysis itself-one of the principle tools of presi-
dential control-can be understood to ask agencies directly to consider popular prefer-
ences in policymaking. Cost-benefit analysis requires agencies to consider which policies
the public would prefer given the relative costs and benefits (assuming the public consists
of rational actors). Of course, cost-benefit analysis also affords politicians a means to pre-
vent agencies from selecting any policy that would impose large costs-or any costs-on
the groups that finance their reelection campaigns.
146 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance 152 (1997) (arguing that Presi-
dent is particularly responsive to public preferences because he deals with issues national
in scope and has no particular constituency demanding benefits in exchange for votes);
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L.
Rev. 23, 58-70 (1995) (endorsing presidential control as mechanism that best promotes
responsiveness to public preferences); Kagan, supra note 25, at 2331-37 (same); Mashaw,
supra note 120, at 95 (arguing that presidential control of administrative decisionmaking
will increase "the responsiveness of government to the desires of the electorate"); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Govern-
ment, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1239, 1251-54 (1989) (arguing that Constitution is premised on
belief that government should act as agent of people, and that President is second best to
Congress as agent of people for controlling administrative policymaking); see also Mat-
thew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 875-76 (1997) (collecting political science
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constitutional concerns notwithstanding changes in control of the
White House. Whatever administration holds office and whatever
regulatory vision that administration implements, the result represents
the majority will. If it does not, then the next election cycle, at least in
theory, will ensure that it does. 147 The President's unique capacity for
public responsiveness-in a word, majoritarianism-ensures that this
model is likely to survive into the future.148
literature that describes emergence of President who seeks and claims support of national
electorate and that demonstrates President's special connection to "Median National
Voter," and noting that law scholars have used this literature to justify President's control
over administrative agencies); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 246 (1987) (arguing that purpose
of administrative law is to help elected politicians retain control of policymaking); Eric A.
Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Per-
spective, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1137, 1141 (2001) (arguing that purpose of cost-benefit analysis
is to ensure that elected officials maintain power over agency regulation); David B. Spence
& Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 102-28
(2000) (arguing that agency decisionmaking maximizes voter preferences); see generally
Fitts, supra note 3, at 853 n.77 (
The theory of a strong unitary president is that the president should take pri-
mary responsibility for those activities of the executive branch that are condu-
cive to majoritarian decisionmaking .... The primary opponents of a unitary
presidency emphasize the need for the exercise of nonmajoritarian influence,
either in the form of autonomous expert executive agencies, congressional in-
terest groups, or civic republican elites).
147 This theory of electoral responsiveness assumes that the public understands what the
President is implementing through his agency vision and votes on that basis. See Farina,
The Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 992-1007 (expressing skepticism); Shane,
supra note 3, at 197 (noting disconnect between President Reagan's strong electoral sup-
port and public's apparent rejection of his policy positions on key issues).
148 That is not to say that responsiveness is the only asserted goal of the presidential
control model or its advocates. Some, though not all, of those advocates connect popular
sovereignty with faction reduction. See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2337 ("To the extent that
presidential supervision of agencies remains hidden from public scrutiny, the President will
have greater freedom to play to parochial interests .... It is when presidential control of
administrative action is most visible that it most will reflect presidential reliance on and
responsiveness to broad public sentiment."); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 139, at 105-06
("[B]ecause the President has a national constituency-unlike relevant members of Con-
gress, who oversee independent agencies with often parochial agendas-it appears to oper-
ate as an important counterweight to factional influence over administration."). I address
below the claim that presidential control reduces faction. See infra notes 197-198 and ac-
companying text. I do not, however, address the claim that presidential control reduces
faction simply because whatever the President does (and the public approves or tolerates)
is public-regarding. At best, that claim simply restates the case that presidential control is
majoritarian. At worst, it makes an argument that is not satisfying even on public choice
theory. See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality: Or, Public Choice and the
Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 109, 125-30 (2000) (explaining public choice
critique of claim that presidential control automatically reduces faction). Thus, I consider
only the claim that presidential control promotes the values that faction can be understood
to subvert, such as fairness and deliberation.
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II
THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL MODEL: THE INABILITY OF
ACCOUNTABILITY TO LEGITIMATE
AGENCY DECISIONMAKING
What I have offered thus far is an explanation for the transforma-
tion in recent models of the administrative state, including the now
dominant presidential control model. Although others have noted the
transformation, few have ventured more than a tentative explanation.
Moreover, none has related it to Bickel. I have shown that the trans-
formation in recent models of the administrative state, beginning with
the interest representation model and culminating in the presidential
control model, occurred in the wake of Bickel's 1962 book. That book
set off a cabin industry in justifying intensive judicial review against
the charge that it positions unelected officials to make policy. Bickel's
book, I suggest, set off another cabin industry: justifying administra-
tive decisionmaking against a similar charge. But there was a notable
difference. While constitutional theorists became openly consumed
with their new "countermajoritarian" project, administrative law
scholars took theirs for granted. They began to walk the walk without
talking the talk.
If I am correct in diagnosing the transformation of the models,
the next question is what inference to draw for the current, presiden-
tial control model. The advocates of that model might take my histor-
ical narrative as evidence that they are on the right track. Whether
consciously or not, they have succeeded in aligning a model of the
administrative state with the prevailing theory of the constitutional
structure. That, I argue, would be the wrong inference to draw.
Section A shows that many constitutional theorists no longer en-
dorse the majoritarian paradigm as an adequate metric for assessing
the legitimacy of judicial review. For this reason alone administrative
law scholars should rethink whether the majoritarian paradigm pro-
vides an adequate metric for assessing the legitimacy of agency deci-
sionmaking. Once they do, Section A continues, they will discover
that the majoritarian paradigm fails to account for a concern of central
importance to the agency legitimacy issue-in particular, the concern
for arbitrariness. As Section A of Part I demonstrated, this concern
has been present from the earliest discussions of the administrative
state. Section A of this Part offers an explanation: The concern plau-
sibly emanates from the constitutional structure itself. The concern
therefore should be addressed in any model that purports to legiti-
mate the administrative state.
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Section B shows that administrative law scholars have begun to
acknowledge as much. Indeed, one such scholar has even reworked
the presidential control model in what might be understood as an at-
tempt to address the arbitrariness concern. Section B concludes that
this attempt, though admirable, cannot entirely resolve the arbitrari-
ness concern. Meanwhile, it imposes a great price on the presidency.
A. A Preliminary Critique of the Majoritarian Paradigm
As an initial matter, constitutionalist theorists have started to
move away from the idea of majoritarianism as the linchpin of legiti-
macy. Some have challenged the assumption on which majoritarian-
ism rests: that the purpose of our complex system of mediated powers
is to aggregate popular preferences. 149 These scholars argue that the
primary purpose of the traditional checks and balances is to protect
individual liberty. Others have questioned the possibility of any true
majoritarianism in a system that allows electoral prospects to drive
policy commitments. They have argued, with a skepticism grounded
in public choice theory, that politicians are less likely to honor popular
preferences than the preferences of their most powerful campaign
contributors. 15 0 Thus, according to these two groups of scholars, ei-
ther majoritarianism was never the proper understanding of our con-
stitutional structure, or it no longer is a feasible one. Another group
of scholars does not reject majoritarianism, but implores the legal
academy to get past the notion that the problem with judicial review is
lack of accountability. 151 These scholars seek to understand judicial
review in terms of the contribution it makes to the democratic regime
as a whole. Put differently, they seek to understand judicial review for
what it offers (e.g., independent judgment) rather than for what it
does not (e.g., popular preference).
149 See supra note 17.
150 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 21-24 (1991)
(describing public choice critique of legislation).
151 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 74-77 (arguing that judicial review serves
democratic functions other than majoritarianism); Farber & Sherry, supra note 90, at 147-
51 (arguing that judicial review must be attuned to variety of democratic goals); Neal
Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 90-
104 (1998) (arguing that judicial review contributes to open exchange among branches),
Friedman, supra note 98, at 653-80 (arguing that judicial review promotes dialogue with
body politic); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Prob-
lem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 509-39 (1997) (arguing that judicial review prevents legislative en-
trenchment); Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 145, 188 (1998) (arguing that judicial review "in politically unpredictable ways,
imposes culturally elite values in a marginally countermajoritarian fashion" (emphasis
omitted)).
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Although it is far from clear which, if any, of these views will stick
over time, all suggest a growing dispute among constitutional theorists
about the role of majoritarianism in understanding judicial review.
Given that constitutional theorists no longer are content to assume
that majoritarianism provides a satisfactory understanding of our con-
stitutional structure, administrative law scholars should no longer as-
sume that majoritarianism provides an adequate foundation for the
administrative state. Rather, they should ask whether it does so.
Once administrative law scholars begin to question whether ma-
joritarianism provides an adequate foundation, they soon will discover
that it does not. The reason is that majoritarianism fails to account for
a concern of paramount importance in the administrative state-
namely, the concern for arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.
How do we know this concern is of paramount importance? For one
thing, it simply will not go away. The concern, evident in the earliest
models of the administrative state, has not abated since. Some of the
most prominent administrative law scholars of our time discussed the
problem of arbitrary administrative decisionmaking well after the ex-
pertise model had begun to collapse. In the 1960s, Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis, Judge Henry J. Friendly, and Professor Louis L. Jaffe
each offered important books seeking fresh approaches to the prob-
lem. 152 Furthermore, Davis et al. were not the only ones who contin-
ued to worry about arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.
Contemporary administrative law scholars still raise the issue, not-
withstanding their overall dedication to majority rule. 153
Moreover, the possibility exists that the concern for arbitrary ad-
ministrative decisionmaking stems from the constitutional structure.
Perhaps this explains why administrative law scholars have not been
able to shake it. In any event, administrative law scholars have not
been properly attributing it. While administrative law scholars have
been talking about the prevention of arbitrary administrative deci-
sionmaking, they have not connected it to the constitutional structure
in an enduring way. They have been discussing the prevention of arbi-
trary administrative decisionmaking as central to good regulatory gov-
ernment, rather than to legitimate regulatory government-as if the
two were entirely distinct. In addition, administrative law scholars
have located the arbitrariness concern in the APA or some other com-
ponent of administrative law and not in constitutional law. Occasion-
ally, scholars do identify the concern in the Due Process Clause. 5 4
152 See Davis, supra note 19; Friendly, supra note 19; Jaffe, supra note 19.
153 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 25, at 2337; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 139, at 105-06.
154 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administra-
tive Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 60, 77-78 (1976) (stat-
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But none has linked it to structural concepts like separation of powers
or accountability.
Administrative law scholars have suffered the consequences.
They have found themselves "ghettoized" in legal theory-as address-
ing only the pedestrian questions about agency action. They also have
had to accept the characterization of administrative law as similarly
attentive only to the pedestrian questions. Of most significance, they
have failed to establish that, because the concern for arbitrariness is
part of the constitutional structure, it must be addressed in any model
that purports to reconcile the administrative state with the constitu-
tional structure. That is the project I commence here.
I engage here in open discussion about the ways in which the con-
stitutional structure plausibly reflects a concern for arbitrary govern-
mental decisionmaking. To understand the principles in this fashion is
not to deny the importance of majoritarian decisionmaking in a de-
mocracy. Nor need one reduce the Constitution to any unified pur-
pose. Rather, I seek only to show that a purpose of the constitutional
structure is to ensure nonarbitrary governmental decisionmaking. I
endeavor to reveal a "good government" paradigm, alongside the
majoritarian paradigm, in the constitutional structure. Furthermore, I
intend to suggest that this paradigm-and not just the majoritarian
paradigm-must play a prominent role in any model that purports to
reconcile the administrative state with the constitutional structure. It
matters less how or where the good government paradigm is ad-
dressed-through "ordinary" or "constitutional" administrative law-
than that it is addressed.
It is important to begin with a more precise conception of the
term "arbitrary." As others have noted, words such as this are often
used in ways that mask concrete problems. 155 I will try to avoid that
difficulty by foregoing a grand definition of the term "arbitrary." In-
stead, I will concentrate on the features and causes of arbitrary gov-
ernmental decisionmaking. I will consider arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking before turning to arbitrary legislative, executive, and
judicial decisionmaking.
ing that "[flundamental to the concept of procedural due process is the right to a reasoned
explanation of government conduct," and that "very essence of arbitrariness" is adminis-
trative decision rendered without adequate explanation); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Leg-
islation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 407 (1987) (stating that "[neal
protections from administrative arbitrariness are to be found in the due process clause and
perhaps the equal protection clause").
155 See Rubin, supra note 1, at 1303 (suggesting that word "discretion" is often used in
this way).
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At a basic level, arbitrary administrative decisionmaking is not
rational, predictable, or fair. More helpfully, it generates conclusions
that do not follow logically from the evidence, rules that give no no-
tice of their application, or distinctions that violate basic principles of
equal treatment. Importantly, it also may affect individual rights in
the absence of an adequate justification-that is, in the absence of
reasons reflecting some sufficiently public purpose. 56 These short-
comings may affect individual liberty in the personal sense-for exam-
ple, when administrative decisionmaking targets a specific individual
for unfavorable treatment without good reason. Often these flaws af-
fect individual liberty in a collective sense-for example, when admin-
istrative decisionmaking impairs a statutorily protected public good
(such as clean air or workplace safety) without a sufficiently public
purpose.
To a certain extent, this definition of "arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking" puts the cart before the horse. It describes evidence
of a problem rather than its source. Lack of reasoned decisionmaking
or lack of public-regarding purpose indicates something amiss-from
agency negligence to malfeasance. While negligence is cause for con-
cern, malfeasance is a matter of greater significance because it often
results from the corrupting forces that the constitutional structure is
designed to inhibit: private interest and governmental self-interest.
Broad delegation of lawmaking authority to administrative agen-
cies facilitates both private interest and governmental self-interest.
Broad delegation, by definition, enables Congress to pass statutes, and
agencies to exercise authority under such statutes, without any regula-
tory standards that meaningfully constrain administrative discretion.
Public choice theory is largely responsible for asserting that politicians
use this space to pressure agencies on behalf of the private groups that
finance their reelection campaigns. 5 7 Public choice theory mostly
blames Congress for this phenomenon. 158 Indeed, public choice the-
ory hypothesizes that Congress often writes statutes with few limita-
tions on administrative discretion intentionally to create room for
interest groups to dominate the administrative process-all the while
156 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 17 (1993) (describing requirement
that government have public-regarding reason for what it does as central to legitimacy).
157 See Schoenbrod, supra note 121, at 9-12 (applying public choice theory to show that
Congress delegates in broad strokes to shift blame for results that favor private interests);
Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 57
(1982) (same).
158 Aranson et al., supra note 157, at 43 ("It is now a commonplace among modern
political analysts that members of Congress are the primary agents responsible for generat-
ing and perpetuating the collective production of private benefits.").
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shifting blame to agencies for unpopular outcomes and claiming credit
with voters for superficial responses to public problems. 159
Public choice theory also posits, though less emphatically, that
delegation allows agencies to act in their own self-interest. Agencies,
inappropriately focused on maximizing their own authority and re-
sources, favor regulatory responses that do not serve the broader
goals of their authorizing statutes.160 Or agencies, generally valuable
for their ideological commitment, improperly pursue that commit-
ment to the detriment of broader goals.' 6' These problems, though
susceptible to characterization in modern theoretical terms, recall is-
sues familiar to the Framers. They are the twin problems of faction
and governmental self-interest-the principal components of govern-
mental tyranny. 162
Describing the causes of arbitrary administrative decisionmaking
in this fashion provides a nice link to discussing the causes of other
forms of arbitrary governmental decisionmaking that might occur-
legislative, executive, and judicial-and specifically the idea that the
Founders put structures in place to prevent such decisionmaking.
That is, it provides a transition to identifying a "good government"
paradigm alongside the majoritarian paradigm in the constitutional
structure. It hardly requires recalling that for Montesquieu and
Madison, among others, a pivotal aim of the constitutional design was
the prevention of tyranny. 163 One means for achieving that end was
to create a government representative of and responsive to the peo-
ple-a government "by the people." A dictator, however benevolent,
could not satisfy this condition. But a democracy, however well inten-
tioned, could not be depended upon to advance the interests of the
people; it could not be depended upon to act as a government "for the
159 See Schoenbrod, supra note 121, at 55-56 (offering example).
160 See generally William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Govern-
ment (1971) (arguing that agencies are motivated by maximizing their budgets and power).
But see Spence & Cross, supra note 146, at 117-19 (criticizing this view).
161 See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 107 (1967) (arguing that agencies are moti-
vated to pursue their mission orientation to exclusion of broader goals); see also Breyer,
supra note 109, at 11-19 (noting that agencies tend toward tunnel vision in pursuing their
statutory mandates). But see Spence & Cross, supra note 146, at 119-21 (criticizing this
view).
162 See The Federalist Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison); Sunstein, supra note 106, at 38-45.
163 See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1513, 1531-40 (1991); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early
Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 212-24 (1989); Laura S. Fitzgerald,
Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 Duke L.J. 679, 771-73 (1997); M. Elizabeth
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1156-61
(2000); Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of Powers: The
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 456-64, 472-84 (1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 434-37 (1987).
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people." The Framers recognized that corrupting forces existed to de-
rail elected officials from the public interest. Madison identified pri-
vate interest as one such corrupting force. Private interest concerns
the potential for narrowly focused groups to influence governmental
decisionmaking at public expense. 164 It is the problem of faction.
There is a separate problem of government self-interest, which con-
cerns the potential for governmental actors or institutions to pursue
their own ideology (or even private well-being) to the public detri-
ment. The Framers also recognized this problem. 165
To put the point more concretely, the requirement that officials
stand periodically for election was, from the Framers' perspective, in-
sufficient to prevent private interest and government self-interest
from diverting their policy decisions from public purposes, and may
even facilitate that result. Those steeped in constitutional theory are
familiar with the notion that elected officials, responsive to majority
will, might enact a law oppressive to individual rights.'6 6 This is ma-
jority tyranny-a type of popular preference aggregation that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, for example, prohibit because of its ef-
fect on individual liberty. Apart from majority tyranny, however, is a
different brand of tyranny. It is this brand of tyranny that is most
relevant to seemingly run-of-the-mill economic legislation. Elected
officials might enact a law that benefits private interests at public ex-
pense. Responding to their own special agendas, they might pursue
these commitments overzealously at public expense. In short, elected
officials might succumb to private pressure or self-satisfaction. When
they do, they exercise power without an adequate, public-regarding
purpose (and without even the support of popular majorities). 67 In
this sense, they act tyrannically or arbitrarily.1 68
164 See The Federalist Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison); Sunstein, supra note 106, at 39-43.
165 See Sunstein, supra note 163, at 435.
166 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The
Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights
of one person to the 'tyranny of shifting majorities.'"); Ely, supra note 12, at 103 (noting
capacity of judges to evaluate charges "that either by clogging the channels of change or by
acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not repre-
senting the interests of those whom the system presupposes they are"); Lani Guinier, The
Tyranny of the Majority 2-7 (1994) (discussing problem).
167 Governmental decisions that lack an adequate, public-regarding purpose are not the
only ones that are tyrannical or arbitrary. A decision that seeks to achieve a permissible
public-regarding purpose through disproportionate or otherwise unreasonable means
might also be tyrannical or arbitrary in the sense that I use those words.
168 I prefer the word "arbitrary" to "tyrannical" because it specifically captures the ef-
fect of private pressure and self-satisfaction on the public interest. Administrative law,
which always has been attentive to the effect of private pressure and self-satisfaction, em-
ploys the word "arbitrary" to describe agency decisions that do not reflect reasoned delib-
eration and therefore likely reflect improper influences. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
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Many of the checks and balances in the first three Articles of the
Constitution can be understood to prevent such instances of arbitrari-
ness and ensure that our government "by the people" also operates as
a government "for the people."' 69 In other words, they are designed
to foster legislation in the interest of the public rather than in the in-
terest of factions, private or governmental. Consider accountability
and separation of powers. Perhaps the best understanding of account-
ability is not that it requires elected officials to make policy decisions
simply because they are responsive to the people.170 Rather, it re-
quires elected officials to make policy decisions because they are sub-
ject to the check of the people if they do not discharge their duties in a
sufficiently public-regarding and otherwise rational, predictable, and
fair manner.' 7 1 Thus, accountability can be understood to enable vot-
ers not only to consider whether elected officials have maximized pop-
ular preferences in making or executing the law, but also, and equally
importantly, whether those officials have inappropriately favored nar-
row interests in doing so. 172
Similarly, perhaps the best understanding of separation of powers
does not require separation among the branches to ensure that only
the branches responsive to the people make or execute the law. 173
Rather, separation of powers prevents the concentration of power in
any one branch so as to prevent the tyranny of any one branch. 174
While many acknowledge this function, few embrace it as more than a
common constitutional refrain.' 75 Taken seriously, it means that sepa-
ration of powers was intended not merely to require Congress and the
President to act independently of one another, but also to act in a
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (finding "arbitrary and capri-
cious" agency decision that failed to reflect reasoned decisionmaking).
169 For a discussion of what it would mean to have a government "for the people" as
well as "by the people," see generally Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government, supra
note 17; Rebecca L. Brown, A Government for the People, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 5 (2002)
(reviewing Eisgruber's book and relating further views on issue).
170 See Brown, supra note 6, at 565-71.
171 See id. at 570-71.
172 See id. at 565-66.
173 See Brown, supra note 163, at 1531-32 (making this argument).
174 See The Federalist No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); Brown, supra note 163, at 1531-40.
175 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982) ("To
ensure against such tyranny, the Framers provided that the Federal Government would
consist of three distinct Branches, each to exercise one of the governmental powers recog-
nized by the Framers as inherently distinct.").
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nonarbitrary, public-regarding manner. 176 Congress and the President
should make law, and make law well.
In addition to accountability and separation of powers, other
structural features also might be understood to ensure that govern-
mental officials make nonarbitrary decisions. For example, the formal
procedures for lawmaking of bicameralism and presentment can be
understood to operate in this fashion.1 77 The Constitution demands
concerted political action for lawmaking in part to decrease the power
of private interest groups. To achieve a legislative victory, such groups
must prevail upon both Houses of Congress as well as the Presi-
dent. 78 Similarly, the constitutional lawmaking requirements impede
the production of improvident law by making any law more difficult
and politically costly to enact. 79 Finally, the requirements ensure that
whatever law results triggers a strong electoral check: both Congress
and the President, or at least a supermajority of Congress, stand to
pay at the polls. 8°1
Most generally, the requirement that legislation evince minimum
rationality might be understood to prevent the exercise of arbitrary
power. This requirement, though typically associated with the Four-
teenth Amendment, also has links to the structural provisions of the
Constitution.'8' Indeed, it has roots in the very nature of the legisla-
tive power. Congress is constrained by its own "creation and charac-
ter" to act only for reasons that reflect the national public interest. 182
Actions motivated by purely local, private, or selfish interests might
be understood to exceed the scope of Congress's limited powers and,
176 See e.g., Brown, supra note 163, at 1534.
177 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7.
178 Cf. Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1372-81 (1977) (arguing
that legislative veto increases power of private groups by allowing them to act upon one
House of Congress rather than persuade both Houses plus President); Richard J. Pierce &
Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1175,
1207-09, 1218-19 (1981) (describing potential for legislative veto to facilitate private inter-
ests); Pierce, supra note 146, at 1248-50 (arguing that legislative veto makes more likely
potential for factionalism at congressional level by removing safeguards of bicameralism
and presentment).
179 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
Geo. L.J. 523, 528-33 (1992).
180 See Farina, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 1018.
181 See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981) ("A court may invalidate legisla-
tion enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for
a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there
is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted
ends.").
182 See I Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1337 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis
omitted) (discussing view of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388
(1798)).
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in some cases, invade powers reserved to other governmental actors,
including the states.
Of course, the Court post-Lochner has demonstrated significant
discomfort with the idea of enforcing the minimum rationality re-
quirement for economic legislation at least under due process princi-
ples. For this reason, it might be thought that the Court has
surrendered its role in policing economic legislation, consistent with
the majoritarian view that such legislation reflects public preference
aggregation and, as such, merits judicial deference. Yet the Court
continues to insist on minimal rationality under due process principles
even when it does not rigorously enforce that requirement. 18 3 Moreo-
ver, the Court has begun strenuously to enforce the requirement
under structural concepts such as limited powers or federalism. For
example, the Court has invalidated federal statutes as beyond the
scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause or Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the theory that these statutes
fail to identify a sufficiently national problem, or any real problem at
all.184 Thus, the Court remains worried both at a rhetorical and prac-
tical level about legislative rationality in a way that majoritarian the-
ory cannot explain. When evaluating congressional statutes, for
example under the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause, per-
haps the Court is seeking to ensure that those statutes can "be under-
stood as 'an exercise of judgment' rather than 'a display of arbitrary
power"' (whether or not it arrives at the correct conclusion in a par-
ticular case). 185 In any event, perhaps that is what the Court should
be doing.
It is not just the constitutional principles applicable to the politi-
cal branches that can be understood to function as constraints on arbi-
trary governmental decisionmaking. Certain requirements of Article
III can be understood to deprive courts of power when such power
might produce arbitrary results. For example, the jury trial provision
carves off from courts factual determinations in felony cases. 186 At
one level, the provision injects peer-based judgment in these most im-
183 Id. at 1365 (noting that, even when upholding economic legislation under substantive
due process analysis from late 1930s to late 1990s, "the Court continually pointed to rea-
sons that could justify such actions in terms of the general public interest," and collecting
cases).
184 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Section Five); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause).
185 See Tribe, supra note 182, at 1365 (quoting Mathews v. deCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185
(1976)).
186 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Bill of Rights contains additional jury safeguards.
See U.S. Const. amend. V (grand jury), amend. VI (petit jury), amend. VII (civil jury).
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portant of cases.' 8 7 It recognizes a class of determinations as to which
popular opinion matters more than judicial independence, both for
the rights of the accused and the people. At another level, the provi-
sion provides a check on the excessive concentration of judicial power
in cases as to which the consequences of judicial bias would be most
severe. 88 Judicial bias, a predisposition to rule against the defendant,
is a form of governmental self-interest to the extent that it arises, for
example, from solicitude for law enforcement.' 89 By depriving courts
of fact determinations, the jury trial provision imposes a brake on ex-
treme judicial alignment with the interests of the prosecution. Simi-
larly, Article III in most cases grants the Supreme Court "appellate"
jurisdiction, as opposed to "original" jurisdiction, over both "Law and
Fact" to prevent it from re-finding facts.' 90
These few examples begin to show that the concern for arbitrari-
ness is not only a ubiquitous feature of the administrative state but of
the constitutional structure. 19' Furthermore, they begin to show that
the concern for arbitrariness is not a secondary consideration or the
subject of a subordinate body of law. 192 It is a foremost consideration,
no matter where in law (administrative or constitutional) it is ad-
dressed. If addressed in administrative law, it serves to elevate such
187 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 120 (1997) ("At
root, jury trials were, in Thomas Jefferson's words, 'trials by the people themselves."'
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 15 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1788-1789, at 676, 678 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958)).
188 Id. at 121 (noting that, for Framers, jury trial functioned as check on "a corrupt or
partial set of judges," much as legislative bicameralism functioned as check on partiality or
corruption in either House of Congress).
189 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to L'Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 The Pa-
pers of Thomas Jefferson, 1788-1789, at 282, 282-83 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) ("[W]e all
know that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known that are liable to
be tempted by bribery, that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party,
by a devotion to the Executive or Legislative.").
190 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
191 The examples I provide here are by no means exclusive. Other structural provisions
that, perhaps more obviously, inhibit arbitrary governmental action include the Bills of
Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; Rogers v. Tennessee, 532
U.S. 451, 460 (2001) (noting with approval contention that Ex Post Facto Clause prevents
"the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws"); Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging: The
Problem of Second-Guessing State Judges' Interpretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 493, 520 (2001) (summarizing "traditional analysis" under which "the Ex
Post Facto Clause protects against arbitrary governance as well as safeguarding the of-
fender's reliance interest"); Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Crimi-
nal Investigations, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1373, 1436 (2002) (arguing that Framers' "deep
suspicion of legislative involvement in individual guilt or innocence was incorporated into
the Constitution in the form of the clause that expressly prohibits bills of attainder").
192 Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 691-92
(2000) (noting that administrative law scholars have consigned themselves to second-class
status by declining to focus on large theoretical issues).
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law to quasi-constitutional status. Yet it is not out of place if ad-
dressed in constitutional law. The critical point is that it must be ad-
dressed alongside accountability-not simply for the sake of good
regulatory government, but for the sake of legitimate regulatory gov-
ernment. Until we do so, we cannot hope to offer an adequate model
of the administrative state.
B. The Effort to Straddle Accountability and Arbitrariness
Perhaps this realization has not been lost entirely on advocates of
the presidential control model. Many worry about arbitrary adminis-
trative decisionmaking, despite their focus on majoritarian accounta-
bility. And one has attempted actually to address it. Fresh from a
stint in the Clinton White House, Professor Elena Kagan devised a
plan to make the presidential control model more responsive not only
to majority will but also to the need for preventing arbitrary adminis-
trative decisionmaking. 193
Importantly, Kagan's impulse to expand the inquiry-her very
concern for arbitrariness-signals that the most sophisticated adher-
ents of the majoritarian paradigm recognize, at least implicitly, defi-
ciencies in that paradigm. In a loose sense, Kagan can be seen as a
new administrative law analogue to John Hart Ely. Ely saw that sim-
ple majoritarianism was inconsistent with the Constitution's commit-
ment to protecting individual rights from arbitrary legislative
intrusion, so he tried to square the circle by explaining how majoritari-
anism in fact entailed some rights protection.194 Likewise, Kagan ap-
pears to appreciate that simple majoritarianism is inconsistent with
the Constitution's concern for protecting rights from arbitrary admin-
istrative intrusion. Rather than using the courts as "representation
reinforcement" of the legislative or administrative process, she uses
the President. She seeks to ensure that agencies make acceptable
judgments by ensuring that the President does.
This Section shows that Kagan's plan cannot work. Her commit-
ment to majority rule, like Ely's, prevents her from resolving fully the
concern for arbitrariness. In the end, her only weapon against arbi-
trary administrative decisionmaking is a call for the President to exer-
cise control of agency decisions "transparen[tly]."1 95 As this Section
demonstrates, transparency alone is not enough to combat arbitrary
administrative decisionmaking; it is really just a handmaiden of major-
193 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2319-83.
194 See Ely, supra note 12, at 87-88.
195 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2331-39.
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itarianism. Moreover, the type of control that might adequately in-
hibit arbitrariness would cripple the presidency.
1. Presidential Control as a Solution
Before describing Kagan's approach and its failings, I must ad-
dress a threshold question: Why is presidential control, without any
special revisions or reinforcements, insufficient to prevent arbitrary
administrative decisionmaking? The question is why the President
cannot be trusted to resist the corrupting forces of good regulatory
decisionmaking. Advocates of the presidential control model, some
steeped in public choice theory and others not, contend that the Presi-
dent is more responsive to the people than Congress is (and, obvi-
ously, than agencies are) and therefore should be trusted to control
administrative discretion and control it well. 196 This argument essen-
tially asserts presidential control as protection against private interest
and agency self-interest.
But the mere presence of presidential control is not sufficient.
Asserting that the President is more immune to factional pressure
than Congress because of his national constituency only asserts that
the President is immune in a relative sense. That is not immune
enough. Furthermore, serious questions exist as to whether the Presi-
dent is immune at all. The President, no different from Congress, may
use unfettered discretion to instruct the agencies under his control to
select the policies that favor his most generous supporters. 197 Even if
the President operates from purer motives, he may leave room for
Congress to facilitate faction and for agencies to develop tunnel vi-
sion. The President may fail to ensure that the agencies under his
control fill up the details of regulatory statutes in a manner compre-
hensive enough to block Congress from diverting administrative poi-
196 See supra Part I.D.
197 See William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence
Over Rulemaking, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 611, 613-15 (2002) (noting that OMB review has
raised concern about "the executive acting as a confidential partner of and conduit for
regulated parties seeking to influence agency action" and arguing that self-imposed White
House controls have not fixed problem); Farina, supra note 148, at 125-30 (expressing
skepticism that, even under public choice theory, presidential involvement reduces fac-
tion); Shane, supra note 3, at 202-04 (voicing doubt that presidential control is proof
against faction); Sidney A. Shapiro, Two Cheers for HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic
Record, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 853, 854 (2002) (arguing that potential for secret White House
contacts has taken on new significance with advent of what Professor Kagan describes as
"presidential administration"); Strauss, supra note 3, at 971-73 (providing examples from
Clinton Administration that "political controls still embody the potential for corruption");
Richard A. Nagareda, Comment, Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional Roles: Lessons from
the OMB Experience, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 623-24 (1988) (criticizing ex parte contacts
with OMB as facilitating faction).
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icy to its most generous supporters, or to block agencies from
diverting administrative policy to their pet projects. The President,
even when not operating from any insidious motives of his own, may
exercise control too sporadically to combat effectively the insidious
motives of others. 198
2. Transparency as a Solution
Perhaps no one realizes this more than Kagan. She constructs a
type of presidential control that might be understood simultaneously
to achieve majority rule and afford safeguards against factionalism,
thus bridging the divide between simply majoritarian government and
truly legitimate government. She starts with President Clinton's prac-
tice of assuming authority to make choices of regulatory policy dele-
gated to agencies and exercising that authority through official
directives to agency heads. 199 She then proposes to formalize that
practice. She suggests that courts interpret all statutory delegations to
agencies as implicit delegations to the President to fill the statutory
gaps. 200 In addition, she suggests that courts ought to refuse to accord
Chevron deference to any administrative interpretation that does not
reflect a presidential directive (or some other comparable indicia of
presidential involvement), including most interpretations by indepen-
dent agencies.20 1 She further recommends that courts adopt a similar
approach to freestanding administrative policy decisions under the
hard look doctrine.20 2 According to Kagan, courts should relax the
scrutiny of the hard look doctrine when an agency can demonstrate
that the President took an official role in formulating regulatory stan-
dards and policy.2°3 Finally, she would subject all official presidential
involvement to judicial review.20 4
198 See Friendly, supra note 19, at 155-57 (expressing doubt that President could set all
standards missing from broad delegations).
199 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2290-99.
200 Id. at 2372-79.
201 Id. at 2376-77. Kagan appears to retreat from this position in a more recent article.
She suggests that the application of Chevron should turn not on whether the President has
taken responsibility for the relevant policy choice by issuing a directive, but on whether a
sufficiently high-level official within an agency has taken responsibility for it by reviewing
the interpretation and adopting it in her name. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chev-
ron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 234-57. This, she claims, will ade-
quately "place[ ] decision making in the hands of politically accountable actors and . . .
discipline administrative behavior." Id. at 241 (internal citations omitted). More specifi-
cally, it will sufficiently connect the decisionmaker to public preferences, id. at 241-44, and
"promote[] the disciplined consideration of policy throughout the agency." Id. at 244.
202 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2380-83.
203 Id. at 2380.
204 Id. at 2350-51.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
May 20031
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 505 2003
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The approach that Kagan puts forth might be understood to re-
duce the risk of factionalism or tunnel vision inherent in broad delega-
tions. It does so, however, not by identifying or proposing additional
means of presidential control over agency decisions, but by rendering
transparent such controls as there are. 2°5 Thus, her approach requires
the President to assert whatever control he exercises through visible
means, such as executive orders and directives. Transparency allows
concerned parties-both public and political-to understand govern-
mental decisions, to detect improper motives, and to assign blame. In
this way, transparency promotes accountability (in the majoritarian
sense) and prevents arbitrary administrative action. And the Presi-
dent is uniquely capable of generating transparency because his ac-
tions are uniquely apparent and understandable. As Kagan argues:
[T]he President has natural and growing advantages over any insti-
tution in competition with him to control the bureaucracy. The
Presidency's unitary power structure, its visibility, and its "personal-
ity" all render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways
that the public can identify and evaluate. The new strategies of
presidential leadership, focused as they are on intensifying the di-
rect connection between the President and the public, enhance
these aspects of the office and the transparency they generate; so
too does the increased media coverage of the President, which is at
once a cause and a result of these strategies.20 6
But Kagan's strategy, taken seriously as an effort to make presi-
dential control effective against arbitrariness, is difficult to implement
because, despite the general visibility of his office, the President has
the incentive and ability to hide control. The President depends on
numerous confidential contacts for information and has executive
privilege. Kagan acknowledges that President Reagan used his office
to veil efforts at administrative control. 207 Yet he often failed, she
counters, partly because his overall efforts to involve OMB in
rulemaking attracted attention.208 Still, she concedes, "[t]he focus on
confidentiality in the Reagan years nonetheless may have interfered in
certain cases with the ability of the public, Congress, and interested
parties to identify the true wielders of administrative authority. '20 9
One might imagine another President who insists on keeping a large
205 Id. at 2337 ("To the extent that presidential supervision of agencies remains hidden
from public scrutiny, the President will have greater freedom to play to parochial interests.
... It is when presidential control of administrative action is most visible that it most will
reflect presidential reliance on and responsiveness to broad public sentiment.").
206 Id. at 2332.
207 Id. at 2333.
208 Id.
209 1d.
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range of documents and decisions private-including, for example, de-
cisions involving critical energy policy.210 One might imagine a Presi-
dent interpreting executive privilege broadly and asserting it
repeatedly, even for documents of a prior president who himself had
waived the privilege. 21'
A related point is that different presidents may eschew transpar-
ent methods of control for more obfuscating methods. Rather than
assuming responsibility for the enforcement of Clean Air Act regula-
tions on coal-fired power plants as his father and President Clinton
had done, President George W. Bush went another route. 212 He solic-
ited a proposal from the EPA on how to amend the Clean Air Act
itself. The EPA submitted a proposal that would have significantly
reduced air pollution, adverse health effects, and associated costs. But
President Bush rejected the proposal for one of his own that would
impose fewer costs on industry. 21 3 The difficulty was that the "Clear
Skies" proposal contained no analysis comparable to the EPA analysis
of expected pollution reduction or health increases-that is, no analy-
sis of potential benefits. When asked for the analysis, the Bush Ad-
ministration disclaimed responsibility for producing it.214 The
Administration said that the proposal was not a regulatory proposal
but a legislative proposal and "the legislative language is still being
written. ' 21 5 When chastised by the chair of the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee and pressed for details by state environ-
mental officials, the Administration released some maps showing na-
tionwide air pollution reductions. The maps carried disclaimers saying
that they reflected only preliminary analyses and were subject to
change. Meanwhile, the proposal was already taking its toll. It was
precluding the EPA from settling lawsuits against major violators of
the Clean Air Act who expected to escape liability should the Clear
210 See Shapiro, supra note 197, at 853-54 (describing controversy surrounding George
W. Bush Administration energy task force, which refused to disclose names of those with
whom it met amid charges that it had extensive secret contacts with lobbyists and industry
executives but not with environmental or public interest groups).
211 See Joshua Micah Marshall, Bush's Executive-Privilege Two-Step, Salon.com (Feb. 7,
2002), at http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2OO2/O2/O7/bushrecords (observing that
President Bush has asserted executive privilege strategically, including for documents of
President Clinton as to which President Clinton himself had waived privilege).
212 See Katharine Q. Seelye, White House Rejected a Stricter E.P.A. Alternative to the
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Skies proposal become law.216 This is not the work of a reliably
"transparent" presidential administration.
Note, however, that this example is not meant to suggest that leg-
islative recommendations always are less transparent than regulatory
proposals. Nor is it meant to suggest that the Bush Administration
always will be less likely than the Clinton Administration to use trans-
parent methods of controlling regulatory policy, or that Republican
administrations always will be less likely than Democratic administra-
tions to do so. Indeed, President Bush's "regulatory czar" at OMB,
John D. Graham, has elevated visibility to an art form. The White
House website provides a log of his meetings, memoranda to agency
heads, and general guidance on rulemaking.21 7
Rather, the Clear Skies example is intended to illustrate the abil-
ity of any president, Republican or Democrat, to use passive-aggres-
sive strategies of controlling regulatory policy that are less likely to
achieve their purported public purpose than to please private inter-
ests. The Bush Administration failed to furnish critical data and pro-
vide a basis for evaluation of its proposal. It hid behind the legislative
label. It quietly defeated EPA settlement plans in lawsuits to enforce
current law. The result was policy control, and it did not require pas-
sage or even completion of the proposed legislation. 218
The President also is able to distance himself from agency pro-
posals or findings that generate disapproval. In 2001, the Internal
Revenue Service proposed a regulation requiring domestic banks to
reveal the identity of all depositors, even if those depositors were for-
216 Months after President George W. Bush announced the Clear Skies initiatives, the
EPA produced new data showing "dramatic" air quality improvements from the initiative.
See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, New EPA Data Shows Dramatic Air Quality Im-
provements from Clean Skies Initiative (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/
clearskies/presrels.html.
217 See Power & Schlesinger. supra note 134, at A]; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/regpol.html (last visited April 10, 2003).
218 The Bush Administration also prompted the resignation of some frustrated, high-
level EPA officials-notable mainly because the Administration did not even have to take
the heat for firing them. See Elizabeth Shogren, A Natural Split with Bush, and Many
Quit, L.A. Times, June 3, 2002, at Al (noting unusually high number of resignations by
senior career executives and political appointees, and linking at least some of resignations
to frustration with "Bush team's strident pro-development policy" and unwillingness to
listen to their perspectives). One of the officials who resigned-Eric D. Shaeffer, Director
of the Office of Regulatory Enforcement, which is responsible for civil enforcement of
most environmental laws-tried to force President Bush to take some heat nonetheless.
He sent a letter to his boss, EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, citing the Presi-
dent's undermining actions as cause for his departure. Id. He also testified on Capitol Hill
about the circumstances precipitating his resignation. See id.
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eign. 219 Banks were up in arms at the expected administrative burden
and loss of foreign depositors fearing privacy invasions. 220 The Bush
White House responded by opposing the proposed rule-but not pub-
licly because that would have angered members of the European
Union who supported it.221 Rather, the White House leaked its oppo-
sition to the economic community and exercised behind the scenes
pressure on the IRS.222 The IRS issued a revised proposal, more solic-
itous of bank interests, without mentioning administration policy.223
In 2002, the EPA delivered its report on global warming to the
United Nations, concluding for the first time that human activities are
causing the problem. 224 Industry, hearing news that they had feared
and that the Bush Administration had assured them was not forth-
coming, accused the Administration of an about face.225 The Admin-
istration reacted by disclaiming responsibility for the report. 226 When
219 Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 66 Fed. Reg.
3925 (proposed Jan. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 31). ! am grateful to
Jeffrey Schoenblum for this example.
220 See Daniel Mitchell, Commentary, America: Europe's Tax Collector?, Wash. Times,
June 27, 2002, at A20.
221 See Richard Rahn, Commentary, Pursuit of Economic Literacy, Wash. Times, Aug.
6, 2002, at A13 (
Even when the [Bush] Administration makes the correct decision, it is reluc-
tant to explain it to the public. For instance, there is a proposal from the
Europeans (the European Savings Directive) that would greatly undermine
our personal privacy and drive hundreds of billions of dollars of needed capital
out of the U.S. The economists in the administration wisely decided that the
U.S. government would not support the proposal, and then quietly let the eco-
nomic policy community know of the decision. When asked why members of
the administration did not make a public announcement, some of us were told
they did not want to offend certain Europeans).
222 See id.
223 See Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 67 Fed.
Reg. 50,386, 50,387 (proposed Aug. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. I and 31)
After consideration of the comments received, the IRS and Treasury have con-
cluded that the 2001 proposed regulations were overly broad in requiring an-
nual information reporting with respect to U.S. bank deposit interest paid to
any nonresident alien. The IRS and Treasury have decided instead that report-
ing should be required only for nonresident alien individuals that are residents
of certain designated countries. The IRS and Treasury believe that limiting
reporting to residents of these countries will facilitate the goals of improving
compliance with U.S. tax laws and permitting appropriate information ex-
change without imposing an undue administrative burden on U.S. banks).
224 See U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Climate Action Report 2002, at 6, available at http://
www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/car/index.html.
225 See Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Sees Problems in Climate Change, N.Y. Times, June 3,
2002, at Al (describing "stark shift" in Bush Administration view on whether human ac-
tions are responsible for recent global warming).
226 See Katharine Q. Seelye, President Distances Himself from Global Warming Report,
N.Y. Times, June 5, 2002, at A23; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the Presi-
dent to the Travel Pool, NSA Operations Center, National Security Agency, Fort Meade,
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that did not work, it attempted to recharacterize the EPA's findings to
indicate uncertainty on whether people contribute to the production
of greenhouse gases.227
Under Kagan's approach, this type of conduct is not without con-
straint. She notes that the President cannot escape media coverage of
his actions. 228 And these examples indicate that President George W.
Bush has not. President Bush would find it difficult to foist responsi-
bility for the Clear Skies proposal on Congress (or the EPA) now that
he has attracted media attention for his involvement. Sunshine might
make a difference in cases where the President himself seeks to com-
plicate the lines of authority. But sunshine might not make a differ-
ence if the public, once exposed to the story, continues to applaud the
President and fault the agency. And who would forego an opportu-
nity to fault the IRS?
Kagan suggests a backup plan that might catch cases of public
misperception (whether or not the IRS example is such a case). Her
plan is to rely on the courts, not the media, to ensure that the Presi-
dent exercises control through transparent means by directing them to
withhold Chevron deference from administrative regulations unless
traceable to presidential policy.229 This proposal is designed to make
it difficult for the President to dictate policy through informal means
rather than announced, binding policy.
But Kagan's Chevron revision is meaningful only if it demands a
reliable indication of presidential involvement. She tells courts to
look for presidential involvement that "rises to a certain level of sub-
stantiality, as manifested in executive orders and directives, rulemak-
ing records, and other objective indicia of decisionmaking
processes. ' 230 The truth is that executive orders and directives pro-
vide the only dependable evidence of presidential involvement. Any
other means allows agencies or the President to fake involvement with
each other. Kagan acknowledges that her approach might encourage
"a new kind of boilerplate in administrative action-a presidential
seal of approval disconnected from real participation in the action by
MD (June 4, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/2002
0604-16.html (stating, in response to media question about whether he plans any new ini-
tiatives to combat global warming, that "I read the report put out by a-put out by the
bureaucracy. I do not support the Kyoto Treaty.").
227 See George Archibald, White House Defends U-Turn on Global Warming, Wash.
Times, June 4, 2002, at A9 (remarking also that "[s]cientists and others normally friendly to
Bush administration policies" emerged to attack EPA's scientific data).
228 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2332-33.
229 Id. at 2376-77.
230 Id. at 2377.
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the President or his close White House aides."' 231 Such boilerplate
seems particularly likely if an administrative record suffices to verify
presidential involvement rather than a freestanding, authoritative doc-
ument emanating from the President himself. Although Kagan is
quick to reject such boilerplate, she shies away from preventing it.232
The reason, as discussed below, must be her concern for the effect on
the President. What Kagan carefully avoids is obligating the President
to exercise truly formal control of administrative decisionmaking as a
precondition of Chevron deference, because doing so would make the
cure for presidential secrecy worse than the disease. 233
3. Presidential Leeway as an Objection
Imposing on the President an obligation to discipline administra-
tive discretion through official, independent means would divert his
energy from "the things that only [he] can legitimately undertake in a
modern democracy: ... making (a very few) particular decisions of
high visibility that genuinely require the exercise of statesmanship and
practical wisdom. ' 234 Kagan concedes that "no President (or his exec-
utive office staff) could, and presumably none would wish to, super-
vise [all, or even all important] regulatory activity. ' 235 But even her
purportedly limited proposal to take presidential control up a notch
demands too much. If the President declines to take a formal role, he
does so on penalty of public disapprobation as a result of the very
visibility he has cultivated,236 as well as judicial disrespect for his ad-
ministration's actions. Yet if the President agrees to assume responsi-
bility in ways that bespeak "ownership" of administration, 237 he would
231 Id. at 2377 n.507.
232 Id. (
I doubt that this result would follow, given the substantial risks that the Presi-
dent would incur from essentially signing a blank check made out to the agen-
cies; I also doubt that courts would prove unable to distinguish between these
boilerplate statements and indicia of concrete policy guidance. And to the ex-
tent I am wrong, the worst that would happen is that the Chevron deference
regime would operate largely as it does now, with a few sentences (concerning
White House involvement) appended to each regulation and corresponding
judicial opinion).
233 Id. at 2377 ("Conditioning deference in this way at once would induce disclosure of
any presidential role in administration and encourage expansion of this role to so far ne-
glected areas of regulation.").
234 Ackerman, supra note 192, at 692; cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Ex-
ecutive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 996 (1992) (arguing that "Presidential oversight has
inherent limitations").
235 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2250.
236 See Fitts, supra note 3, at 835-36 (arguing that President's visibility is vice as well as
virtue in terms of legitimating his actions in public eye).
237 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2250.
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find himself consumed by the process or simply rubber-stamping di-
rectives drafted by an ever-expanding staff (or perhaps another layer
of bureaucracy).2 38 The reality is that the President needs leeway to
run modern government that precludes the imposition of a formal
control obligation-even the form that Kagan advocates.
This observation is a matter of common sense with respect to the
other potential source of political control: Congress. Congress needs
leeway to write broad regulatory statutes. It may possess the will to
enact broadly responsive regulatory programs but lack the technical
judgment or factual information to micromanage regulatory policy. It
may lack the votes to support specific provisions. It simply may lack
the time, given the vast demands of modern government. Of course, it
also may have more suspect reasons-for example, to preserve room
for private interests to dominate the administrative process. But we
have come to recognize through a combination of respect and resigna-
tion that it is impossible to distinguish the permissible motives from
the impermissible ones. Most delegations reflect both. Members of
Congress may lack the competence or the votes or the time to decide
a complex regulatory matter as well as the discipline to follow the
public interest rather than the selfish interests of its members. If we
are to have effective modern government or any modern government
at all, we cannot permit the degree of delegation to turn on the issue
of legislative motive. 239
The same sorts of arguments apply to the President and undercut
Kagan's strategy to make presidential control effective against arbi-
trariness. The President needs leeway to issue broad directives or
none at all. He also may lack the technical judgment and factual in-
formation to micromanage regulatory policy. In any event, he cannot
possibly attend to every problem that every regulatory statute ad-
dresses or even the subset for which an agency might seek to claim
Chevron deference-at least not without losing the government for
the regulation. Although the President has the responsibility for coor-
dinating specific regulatory policy with broader governmental priori-
ties, he should not have the responsibility for dictating the details of
such regulatory policy.
238 See Farina, supra note 113, at 185 ("It seems to me that it is unrealistic to think that
the President can supervise the entire regulatory enterprise in any comprehensive and
meaningful way.").
239 This does not mean that we have to tolerate all broad delegations. In some cases, the
nature of the delegation might increase the potential for abuse of discretion to such an
intolerable level that it merits invalidation-for example, delegation directly to the Presi-
dent. See infra text accompanying notes 290-298 (discussing invalidation of delegations to
President under nondelegation doctrine). But the reason for invalidation does not neces-
sarily concern congressional motives.
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Releasing the President from such responsibility avoids a conten-
tious issue that Kagan necessarily enjoins: whether the President pos-
sesses the authority to dictate specific regulatory policy as he chooses.
There is disagreement among scholars whether the President may is-
sue official directives even to executive branch agency heads, and no
court has resolved the precise issue. 240 The Supreme Court has indi-
cated, however, that reviewing courts might consider presidential ap-
proval of executive branch agency policies in their Chevron analyses
of those policies. 241 The Court stated that courts should defer to rea-
sonable administrative statutory interpretations that "rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy. ' ' 242 It may be that
reliance on the President's view-especially when that view is ex-
pressed in a transparent and authoritative format-is an additional
reason to accord deference to a well-considered administrative deci-
sion. Direction from the people, in the person of the President, is a
positive factor when it contributes to a rational administrative deci-
sion.243 At the same time, it may be that reliance on a presidential
directive is neither necessary nor sufficient.244
Furthermore, it may be that reliance on a presidential directive is
not beneficial with respect to all agency decisions. Consider, in partic-
ular, independent agency decisions. One reason that Congress creates
independent agencies is to insulate their decisions from unfettered
presidential politics. Congress has done this with less and less fre-
quency, suggesting that it does so only when necessary.2 45 One might
think that administrative law ought to respect such congressional de-
terminations rather than trying to defeat them-for example, by deny-
ing Chevron deference to independent agency regulations as Kagan
suggests. 246 Perhaps administrative law would be justified in attempt-
ing to neutralize the authority of independent agencies if the Constitu-
240 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2250 & n.8 (noting scholarly debate and lack of court
resolution).
241 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
242 Id. at 865.
243 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (observing that presi-
dential involvement in choosing policy supported by rulemaking record is permissible and
beneficial).
244 Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legit-
imacy in the Administrative State, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 17, 22 (2001) (noting that presiden-
tial direction alone is insufficient to authorize administrative action unless that action is
"rationalized in terms of relevant statutory criteria and social, economic, or scientific facts
spread upon the rulemaking record").
245 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988) (insulating independent counsel
from plenary presidential removal authority to preserve counsel's impartiality and
integrity).
246 Kagan, supra note 25, at 2376-77.
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tion requires such a result-that is, if the Constitution forbids the
creation of independent agencies. But Kagan herself denies that it
does.24
7
These criticisms show that Kagan's strategy asks too much of the
President-perhaps more than he legitimately possesses. But her
strategy also asks too little. Her modified Chevron approach prods
the President to supply official control when an agency acts to fill a
statutory gap, but it does not require the President to supply such con-
trol when an agency declines to do so. That is, it does not instruct the
President to assume comprehensive control of the administrative state
by directing agencies to regulate in ways that prevent them or Con-
gress from diverting administrative policy away from the public inter-
est. As a mechanism for controlling administrative discretion, it is
sporadic at best. Of course, it must be spotty to avoid obliterating
presidential prerogatives entirely. That observation only confirms its
inadequacy as well as its impracticality for addressing, in full, the ad-
ministrative legitimacy problem. If the presidential control model
cannot offer comprehensiveness, it must rely on the existence of other
control mechanisms to legitimate the administrative state. Professor
Kagan does not assert otherwise. 248 But then the presidential control
model is only as good as the other models that serve alongside of it.
The presidential control model, even where feasible, does not dampen
the quest for other legitimating models.
To summarize, we might have serious concerns about a model of
the administrative state that obligates the President to issue official
directives for controlling agency discretion. Such a model might solve
some instances of faction and government self-interest that broad
delegations to administrative agencies facilitate, but it does so at a
great price to democracy. In any event, the model simply is not
enough. Even if presidential control, exercised responsibly, offered
some protection from the forces that corrupt agency decisionmaking,
this amount falls short of what legitimacy demands. Thus, efforts to
247 Id. at 2250. Kagan does maintain that presidential control is necessary to improve
the accountability rather than the constitutionality of independent agency decisionmaking.
Id. at 2331-39. This argument misses the point. In creating independent agencies, Con-
gress implicitly has determined that presidential control would increase the risk of arbi-
trary administrative decisionmaking. Cf. Strauss, supra note 120, at 650-53 (arguing that
Constitution requires preservation of rough parity between Congress and President to con-
trol administrative action, and thus forbids Congress from retaining control of agencies
while preventing President from doing same). Kagan has failed to demonstrate why courts
applying Chevron should disregard this congressional determination.
248 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2250 ("And of course, presidential control [has] co-
existed and competed with other forms of influence and control over administration, ex-
erted by other actors within and outside the government.").
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straddle accountability and arbitrariness from within the presidential
control model cannot entirely succeed. A model fixated on accounta-
bility cannot adequately address the concerns for arbitrariness neces-
sary for a truly legitimate administrative state.
III
BACK TO THE FUTURE: REFOCUSING ON ARBITRARINESS
TO RESOLVE THE PERENNIAL PUZZLES AND
POINT THE WAY AHEAD
The question is where to go from here. We could take refuge in
accountability, as we have done for the last thirty-plus years. If Ka-
gan's intuition is right, that approach no longer suffices. We already
have come some distance beyond the view that majoritarianism alone
can legitimate the administrative state. We now recognize, at least
implicitly, that we must address the concern for arbitrary administra-
tive decisionmaking at the level of high theory, not just workaday doc-
trine. Moreover, we cannot address that concern exclusively through
political control-not through presidential control, any more than
through congressional control. We have no choice but to seek a better
balance.
This turns out to be quite a good thing. When we look for a more
balanced approach, something interesting happens, as we might ex-
pect if we are in fact making progress toward reconciling the constitu-
tional structure and the administrative state. Sure enough, we see that
some of the conventional puzzles in administrative law (both constitu-
tional and ordinary) start to dissolve.
For example, we can begin to understand the constitutional doc-
trine concerning delegation. We can perceive why the Supreme Court
both takes pains to maintain the nondelegation doctrine and refuses
to enforce it. We also can appreciate why the Court strikes down cer-
tain legislative efforts to control administrative action, seeing the in-
validation of such devices as the legislative veto as more than silly
formalism. A majoritarian model does not explain this kind of judicial
activism.
Moreover, we can begin to make sense of the whole idea of
agency-supplied standards as integral to the legitimacy of the adminis-
trative state. Davis, Friendly, and Leventhal began talking about it in
the 1960s.249 Now sitting judges on the "administrative law circuit"
have begun to talk about it, too, and even to reincorporate it in the
law. Yet, more than ever, scholars have trouble comprehending the
notion of administrative standards because such standards do not fit
249 See supra note 19.
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nicely within the majoritarian model. And the Supreme Court, as al-
ready noted, has rejected the idea that constitutional law mandates
administrative standards-although it left open the possibility that ad-
ministrative law does.250 Once we step outside the majoritarian para-
digm, we can grasp the importance of administrative standards, and
begin to integrate ordinary and constitutional administrative law.
In addition, we can start to see a transition to a future, prescrip-
tive model of the administrative state. Although its precise contours
are uncertain, one element is clear. It will require a significant change
to the (ordinary) administrative law principle concerning the choice of
procedures. Since the watershed decision of SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery 1/)251 in 1947, the Court has allowed agencies virtually un-
limited discretion to choose their procedures for making general pol-
icy. This "choice of procedures" rule has met little objection. Who
could be against affording agencies the flexibility to avoid burden-
some procedures when they determine that others might serve more
effectively? We now can see such unlimited administrative flexibility,
like other forms of unlimited administrative discretion, as an impedi-
ment to administrative legitimacy. We can also begin to understand
the Court's recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,252 which
restricted choice of procedures in an important way. But we can see
that Mead ultimately falls short of what legitimacy demands.
Section A discusses "constitutional" administrative law princi-
ples, first those that pertain to congressional control of administrative
action and then those that pertain to presidential control of agency
action. Section B considers "ordinary" administrative law principles,
first those involving administrative standards and then those involving
choice of procedures.
A. "Constitutional" Administrative Law Principles
From a majoritarian perspective, the constitutional law principles
concerning delegation seem exactly backwards. Those principles do
not maximize majority rule but thwart it. This Section shows that
these principles are just right if the concern is not increasing accounta-
bility but decreasing arbitrariness.
1. The Nondelegation Doctrine I
The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating
authority to administrative agencies in the absence of an "intelligible
250 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
251 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
252 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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principle" guiding and limiting the exercise of that authority and facil-
itating judicial review. 253 It demands, in theory, congressional control
of administrative decisionmaking. Furthermore, the Court recently
has said that administrative self-control will not suffice. In Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns,254 the Court rejected an effort of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to obtain agency-supplied standards for del-
egation of power in the absence of congressional standards.25 5 The
Court stated that agencies lack the power to furnish the intelligible
principle that would render their delegated lawmaking authority con-
stitutional. 256 Without a congressional intelligible principle to render
valid their delegated authority, agencies simply possess no power
whatsoever. 257
But the nondelegation doctrine, as applied, has never lived up to
its potential. The Court consistently has approved as "intelligible
principles" legislative provisions that do not adequately confine ad-
ministrative authority by making the basic choices of policy.258 In
many cases, the supposed congressional principles make virtually no
choices at all. Nor did the Court require more in American Trucking.
Even though it went out of its way in that case to reaffirm the intelligi-
ble principle requirement, the Court bent over backwards to find an
intelligible principle in the most anemic statutory language.259 With
the exception of two cases decided in 1935, the Court has not enforced
the nondelegation doctrine to require congressional intelligible princi-
ples that meaningfully guide and limit administrative discretion. 260 As
others too numerous to mention have noted, the "nondelegation"
doctrine is a misnomer. The doctrine validates rather than prohibits
or polices broad delegations to agencies.
The question is how to make sense of a doctrine that the Court
takes pains to maintain in pristine form261 and yet makes no effort to
253 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (articulating
"intelligible principle" requirement).
254 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
255 Id. at 473.
256 Id.
257 See id.
258 See Bressman, supra note 99, at 455.
259 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 473 (approving as intelligible principle phrase "requi-
site to protect the public health").
260 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935): Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1403-
06 (2000).
261 At least what has been pristine form since 1928, when the Supreme Court first an-
nounced that the nondelegation doctrine does not ban delegation, as its name suggests, but
merely requires an "intelligible principle" guiding administrative discretion. See J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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apply in any form. One answer is that the Court has found itself
caught between the practical necessity of delegation and the strict
logic of constitutional analysis. The Court feels bound to acknowl-
edge that Congress needs leeway to enact broad statutes in order to
establish modern government. Yet it is unwilling to admit that agen-
cies have power to self-validate their own authority under those stat-
utes, for to do so would defy reason. This explanation, while close to
the one the Court gives, is not flattering. It depicts the Court as waf-
fling uncomfortably between pragmatic and formal analysis. Moreo-
ver, it suggests that the Court lacks any theory of why delegation
presents a constitutional problem or how to address that problem.
Be that as it may, the focus on arbitrariness suggests another ex-
planation. The Court honors the nondelegation doctrine in the breach
for a purpose: to excuse Congress from any obligation to provide
meaningful standards while continuing to emphasize the need for such
constraints on administrative discretion. Although the Court, on this
understanding, intends to grant Congress the necessary leeway to en-
act broad delegations, it still aspires to record a concern for such dele-
gations. Of course, that would seem to leave agencies as the best
candidates to address the concern. Why, on this view, would the
Court refuse to ask agencies for meaningful standards? It would not.
It might, however, refuse to ask agencies for the requisite standards
under "constitutional" administrative law. It might do so because re-
viewing courts could ask agencies for such standards under "ordinary"
administrative law-for example, as part of the reasoned explanation
agencies must provide in support of their decisions. 262
The Court's approach to the nondelegation doctrine can be made
comprehensible when viewed in terms of arbitrariness rather than just
accountability, and as continuous with "ordinary" administrative law
rather than confined to "constitutional" administrative law: A case
like American Trucking recognizes the importance of meaningful stan-
dards to legitimate administrative action and the limits of congres-
sional control and "constitutional" administrative law toward that
end. It maintains the concern for standardless delegation as part of
congressional consideration and "constitutional" administrative law,
but redirects the solution to agency consideration and "ordinary" ad-
ministrative law. It indicates how ordinary administrative law might
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
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serve to improve the legitimacy, as well as the quality, of administra-
tive decisionmaking.263
2. The Legislative Veto and the Comptroller General
In INS v. Chadha,2 64 the Court invalidated a statute authorizing
one House of Congress, by resolution, to veto executive branch deci-
sions ordering the deportation of particular individuals from the coun-
try.265 The Court held that the "legislative veto" violated the
constitutional lawmaking requirements of bicameralism and present-
ment:2 66 When Congress makes "law," it must do so through the con-
stitutionally prescribed channels of bicameralism and presentment
rather than through a single house resolution.
Scholars have come to describe the Court's holding in Chadha as
constitutionally prohibiting Congress from reclaiming power once it
has delegated that power to an executive branch agency. Opponents
of the decision applaud the legislative veto as allowing Congress to
correct the excessive concentration of power in the executive branch
created by broad delegation. 267 Proponents condemn the legislative
veto as allowing Congress to replace presidential control with its own
brand of control. 268 Once Congress relinquishes power, the President
assumes it. Congressional repossession amounts to congressional
263 For reasons why the Court sensibly might have made this shift from constitutional
administrative law to ordinary administrative law, see Bressman, supra note 99, at 455-69.
Unlike constitutional law, administrative law contains a well-established framework for
obtaining administrative standards. See id. at 466-69. In addition, it does not require revi-
sion of constitutional doctrine or impugn the validity of congressional acts, but only affects
the validity of administrative action. See id. at 459-66.
264 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
265 Id. at 925, 928.
266 Id. at 956-58.
267 See E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Consti-
tution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 134-38 (arguing that legislative
veto did not constitute forbidden grant of legislative power); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 179, at 540-43 (arguing that legislative veto restores balance of power between Con-
gress and President implicit in requirements of bicameralism and presentment); Greene,
supra note 3, at 187-95 (contending that legislative veto is necessary to restore checks and
balances given overall increase in presidential power); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Pre-
cedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the
Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 30-40 (1994) (defending legislative veto); Strauss, supra
note 120, at 651 (noting that legislative veto is most legitimate when exercised "in those
cases in which the initiative subject to the possibility of veto is actually the President's"
because "[tihe President's involvement assures parity" with Congress); see also Chadha,
462 U.S. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative veto "is a necessary check
on the unavoidably expanding power of the agencies, both Executive and independent, as
they engage in exercising authority delegated by Congress").
268 See Calabresi, supra note 146, at 73-74.
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usurpation of executive authority-simply put, congressional
aggrandizement.
There is another way to understand the result in the case that
better identifies the crux of the problem. The concern raised by the
legislative veto is not who should exercise control but how such con-
trol should be exercised. The legislative veto allows Congress to as-
sert a passive-aggressive form of control. A legislative veto may be
exercised without public hearing, report, or statement of reasons, and
may be passed without recorded vote.269 Thus, it clearly does not
have the qualities of the administrative action it reverses-such as
participation, transparency, and rationality. Furthermore, it does not
even have the benefits of concerted action that the Constitution typi-
cally demands for legislative action, which mutes the influence of pri-
vate groups,2 70 moderates the production of improvident law,27' and
ensures that whatever law is produced at least receives the assent of
both accountable branches, or a supermajority of one.272 In Chadha
itself, the veto had the additional vice of determining individual rights
without procedural safeguards and without binding more than the
party to the ruling. 273 Thus, it furnished no basis on which to assess
fair application in a particular case or promote predictable and consis-
tent application in future cases-that is, to prevent arbitrariness.
Evaluating the legislative veto in terms of arbitrariness accounts
for the Court's reliance on the lawmaking requirements of bicamera-
lism and presentment to invalidate it. It may be that the Court in-
voked those requirements not to engage in a formal analysis but to
demonstrate a practical problem with the process that Congress had
chosen to control administrative discretion. The Court effectively told
Congress that when it wants to control administrative discretion, it
must do so through channels that require concerted effort in order to
promote deliberation and moderation, and that produce decisions ac-
cessible to public view. Such a requirement was particularly impor-
269 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926-27.
270 Cf. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 178, at 1372-81 (suggesting various problems with
legislative veto, including diminishing procedural checks on Congress); Pierce & Shapiro,
supra note 178, at 1207-09 (describing potential for legislative veto to facilitate private
interests); Pierce, supra note 146, at 1248-50 (arguing that legislative veto makes more
likely potential for factionalism at congressional level by removing safeguards of bicamera-
lism and presentment).
271 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 179, at 528-33 (arguing that requirements of
bicameralism and presentment reduces production of hasty or unwise law).
272 See Farina, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 10-18 (arguing that re-
quirements of bicameralism and presentment ensures high degree of political support for
any law enacted).
273 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964-66 (Powell, J., concurring); Farber & Frickey, supra note
150, at 130; Brown, supra note 163, at 1546-47.
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tant in the context of Chadha itself-involving a legislative veto of an
administrative adjudication-because of individual fairness concerns.
But formal procedural requirements also are apt in cases involving
legislative vetoes of administrative rules. A legislative veto of an ad-
ministrative rule neither provides the accountability of a statute re-
pealing the rule nor the participation, transparency, and rationality of
a new rule rescinding the old one.
A similar concern for the manner in which Congress asserts con-
trol of executive functions can be understood to account for the
Court's holding in Bowsher v. Synar.a 74 In that case, the Court invali-
dated a provision in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 275 that permit-
ted Congress to exercise another form of potentially arbitrary control.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act vested the Comptroller General
with responsibility for reporting to the President the specific programs
to receive "automatic" spending reductions, based on an independent
analysis of a report jointly prepared by OMB and the Congressional
Budget Office.276 The Act also authorized Congress, by joint resolu-
tion, to remove the Comptroller General for certain specified
causes.277 The Court held that "[b]y placing the responsibility for exe-
cution of the [Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act] in the hands of an of-
ficer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has
retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into
the executive function. '278
Unlike Chadha, Bowsher addressed directly the question whether
the assertion of power over the Comptroller General constitutes con-
gressional aggrandizement and executive invasion. The problem was
not repossession of executive authority (through a one-house veto)
but original assertion of executive authority (through a congressional
agent). The difference was of no consequence because the result was
precisely the same (congressional, rather than presidential, control of
executive discretion).2 79
While this characterization describes the technical constitutional
issue, it does not explain the actual constitutional danger. The prob-
lem with the removal provision was not so much that it increased con-
gressional power at presidential expense, but that it increased
274 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
275 Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
276 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 718.
277 Id. at 720.
278 Id. at 734.
279 Id. at 726 ("To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws would
be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto.").
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congressional power over the official with "ultimate authority" 280 to
make spending cuts-at public expense. The removal provision en-
hanced the ability of Congress to pressure the Comptroller General,
its own agent, from cutting spending programs important to its most
prized constituents. That the removal provision worked in this way is
not obvious. It required a joint resolution, which in turn requires
presidential signature or passage, by two-thirds majority, over a presi-
dential veto-the same amount of political capital required for ordi-
nary legislation, such as a statute cutting the Comptroller General's
budget or abolishing its office.28 ' Thus, the removal provision did not
seem to give Congress any power to influence the Comptroller Gen-
eral that it did not already have through the legislative process.
But this analysis cannot explain why Congress wanted the re-
moval power. Congress sought the removal power because it believed
that threat of removal was particularly effective in influencing the
Comptroller General.282 Perhaps it presumed that the Comptroller
General would take the threat of removal more personally than the
threat of other forms of action, which might be attributed to any num-
ber of generic causes. Perhaps it thought that the Comptroller Gen-
eral would take the threat of removal more seriously than the threat
of ordinary legislation-such as the threat of a statute restoring aid to
a particular program or a statute cutting its budget. To be sure, Con-
gress could not easily enact such statutes. Restoring aid to a particular
program might be seen as blatant interest group favoring legislation,
which might cause the coalition supporting it to break down. Cutting
the Comptroller General's budget or authority might be seen as en-
dorsement of deficit spending and therefore equally unlikely to main-
tain the necessary political backing. But Congress could fire the
Comptroller General because it could blame the termination on poor
job performance-that is, failure properly to cut pork spending.28 3
Thus, the problem with the Act was that it offered Congress a particu-
larly credible tool for pressuring the Comptroller General to keep cer-
tain programs off the list.
280 Id. at 733.
281 Id. at 767-68 (White, J., dissenting).
282 See id. at 728-29 (noting importance to various members of enacting Congress that
through removal, it could control Comptroller's "destiny in office").
283 Historically, Congress had never even tried to fire a Comptroller General. See id. at
773 (White, J., dissenting). This historical fact was irrelevant to the Court on the issue of
whether the removal provision interfered with executive functions as a constitutional mat-
ter. Id. at 730. It might reinforce my analysis. The fact that Congress never tried to fire
the Comptroller General might show that the mere threat of removal was sufficient to
achieve desired results.
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Chadha and Bowsher can be understood either to depict a con-
gressional struggle for executive power or a congressional grab for ad
hoc power. The advantage of the latter construction is that it rational-
izes the Court's invocation of the lawmaking requirements of bicamer-
alism plus presentment. The manner in which Congress exerted
itself-through a one-house veto and through its own agent-can be
seen as increasing the potential for private lawmaking of the type that
the constitutional structure seeks to avoid.
3. The Nondelegation Doctrine H
Several cases involving limits on presidential control of adminis-
trative discretion also are consistent with the goal of preventing arbi-
trary administrative decisionmaking. In fact, they are difficult to
explain otherwise. The cases fall into two groups. A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States284 and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 285
concern restrictions on the President's ability to exercise administra-
tive authority. Clinton v. City of New York 286 concerns a restriction
on the President's ability to control the authority exercised by
agencies.
Each of these cases is different from the case concerning limita-
tions on presidential control that comes most readily to mind-
Humphrey's Executor v. United States 2 87-which concerned the limita-
tion on presidential removal authority that created independent agen-
cies. Humphrey's Executor did not involve limits that the Court itself
imposed. Rather, it involved restrictions that Congress imposed and
the Court merely upheld-namely, a "for cause" statutory restriction
on presidential removal of the agency head. In the cases at issue here,
the Court itself imposed the restrictions on presidential control. In
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, the Court prevented the
President from assuming lawmaking authority himself under the
nondelegation doctrine.28 8 In Clinton, it blocked the President from
asserting line-item veto power over agency decisions under the re-
quirements of bicameralism and presentment. 28 9 These were cases in
which Congress wanted to hand the President certain authority, and
the Court disapproved.
284 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
285 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
286 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
287 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
288 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 551 (invalidating under nondelegation doctrine
statutory provision that delegated to President authority to promulgate regulations stabiliz-
ing economy); Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 433 (same).
289 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438-39.
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It is this countermajoritarian aspect of the cases that is difficult to
explain. The question is why the Court should forbid the President,
an elected official, from receiving as much authority as Congress in-
tends to grant. Similarly, the question is why the Court should bar the
President from exercising control of agencies when Congress encour-
ages such control. An understanding based on arbitrariness provides
an answer. It explains these cases as preventing the President from
asserting control over administrative discretion under circumstances
or in ways that create a particularly intolerable risk of arbitrariness.
Consider first Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining. These
cases are the only ones in which the Court ever has invalidated stat-
utes under the nondelegation doctrine. 2901 In Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining, Congress delegated authority directly to the Presi-
dent rather than to an administrative agency. 291 These were not the
first or last cases in which Congress delegated authority to the Presi-
dent, however. But in each of those other cases-from The Cargo of
the Brig Aurora v. United States,292 decided in 1813, to Loving v.
United States,293 decided in 1996-Congress had delegated a narrower
slice of authority to the President.294 None of the cases involved, as
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining did, the sweeping power to
regulate virtually the entire economy. 295
Under the presidential control model, the breadth of the dele-
gated power in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining-however ex-
traordinary-would not impugn the legitimacy of that power. 296 The
President routinely deals with matters national in scope. There is no
290 See Bressman, supra note 260, at 1404-05 (noting that Supreme Court, while enter-
taining nondelegation challenges since it decided Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining,
has never applied nondelegation doctrine to invalidate piece of legislation).
291 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521-23; Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 433.
292 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383-84, 388 (1813) (upholding delegation to President to
suspend embargo on trade with France and Britain if he determined that those nations
"cease[d] to violate the neutral commerce of the United States").
293 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996) (upholding delegation to President to define "aggravating
factors" that permit imposition of' death penalty in court martial).
294 See also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401,410-11 (1928)
(upholding delegation to President to adjust tariffs when they failed to "equalize ... differ-
ences in costs of production"); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (upholding delega-
tion to President to suspend favorable tariff treatment for nations that imposed on
American products any "exactions and duties ... which he found to be ... unequal and
unreasonable").
295 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of the Law in the American Administrative State, II
Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 9, 22-23 (1992) (arguing that problem in Schechter, unlike other cases,
was that delegation was both directly to President and so sweeping, because such delega-
tion concentrates dangerous amount of power in President); Strauss, supra note 3, 981-82
(noting that early delegations to President were narrow in scope and involved matters,
such as foreign relations, particularly appropriate to executive discretion).
296 See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2365-67.
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fear that he, unlike specialized agencies, will be out of his area of com-
petence in regulating the national economy. Furthermore, there is a
hope that he will be particularly well suited to regulate the national
economy because he, unlike Congress, is responsive to a national
constituency.
But the Court regarded the President as part of the problem, not
the solution, in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining. Consider as a
reason that the President's involvement created particularly intolera-
ble opportunities for arbitrariness, given the extraordinary breadth of
the delegations. Perhaps the grant of authority directly to the Presi-
dent made the opportunities for regulatory policy to favor private in-
terest groups particularly easy, and the scope of that authority made
the impact of those opportunities particularly menacing. No agency
or administrative process stood between the President and private
groups, as some sort of mediating influence. 297 Indeed, the President
used his authority as a direct pipeline to industry groups, simply rub-
ber-stamping agricultural codes that those groups proposed. 298
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining thus can be understood
to invalidate delegations that increase the possibility of arbitrary ac-
tion to unacceptable levels. Unless understood in this fashion, the
cases seem exactly backwards. They single out for invalidation dele-
gations that are more-not less-appropriate than other delegations
that the Court has upheld. They are more appropriate because they
are aimed directly at the President, who is more responsive to the peo-
ple than Congress or the agencies.
4. The Line-Item Veto
The other case in which the Court imposed its own limits on pres-
idential control is Clinton v. City of New York. 299 In that case, the
Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, 3°° which authorized the
297 Cf. Farina, The Consent of the Governed, supra note 3, at 999-1002 (viewing execu-
tive branch as multifarious, rather than unitary, and thus less likely to provide system of
constraints over lawmaking); Strauss, supra note 295, at 984 (arguing that presidential own-
ership of rulemaking eliminates "multi-voiced framework" of government that includes
agency itself).
298 Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935)
(predicting this result). Professor Kagan suggests that the problem in Schechter Poultry
and Panama Refining was lack of judicial review, which the statutes did not authorize. See
Kagan, supra note 25, at 2368-69. This diagnosis does not undermine my reading of the
cases but rather confirms it. If lack of judicial review was the problem, it was because
judicial review is a means to prevent the President from discharging his delegated authority
in an arbitrary fashion. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the effects (either
good or bad) of judicial review on such presidential authority.
299 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
300 Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
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President to "cancel" certain items of spending in certain bills. 30 I The
Court reasoned that the line-item veto, like the legislative veto, vio-
lated the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.30 2
Clinton has supporters and detractors. Some embrace the deci-
sion as a backdoor nondelegation doctrine. The line-item veto, they
say, enables Congress to claim credit with its backers for funding their
programs while deflecting responsibility and blame for all uncorrected
excessive spending to the President.3 03 The decision invalidating the
line-item veto prevents Congress from engaging in this conduct.
Critics of the decision view it as diminishing presidential control
of spending decisions. 30 4 Regardless of what the line-item veto allows
Congress to do, it grants the President a specific tool for counteracting
improvident funding. The decision invalidating the line-item veto is
not only as formalistic as the decision in Chadha, which invalidated
the legislative veto, but less defensible because it struck down a provi-
sion that directed increased power to the President rather than back
to Congress.30 5 Clinton did not rectify a case of congressional usurpa-
tion of an executive function. Rather, it struck down a provision that,
by affording the President a mechanism to control federal spending,
enhanced presidential control of an executive function.306
Again, however, the case is better explained from an arbitrariness
perspective. In important respects, the line-item veto can be under-
301 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-38.
302 Id. at 438-39.
303 See Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto
Act, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1605, 1629-31 (1997) (arguing that line-item veto enables
Congress to authorize spending that benefits powerful constituents, while blaming Presi-
dent for failure to cut such spending); Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto
Law, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1659, 1660-65 (1997) (assuming that line-item veto permits
Congress to avoid responsibility for pork spending and to shift either responsibility or
blame for such spending to President, and arguing that it thereby violates nondelegation
doctrine); see also Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for
Clinton v. City of New York, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 265, 366-67 (2001) (arguing line-item veto
violates "formalist nondelegation doctrine" because it permits President to make basic pol-
icy decisions about which programs receive funding); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public
Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385 (1992) (describing public
choice arguments in favor of line-item veto and ultimately rejecting them).
304 Cf. Aranson et al., supra note 157, at 41 (questioning view that line-item veto inhibits
private benefits); Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 Va.
L. Rev. 403, 410-12 (1988) (same).
305 See Devins, supra note 303, at 1623-25; Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Re-
straint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 871,
882-84 (1999).
306 Nor did the line-item veto create an excessive concentration of presidential power
because Congress retained the power to specify that particular projects cannot be can-
celled. See Garrett, supra note 305, at 884-85.
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stood as combining features of both the legislative veto invalidated in
Chadha and the removal provision invalidated in Bowsher. Like the
legislative veto, it permitted the President to act without a process
designed to produce deliberative policymaking and prevent arbitrary
policymaking, or at least to ensure the consent of the two accountable
branches or a supermajority of one. Like the removal provision, it
allowed the President to influence spending decisions in ways that
tended to please private interests at public expense. Moreover, it al-
lowed the President to do so even more directly than the removal pro-
vision in Bowsher allowed Congress to do. The President did not have
to pressure an agency head through threat of removal but instead
could exercise his line-item veto to cut funding for programs sup-
ported by politically powerless groups or disfavored by politically
powerful ones. By so doing, he could claim credit with voters for re-
ducing pork without making cuts that affect his base of private
support.
Once the line-item veto is understood as conferring on the Presi-
dent the type of policymaking authority that invites arbitrary determi-
nations, the decision is consistent with Chadha and Bowsher. The
Court again relies on bicameralism and presentment to identify a
problem with the process by which political officials seek to control
administrative decisionmaking. It shows that the President is just as
capable as Congress of possessing and exercising an improper method
of control. Thus, it suggests, the fact that the line-item veto enhanced
presidential control rather than diminished such control is not as de-
terminative as it might have seemed in Chadha or Bowsher. In all
three cases, the potential for arbitrariness determined the result.
B. "Ordinary" Administrative Law Principles
If constitutional law doctrine can be explained as prohibiting
majoritarian control over administrative action when such control cre-
ates an undue risk of arbitrariness, we might expect administrative law
doctrine to do no less. After all, the test for "arbitrary and capricious"
administrative action comes from the APA itself.30 7 Yet even a cur-
sory glance at administrative law doctrine over the last thirty years
reveals much the opposite. Recent administrative law developments
tend to reinforce majoritarian control rather than restrict it. Indeed,
many such developments have been the building blocks of the
majoritarian models. The first wave of changes opened the adminis-
trative process to all affected interests, consistent with the develop-
307 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (prescribing arbitrary and
capricious standard of judicial review).
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ment of the interest group representation model. 30 8 The second wave
of changes strengthened presidential control over administrative deci-
sionmaking, consistent with the advent of the presidential control
model. Most significantly, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council30 9 held that agencies are entitled to judicial defer-
ence when interpreting ambiguous statutory terms in part because
they are subject to the President, who is accountable to the people.310
But there is one glaring exception to the evidently majoritarian
bent of contemporary administrative law doctrine: Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Corp.311 In that case, decided in 1983, the Court held that agencies
must articulate the basis for their policy decisions.312 Thus, the Court
endorsed the "reasoned decisionmaking" requirement or "hard look"
doctrine that had been percolating in the law since the 1940s. 313
Moreover, it applied the doctrine to remand a regulation containing a
policy that the President himself had directed.3 14 Simple majoritarian-
ism, particularly of the presidential variety, cannot make sense of this
result. Scholars, not surprisingly, have accused State Farm of granting
courts the power to micromanage agency decisions and ossify the no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking process. 315 But the case is not without
an alternative explanation-one that should be familiar by now. State
Farm, or more precisely the reasoned-decisionmaking requirement,
308 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (describing doctrinal changes that fa-
cilitated development of interest group representation model).
309 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
310 See id. at 864-66; Farina, supra note 54, at 499.
311 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
312 See id. at 43 (asking agency to "examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfac-
tory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made"' (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962))). If an agency fails to articulate such a basis for its policy decision, the requirement
directs the reviewing court to remand that policy decision to the agency for further deliber-
ation or explanation rather than upholding it. See id.
313 The reasoned-decisionmaking requirement calls on agencies, as a condition of judi-
cial validation of their policy decisions, to engage in the type of decisionmaking that tends
to produce rational decisions. By promoting rational decisions, the requirement inhibits
decisions that are poorly considered-for example, those that rest on a faulty chain of logic
or an incomplete assessment of the relevant considerations. See id. Moreover, the re-
quirement tends to inhibit decisions that are precisely calculated to advance private inter-
ests or agency objectives at public expense. Put differently, the requirement tends to
inhibit decisions that evince an impermissibly narrow purpose or fail to evince a properly
public purpose. An agency, confronting judicial scrutiny of its decisionmaking process and
judicial remand of its decisionmaking product, will hesitate to rely on a purpose that does
not demonstrably advance the broad public goals of the statute it implements. Thus, the
requirement involves agencies (with court assistance) in ensuring the deliberative and pub-
lic-regarding quality of their own decisionmaking.
314 Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
315 See supra note 109.
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can be understood as preventing arbitrariness. That does not mean
the reasoned-decisionmaking requirement must be understood as sub-
verting accountability. To the contrary, the requirement may promote
accountability by ensuring public participation in or oversight of the
administrative process. It may even coincide with political control of
the administrative process. Of course, as applied in State Farm, it did
not. The case thus contains an important lesson about the relationship
between administrative arbitrariness and political accountability. The
former may prevail over the latter when the two conflict.
This Section discusses two other principles, in some sense related
to State Farm, that reflect a similar lesson about the relationship be-
tween administrative arbitrariness and political accountability. Yet
these principles, unlike State Farm, are not a part of mainstream ad-
ministrative law. Indeed, one has garnered thin recognition and the
other flat rejection. This Section first addresses the requirement that
agencies supply the standards that guide and limit their discretion. It
then turns to the corollary requirement that agencies generally choose
certain procedures to supply such standards-in particular, notice-
and-comment rulemaking.
1. Administrative Standards
In the 1960s, Davis and Friendly described the problem of arbi-
trary administrative decisionmaking as the lack of standards control-
ling the exercise of administrative authority.316 At one level, the
problem coincided with a lack of political control; it occurred when
Congress failed to include meaningful standards in delegating stat-
316 See Davis, supra note 19, at 55 ("When legislative bodies delegate discretionary
power without meaningful standards, administrators should develop standards at the earli-
est feasible time, and then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their own dis-
cretion through principles and rules."); Friendly, supra note 19, at 5-6 ("A prime source of
justified dissatisfaction with the type of federal administrative action .. is the failure to
develop standards sufficiently definite to permit decisions to be fairly predictable and the
reasons for them to be understood."). For other significant articles from this period dis-
cussing the failure of agencies to articulate standards through rulemaking, see generally
Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571 (1970); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied
Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 Yale L.J. 729 (1961);
David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Ad-
ministrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the
Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 375 (1974). Jaffe is
notably missing from this list. Although Jaffe toiled alongside Davis and Friendly on issues
of administrative arbitrariness, he focused primarily on strengthening the role of judicial
review in policing agency decisionmaking. See Jaffe, supra note 19; see generally Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern Adminis-
trative Law Theory, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1159 (1997) (describing Professor Jaffe's efforts
to organize administrative law).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
May 2003]
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 529 2003
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
utes.3 17 But agencies perpetuated the problem at the administrative
level by failing to develop subsidiary standards in the course of regu-
lating. Failure to develop such standards created room for agencies to
succumb to private interests or their own ideological interests at pub-
lic expense. 318 It also decreased the predictability and consistency of
their decisions.319
Critically, the Davis/Friendly solution to the problem they identi-
fied was not increased political control of administrative discretion. It
was not to restore congressional control by, for example, asking Con-
gress to include standards in delegating statutes.320 Nor was it to in-
vite presidential control by, for example, asking the President to
dictate standards through policy directives. 32' Indeed, much of the
failure to set standards occurred in adjudication-the prevailing mode
of administrative decisionmaking at the time-and was off limits to
presidential intervention. 322 The solution was to implement adminis-
trative control. It was to require agencies to supply the standards
guiding and limiting their own discretion. 323
317 See Davis, supra note 19, at 48 ("What Congress says in some such statutes is, in
effect: 'We the Congress don't know what the problems are: find them and deal with
them.'"); Friendly, supra note 19, at 12 ("'Sometimes telling the agency to do what is in the
public interest is the practical equivalent of instructing it: "Here is the problem. Deal with
it.""' (quoting I Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.03, at 82 (1958))).
318 See Friendly, supra note 19, at 22 ("Lack of definite standards creates a void into
which attempts to influence are bound to rush .... ).
319 See id. at 19-20 (arguing that lack of standards enables agencies to treat similarly
situated parties differently and decreases beneficial reliance).
320 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 19, at 49 (noting that "[l]egislative clarification of objec-
tives may sometimes be undesirable"); Friendly, supra note 19, at 163-73 (expressing doubt
that Congress could-or should-specify missing standards).
321 See Friendly, supra note 19, at 150 (arguing that President should not set specific
administrative standards, though he may "inform[ ] the agency of his policy when the pol-
icy is a very general one, for which he desires the cooperation not only of the particular
agency but of all branches of Government").
322 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (2000) (prohibiting ex
parte contacts in adjudication); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative
Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1148-49 (2001)
(noting that Davis and Friendly wrote in response to prevalence of administrative
adjudication).
323 See Davis, supra note 19, at 55-57 (arguing that agencies should develop standards
through rulemaking to confine their own discretion as soon as feasible and as often as
possible); Friendly, supra note 19, at 19-26, 145 (arguing that agencies should develop stan-
dards in adjudication and should supplement adjudication with policy statements and
rulemaking for elaborating standards); see also Jaffe, supra note 19, at 49-51 (agreeing with
Friendly's basic observation that agencies should more often formulate standards than they
do, but noting that in circumstances "where the opposed forces are so powerful that Con-
gress cannot compose their quarrel, it is quixotic to expect an agency with little or no
political power to resolve it" and Congress therefore must set standards).
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For a brief period, this solution moved into the law. In the fa-
mous case of Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,324 Judge
Leventhal announced that reviewing courts should ask agencies to ar-
ticulate the standards that constrain their discretion and thereby legiti-
mate their authority under broad delegations.325 Other cases held
that due process requires agencies to supply standards governing their
discretion under certain circumstances. 326
Despite these cases, the Davis/Friendly solution never really ma-
terialized into a robust model of the administrative state.32 7 Perhaps it
was trumped by other developments in the law. Emerging at the same
time were the components of the interest group representation model
that increased hearing rights and facilitated other forms of participa-
tion in the administrative process.328 These principles, obviously re-
lated to the new majoritarianism, left the administrative standards
requirement, not so obviously related, stranded.329 The administrative
standards requirement still retained appeal particularly in connection
with due process, but it had limited vitality.330
With the passage of time, a more basic reason for the neglect or
subordination of the administrative standards requirement has
emerged. The administrative standards requirement just seems inco-
herent. It advances neither congressional nor presidential control of
administrative decisionmaking, at least not directly.33' Thus, it does
not materially improve the accountability of agencies. Agencies sim-
ply cannot improve their accountability through self-help.
324 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
325 Id. at 758-59 (Leventhal, J., for three-judge panel).
326 See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-36 (1974); Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964).
327 See Rodriguez, supra note 316, at 1159 (noting that era from 1940s through 1960s "is
somewhat neglected by modern accounts of administrative law"); cf. Frug, supra note 25, at
1283 (counting "judicial review model" among legitimating models of administrative state,
and attributing this model to Davis in part); Seidenfeld, supra note 39, at 91-94 (referring
to "'traditional' model" of administrative law, in place from 1940s to 1970s, which owed its
origins to legal process school).
328 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that Due Process Clause
requires hearings before termination of welfare benefits to allegedly ineligible recipients);
see supra Part I.B.
329 Cf. Bressman, supra note 260, at 1416-17 (noting that administrative standards re-
quirement does not bear clear connection to separation of powers rationale that underlies
traditional nondelegation doctrine).
330 See Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 771, 792-93 (1975) (arguing that Due Process Clause only requires agencies
to issue standards when allocating scarce governmental benefits).
331 Cf. Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn & Byse's Administrative Law 434-35 (9th ed.
1995) (noting that administrative standards may reduce costs of political monitoring);
Bressman, supra note 260, at 1423 (noting that administrative standards may enhance con-
gressional oversight).
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Recently, Judge Stephen Williams of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals tried to show why this majoritarian conception of administra-
tive self-regulation is wrong. Relying on Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
Judge Williams argued that "[i]f the agency develops determinate,
binding standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise the delegated
authority arbitrarily. ' 332 He argued that agency-generated standards,
coupled with judicial review, are enough to make constitutional the
delegated authority.333 He applied this rule in a case involving the
EPA, remanding to the agency a regulation for articulation of stan-
dards that would support it and render constitutional the statute au-
thorizing it. He thus recognized that agency-supplied standards, while
not addressed to majoritarian control, powerfully respond to adminis-
trative arbitrariness. 334
In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 335 the Supreme Court
rejected this effort. The Court found illogical the notion that agencies
possess the power to supply the standards that render their own statu-
tory power constitutional. 336 In some ways, the Court reaffirmed the
incoherence of administrative standards in a world that requires
majoritarian control of administrative decisionmaking-in particular,
a congressional "intelligible principle" to guide and limit administra-
tive discretion. But, as suggested earlier, the Court might be under-
stood, somewhat counterintuitively, as appreciating the relevance of
administrative standards. The Court stressed the need for an "intelli-
gible principle" and then approved one that was utterly meaning-
less. 337 It thus signaled a rule of law deficit that could only be made
up with administrative standards. Perhaps, then, the Court merely de-
clined to demand such standards under constitutional law, instead
leaving that work to administrative law.338
Even if this reading of the Court's analysis is wishful thinking, it is
time for administrative law to come to grips with the concept of ad-
332 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified in part
and reh'g en banc denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
333 Id.; see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C.
1971) (noting that administrative standards requirement "means that however broad the
discretion of the Executive at the outset, the standards once developed limit the latitude of
subsequent executive action").
334 Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038.
335 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
336 Id. at 473.
337 See id. at 472-73 (approving as intelligible principle phrase "requisite to protect pub-
lic health").
338 See id. at 476 ("It will remain for the Court of Appeals-on the remand that we
direct for other reasons-to dispose of any other preserved challenge to the NAAQS
under the judicial-review provisions contained in 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9).").
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ministrative standards. As Davis, Friendly, and the current judges on
the "administrative law circuit" have recognized, 339 such standards are
necessary to improve the rationality, fairness, and predictability-and
hence the legitimacy (although not, after American Trucking, the
technical constitutionality)-of administrative decisionmaking. Few
long for a return to the transmission belt model and the expectation
that Congress will make the basic choices of regulatory policy rather
than delegating those choices. 340 If that is the case, however, agencies
must assume responsibility for those choices. Otherwise, there is no
assurance that they will exercise their authority in a manner that re-
flects reasonableness rather than arbitrariness-as contemplated by a
case already very much a part of (ordinary) administrative law: State
Farm. Thus, agencies must supply the standards that discipline their
discretion under delegating statutes, and it does not matter for legiti-
macy purposes whether they do so under "ordinary" administrative
law or "constitutional" administrative law. Indeed, for a number of
reasons explored elsewhere, it may make great sense for agencies to
supply standards under "ordinary" administrative law.341 The result is
to elevate ordinary administrative law to quasi-constitutional status,
not to denigrate administrative standards to second-class status, as
some might mistakenly think.
2. Choice of Procedures
The idea of administrative standards as a constraint on agency
discretion is contingent on another set of issues concerning choice of
procedures. Put simply, agencies must choose certain procedures for
issuing standards or else they deprive such standards of their intended
force. First, agencies must choose procedures capable of generating
binding standards. Procedures that yield nonbinding standards do not
really yield any standards at all. Second, agencies must choose notice-
and-comment procedures, to the extent possible, for issuing standards
339 See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that agency vio-
lated arbitrary and capricious test of APA because it failed to articulate standards that
governed its discretion); Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221, 225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).
340 But see Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (recommending that
Court revisit issue of whether current nondelegation doctrine, as applied, is consistent with
original understanding of constitutional structure); Martin H. Redish, The Constitution
as Political Structure 135-61 (1995) (arguing for revitalized nondelegation doctrine);
Schoenbrod, supra note 121, at 14-16 (arguing, on public choice grounds, for reinvigorated
nondelegation doctrine); Hamilton, supra note 157, at 807 (understanding Constitution "to
prescribe a bright-line doctrinal approach" to distinguish legislative power, which Congress
may not delegate, from executive power, which Congress may delegate); Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 333-35 (2002) (arguing on originalist
grounds that Constitution compels vigorous nondelegation doctrine).
341 See Bressman, supra note 99, at 459-69.
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in advance of applying them to particular facts. Other procedures,
even if capable of binding, do not best promote the values of fairness,
predictability, and participation important to a genuinely nonarbitrary
administrative state.
It was Davis who wrote that agencies should, to the extent possi-
ble, articulate standards through notice-and-comment type rulemak-
ing in advance of applying those standards to particular facts. 342 But
the notion that agencies should issue ex ante standards is extremely
provocative. It is one thing to suggest that agencies, already engaged
in notice-and-comment rulemaking, supply the standards that govern
their decisions in the course of that rulemaking. This is essentially
what Judge Williams asked of the EPA in American Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA.343 It is quite another to suggest that agencies, regularly engaged
in formal adjudication or other administrative action, first undertake
notice-and-comment rulemaking to supply the standards that will gov-
ern their subsequent decisions. Few courts have ever done this.344
The reason is that administrative law always has permitted agen-
cies virtually unqualified discretion to choose the procedures for issu-
ing general policy. 345 Since the 1947 decision of SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery II),346 the Supreme Court has refused to second-guess agen-
cies on their selection of policymaking tools. 347 Within limited con-
342 Davis, supra note 19, at 55-59.
343 See 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-38 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified in part and reh'g en banc
denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. 457 (2001).
344 Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-66 (1969) (plurality opinion)
(holding that NLRB could not announce new rule in adjudication and refuse to apply that
new rule to parties in case because to do so would constitute impermissible rulemaking);
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1981) (preventing agency from using
adjudication to announce new policy where doing so would circumvent notice-and-com-
ment process).
345 For an excellent discussion of the various policymaking methods among which agen-
cies choose, see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form (on
file with the New York University Law Review).
346 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
347 In Chenery I, the SEC had, in the course of adjudication under the Securities Act,
interpreted that statute to bar corporate management from purchasing preferred stock dur-
ing reorganization. Id. at 198-200. The SEC initially had found that equitable principles
barred such purchases. The Supreme Court, in the first Chenery decision, rejected this
reasoning and remanded the issue to the agency for further reflection. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 87-90 (1943). The agency then supplied a statutory basis
for its rule, on which rationale the Court upheld the rule. Chenery I1, 332 U.S. at 207-09.
The Court rejected arguments that the agency could not announce its new rule in adjudica-
tion. Id. at 201-03. Although the Court praised the advantages of rulemaking for avoiding
unfair retroactive application of new policy, it refused to establish a preference for
rulemaking. Id. at 202. The Court noted that agencies frequently lack the foresight, expe-
rience, or information to formulate a general rule and often need the flexibility to use case-
by-case adjudication. Id. at 202-03. Moreover, the Court states that it simply would not
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straints, agencies may choose to make policy through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, through adjudication, or through other adminis-
trative action. 348
Chenery H, though decided during the reign of the expertise
model, has enjoyed enduring support. Not even Davis was willing to
tinker with it, suggesting instead that agencies, in the exercise of their
discretion, choose to issue ex ante standards when possible.349 The
same is true of other scholars who have recognized the advantages of
notice-and-comment rulemaking for issuing general policy.350 They
have merely recommended the use of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, rather than required it. When push comes to shove, few scholars
want to reduce agency flexibility. Advocates of the presidential con-
trol model might be particularly reluctant. Chenery H, like Chevron
and unlike State Farm, reserves discretionary decisions (here, the
choice of procedures) for those subject to political control-agencies
rather than courts.
But that is exactly why Chenery H is troubling. It is inconsistent
with subsequent cases, including State Farm, that demand more trans-
parency and rationality for discretionary agency decisions. Moreover,
in the context of modern agency decisionmaking procedures, it pro-
vides far more opportunities for abuse than it did in 1947. In 1947, the
choice of adjudication over rulemaking was commonplace because
second-guess an agency's reasons for relying on adjudication. Rather, it stated, "the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency." Id. at 203. This princi-
ple has governed with few exceptions ever since. Cf. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 764-66
(holding that NLRB could not announce new rule in adjudication and refuse to apply that
new rule to parties in case because to do so would constitute impermissible rulemaking);
Ford Motor, 673 F.2d at 1010 (barring agency use of adjudication to announce new policy
when it would avoid notice-and-comment process); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 294 (1974) (reaffirming that agencies possess discretion to choose between rulemaking
and adjudication, except in those rare cases where reliance on adjudication "would amount
to an abuse of discretion"). For detailed discussions of Chenery II, see generally Magill,
supra note 345; William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the
Limitation of Labels, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 351 (2000); William V. Luneburg, Retroac-
tivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 Duke L.J. 106; Russell L. Weaver, Chenery I1:
A Forty-Year Retrospective, 40 Admin. L. Rev. 161 (1988).
348 Even under Chenery 11, there is a judicial check for arbitrariness. Reviewing courts,
applying a due process-like balancing test, will preclude agencies from changing course in
adjudication without sufficient notice or solicitude for reliance interests. See, e.g., Clark-
Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(articulating this test); Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy
540-42 (4th ed. 1999) (collecting cases).
349 Davis, supra note 19, at 59 n.6.
350 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 316, at 587-97 (noting advantages of rulemaking);
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 297,
326-31 (1986) (same); Peck, supra note 316, at 754-60 (same); Shapiro, supra note 316, at
929-42 (same).
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agencies hardly ever used rulemaking. Agencies now routinely use
rulemaking, which makes the choice of adjudication over rulemaking
for making policy significant if not suspect. Furthermore, agencies
now choose other methods instead of rulemaking for making policy.
They use informal adjudications or enforcement actions against pri-
vate parties. They use guidance documents or settlement
negotiations. 351
It should therefore come as no surprise-at least to those who
understand administrative law as concerned with arbitrariness as well
as accountability-that the Supreme Court has recently begun to pare
back the deference it accords to agency choice of procedures. In
United States v. Mead Corp. ,352 the Court held that an agency is enti-
tled to Chevron deference only if Congress has delegated to that
agency the authority to issue interpretations that carry the force of
law, and the agency has used that authority in issuing a particular in-
terpretation. 353 And where an agency chooses a procedure that belies
a congressional intention to give the interpretation the force of law-
procedures that do not "bespeak the legislative type of activity that
would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling," 354-it is not
entitled to Chevron deference. 355 The agency may be entitled to Skid-
more v. Swift & Co. 356 deference, however, if it produces an interpre-
tation that reflects "'a body of experience and informed judgment"'
upon which courts, though not required, would be wise to rely.357
351 For a description and criticism of the use of settlement negotiations for making pol-
icy, see Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public
Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 Duke L.J. 1015, 1018-32 (2001) (arguing that
rulemaking settlements are problematic because they create principal-agent gap in policy
formulation).
352 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
353 Id. at 231-33.
354 Id. at 232. One example is the tariff classification ruling letters under consideration
in Mead. See id. at 231-34. The Customs Service issued such ruling letters in 10,000 to
15,000 individual cases each year. Id. at 233. The ruling letters, which specify the tax clas-
sification for particular imported products under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States, also are subject to independent review and displacement by the Court of
International Trade. Id. at 232. They are treated as binding between Customs and the
individual party to whom a particular ruling is issued. Id. And they come from forty-six
different Customs offices. Id. at 233. The Court was not persuaded by the fact that the
ruling letter at issue in the case was generated by Customs Headquarters, rather than one
of the myriad field offices, and that it contained a reasoned explanation for its classifica-
tion. Id. at 233-34.
355 Id. at 231-34.
356 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
357 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998), in turn
quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). Under Skidmore, agencies get deference only to the
extent they offer interpretations with the "power to persuade." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
As the Skidmore Court stated: "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
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This Section argues that Mead moves in the right direction. The
case begins a partial weaning from Chenery H and unlimited choice of
procedures. As such, it shows that administrative law has begun to
record a concern for arbitrariness in this area. This Section contends,
however, that Mead does not go far enough. While recognizing that
nonbinding agency interpretations are tantamount to no interpreta-
tions at all, Mead does not create a preference for ex ante, notice-and-
comment interpretations. It does not ask agencies generally to issue
interpretations in a way that best addresses the concern for arbitrari-
ness and even the need for accountability.
a. From Chenery II to Mead.
To see Mead as a movement away from unlimited choice of pro-
cedures takes some effort. The case is new, and those who have com-
mented tend to view it as nothing more than judicial overreaching.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in the case, claimed that Mead "makes an
avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action" be-
cause "[w]hat was previously a general presumption of authority in
agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been author-
ized to enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such author-
ity, which must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent. '358 On
his account, Mead replaces an implied delegation principle with a con-
gressional clear statement principle. Many scholars have castigated
Mead for a different reason. They argue that Mead transfers author-
ity illegitimately from agencies to courts.359 In their view, the case
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id.
358 Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also John 0. McGinnis, Presidential
Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 Duke L.J. 901, 951 n.222 (2001) (noting that
Mead may have restricted scope of Chevron).
359 See, e.g. Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking
Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 673, 677-81 (2002) (arguing that Mead
improperly shifted interpretive authority from agencies to courts by imputing to Congress
need for specific delegation of interpretive authority); William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Re-
view of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer Is Chevron Step Two, Not Chris-
tensen or Mead, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 719, 722-25 (2002) (arguing that Mead pits executive
branch against judicial branch in cases to which Chevron does not apply because once
court chooses meaning in reliance on agency informal adjudication, agency may not be able
to depart even through use of congressionally specified procedures such as notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Defer-
ence?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54
Admin. L. Rev. 735, 751 (2002) (arguing that Mead represents "a naked power grab by the
federal courts" because it provides them yet another way to displace an agency interpreta-
tion); Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 Admin. L.
Rev. 771, 793-94 (2002) (contending that Mead gives courts too large role in denying
agency deference due).
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provides courts yet another tool for reclaiming interpretive power that
Chevron (correctly) accords to agencies. It is necessary to make sense
of Mead as more than inappropriate judicial interference with, first,
broad congressional delegations and second, reasonable agency
interpretations.
Mead, though framed in terms of congressional intent, does not
have to be understood as telling Congress how to write statutes.
Rather, it can be understood as telling agencies how to interpret stat-
utes. It instructs agencies, as a condition of judicial deference, to use
only those interpretive methods that Congress has contemplated.
Those methods are rulemaking and adjudication, which are the cus-
tomary tools for interpretive purposes, or some other means that "be-
speak the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more
than the parties to the ruling. ' 360
While Mead speaks to agencies, it does not have to be understood
as unjustifiably depriving them of power. Rather, the case can be
viewed as properly steering agencies toward interpretive methods that
satisfy two conditions important to their own legitimacy: Agencies
may possess only so much authority (1) as Congress may grant them,
and (2) as they may exercise consistent with the values of fairness,
rationality, and predictability. Mead's requirement of congressional
authorization can be seen to satisfy the first condition. It ensures that
agencies stay within the scope of their delegated authority. But the
congressional authorization requirement-like its constitutional coun-
terpart, the nondelegation doctrine-is only a nominal requirement.
It is inferred from and satisfied by the same considerations as the sec-
ond, administrative exercise condition.
Those considerations are the nature of the interpretive method
and the administrative practice in using that method.361 More specifi-
360 Mead, 533 U.S. at 232; see Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations
Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 2-6, 36-40 (1990) (arguing, long
before Mead, that agencies should not have power to bind unless they use procedures
Congress has provided for that purpose).
361 In a subsequent case, the Court confirmed this understanding in dicta. In Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), the Court addressed the issue of whether Chevron defer-
ence applied to certain Social Security Administration interpretations of a definition in the
Social Security Act. The agency originally issued the interpretations in a 1982 Social Se-
curity Ruling, a 1965 Disability Insurance State Manual, and a 1957 OASI Disability Insur-
ance Letter. See id. at 219-20. In 2001, it promulgated them in notice-and-comment
regulations. Id. at 217. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the argument that
the agency's regulations were not entitled to Chevron deference because they were re-
cently promulgated, perhaps in response to litigation. See id. at 221. He said that the
agency's interpretation was "long standing." Id. "And," he continued, "the fact that the
Agency previously reached its interpretation through means less formal than 'notice and
comment' rulemaking does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial
deference otherwise its due." Id. (internal citation omitted). Under Mead, he noted,
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cally, the considerations are whether the method is capable of produc-
ing generally applicable, binding law (i.e., policy that "bespeak[s] the
legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more than the
parties to the ruling" 362) and whether the agency treats it as producing
generally applicable, binding law. 363 These considerations form a sort
of "law-like decisionmaking" requirement, akin to the well-recognized
reasoned-decisionmaking requirement. The law-like decisionmaking
requirement ensures that when agencies claim the force of law, they
actually have made law.
But the law-like decisionmaking requirement serves a more im-
portant purpose than ensuring that agencies put their money where
their mouths are (though it frequently does this, in the literal as well
as figurative sense). It also makes certain that agencies given poli-
cymaking authority exercise that authority in ways that generally pro-
mote consistency and specifically prevent ad hoc departures at the
behest of narrow interests. By announcing a rule that binds all simi-
larly situated parties, agencies may stem requests for deviations ex-
cept through official channels-for example, a petition for
reconsideration or an argument for overruling based on changed cir-
cumstances. In any event, agencies provide themselves a tool for re-
sisting requests that continue undeterred. In so doing, agencies
further the very purpose that an administrative standards requirement
"whether a court should give such deference depends in significant part upon the interpre-
tive method used and the nature of the question at issue." Id. at 222. Justice Breyer never
reached these questions because he determined that routine Chevron deference applied to
the interpretation, which was issued through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process
and "ma[de] considerable sense in terms of the statute's basic objectives," in addition to
validating long-held policy. Id. at 219.
362 Mead, 533 U.S. at 232.
363 These considerations are different from whether an interpretation is "authoritative,"
as Justice Scalia uses the word. See id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The test is not merely
whether the interpretation reflects the "official position of the agency," id., which, as the
majority observed, depends not on "breadth of delegation or the agency's procedure in
implementing it ... and may ultimately be a function of administrative persistence alone."
Id. at 237. The test is analogous to the one courts have employed, in reverse, to determine
whether an interpretation constitutes a valid interpretative rule for purposes of APA ex-
emption from notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst.
v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946-50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that "action level" below which
agency would not institute enforcement proceedings constituted invalid legislative rule be-
cause it was capable of binding parties and agency followed it consistently). For a different
view of what the Court meant by an agency action with the force of law, see Thomas W.
Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54
Admin. L. Rev. 807, 827 (2002) (arguing that agency acts with force of law for purposes of
Mead when it adopts rule or order that once final, is no longer open to challenge and
subjects those who violate it to legal consequences).
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is intended to serve. Only then do agencies deserve judicial deference
for their policymaking.364
Even on this reading, Mead only makes a difference if the case
induces agencies to use law-like procedures, which in turn depends on
the risk agencies perceive in foregoing such procedures. Agencies
may not perceive a significant risk. Indeed, agencies may not think
about the issue at all. Those who do may know that the failure to use
law-like procedures puts them in a Skidmore regime rather than a
Chevron regime. Under Skidmore, they must take their chances of
persuading a court that their interpretations are entitled to deference
rather than commanding near automatic deference. 365 But they also
may know that courts typically have awarded Skidmore deference as
often as they have awarded Chevron deference. 366
This risk assessment overlooks the consequences of Skidmore
deference for future administrative action. Agencies that forego law-
like procedures and settle for Skidmore deference run the risk of los-
ing the ability to change their interpretations in the future. This risk
arises because the Court has not clarified whether Skidmore grants
the agency or the court the final power to interpret the relevant statu-
tory provision.367 In other words, the Court has not clarified whether
Skidmore directs courts to uphold persuasive agency interpretations
or to consider agency interpretations, to the extent persuasive, in their
own independent statutory analysis. If courts are the final arbiters
under Skidmore, agencies will have limited flexibility to change their
interpretations in the future, even through methods that Congress
contemplates for issuing interpretations with the force of law. Once a
364 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833,
884-85 (2001) (noting procedural advantages of restricting scope of Chevron to legislative
rules and binding adjudications).
365 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
366 Interestingly, the lower court, on remand in Mead itself, did not follow this tradition.
See Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1345-50 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (refusing to
accord Skidmore deference to tariff classification ruling letter).
367 See Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More Pieces for the Chev-
ron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 699, 714-15 (2002) (noting confusion
on issue whether court or agency is final decisionmaker under Skidmore). Compare
Jordan, supra note 359, at 722 (asserting that court is final decisionmaker under Skidmore),
with Merrill & Hickman, supra note 364, at 861-63 (arguing that under Skidmore, agency
resolves meaning of statutory ambiguity at issue rather than reviewing court). There ap-
pears to be some disagreement or confusion among members of the Court about the effect
of Skidmore deference (or non-Chevron deference) on the ability of agencies to adopt
other permissible interpretations in the future. Compare Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535
U.S. 106, 114 n.8, 118 (2002) (finding agency's interpretation "unassailable" but suggesting
that it was not only one that agency could adopt), with id. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that only finding of Chevron deference to existing interpretation permits agency
freely to change that interpretation in future).
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court locks in the meaning of a statutory ambiguity, agencies have lit-
tle ability to adjust that interpretation for changing circumstances in
the exercise of their expert judgment-an ability that Chevron ex-
pressly affords them.368 Even if agencies retain the final interpretive
power under Skidmore, they are not home free. Once an agency has
succeeded in persuading a court that it has arrived at an acceptable
interpretation, it may be reluctant to take a chance again. Such risk
aversion increases in cases where courts, applying Skidmore, go be-
yond suggesting that an administrative interpretation is persuasive
and intimate that it is correct.
b. A Preference for Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Assuming Mead can succeed in prodding agencies to issue law-
like interpretations, it still falls short for purposes of preventing ad-
ministrative arbitrariness. Mead fails to establish a preference for no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking.369 Mead either assumes congressional
indifference among congressionally authorized interpretive tools or it
perpetuates its own indifference-or rather, its own Chenery H-based
preference for unlimited administrative flexibility to choose among
congressionally authorized procedures. This preference is a mistake
when viewed through the lens of arbitrariness. And here is where I
begin to sketch how the concern for arbitrariness might bridge the gap
between the positive account of the law we do have and the prescrip-
tive account of the law we should have.
The place to start is with the advantages of notice-and-comment
rulemaking for making general policy. Many scholars have articulated
these advantages,37° and I will only summarize them here. In so do-
ing, I necessarily will make some overgeneralizations, as others have
done before. But, because I do not intend to defend the use of notice-
and-comment rulemaking in all cases (but merely a preference for no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, as described below), I permit room for
departures where the advantages are overstated or the disadvantages
are understated.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, by its nature, facilitates the
participation of affected parties, the submission of relevant informa-
368 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984) (upholding as reasonable agency interpretation that reflected change in policy).
369 Mead also only addresses a limited context. While it imposes a law-like decision-
making requirement under Chevron, it does not address the issue of whether such a re-
quirement also applies under State Farm. The claim is not that Mead should have
addressed the broader context, simply that the broader context must be addressed.
370 See generally Davis, supra note 19, at 65-67; Pierce, supra note 146, at 59-60; Sha-
piro, supra note 316, at 929-42; Strauss, supra note 26, at 755-56; Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185, 188-93 (1974).
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tion, and the prospective application of resulting policy. As a result of
the reasoned-decisionmaking requirement that accompanies it, notice-
and-comment rulemaking fosters logical and thorough consideration
of policy. To the extent notice-and-comment rulemaking issues gen-
eral rules that rely for their enforcement on further proceedings, it
also promotes predictability. At a minimum, it allows affected parties,
who participate in the formulation of the rule, to anticipate the rule
and plan accordingly.
Now compare formal adjudication. Agencies, like the NLRB,
have shown that adjudication may serve as a policymaking tool. 37'
And, adjudication certainly affords important procedural protections
to individual litigants. Yet, adjudication, as a general matter, has seri-
ous shortcomings for formulating policy. It applies new rules retroac-
tively to the parties in the case. It also excludes other affected parties
in the development of policy applicable to them, unless included
through the venues of intervention or amicus curiae filings. To the
extent it excludes such parties, it also excludes the information and
arguments necessary to define the stakes and educate the agency.37 2
It tends to approach broad policy questions from a narrow perspec-
tive-only as necessary to decide a case-which decreases the com-
prehensiveness of the resulting rule and increases the risk that bad
facts will make bad law. Similarly, it elaborates policy in a narrow
manner-on a case-by-case basis-which decreases predictability and
opportunities for planning. It also announces policy in the form of an
order rather than codifying it in the Federal Register, thus decreasing
accessibility. And, it depends for all of this on the existence of circum-
stances that lead to the initiation of a proceeding or succession of
proceedings. 373
371 See Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragma-
tism, 41 Duke L.J. 274, 281-82 (1991).
372 Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
953, 962 (1997) ("When the fixing of a rule requires either the kind of scientific or technical
data obtainable only in a rulemaking proceeding, or simply an arbitrary judgment, the
adjudicative process is unusable. Notice and comment rulemaking must be employed
....1).
373 All of this might be said of judicial adjudication, and indeed, it forms the basis for a
significant body of scholarly work critiquing "activist" judging. See Farber & Sherry, supra
note 90, at 17-18 (criticizing Robert Bork). While beyond the scope of this Article to
discuss fully the differences between judicial adjudication and administrative adjudication
for formulating general policy, it suffices for now to point out one critical distinction:
Courts have no choice but to elaborate policy on a case-by-case basis. It is for this reason
that courts face all sorts of judicial restraint rules, both constitutional and prudential-for
example, the ban on advisory opinions, the limits on standing, the rule of stare decisis, and
the rule against prospectivity. That is not to debate the necessity or sufficiency of those
rules, or even my selection among them. It is simply to note that rules exist to prevent
courts from freely legislating. Unlike courts, agencies are expected to legislate freely-
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Other methods for formulating general policy, whatever those
might look like after Mead, fare even worse. Consider the administra-
tive action at issue in Pearson v. Shalala.374 The FDA had failed alto-
gether to define the statutory phrase "significant scientific
agreement," although it repeatedly had applied that phrase to ap-
prove and reject requests from manufacturers to make certain claims
on dietary supplement labels.375 The D.C. Circuit held, in reviewing a
claim rejection, that the FDA had violated the reasoned-decisionmak-
ing requirement by failing to define the criteria it used in applying the
statutory phrase.376 The court remanded the claim rejection to the
agency. 377 Suppose the FDA decides in the course of its next claim
decision to define the criteria. 378 Such action would be less fair and
deliberative than formal adjudication, which at least provides proce-
dural protections for individual litigants and the possibility of inter-
vention and amicus curiae filings for other parties. It would be
equally retroactive and narrowly focused. And it would be less visi-
ble, decreasing notice and planning.
If notice-and-comment rulemaking typically is the best method
for making general policy, then a refusal to use it might be arbitrary.
It might lack any justification whatsoever. Or it might indicate im-
proper motives, such as a desire to avoid committing broadly or visi-
bly, or to retain room for departures that serve narrow interests. Of
course, it might be neither. The refusal to use notice-and-comment
rulemaking might reflect a perfectly understandable desire to avoid
the costs and complexities that the process imposes. This justification
really is an objection to the entire idea of rulemaking, notwithstanding
its potential advantages. I address this objection below. 379
Cost considerations aside, there are legitimate justifications for
the refusal to use notice-and-comment rulemaking. In Chenery I, the
Court itself envisioned some such instances. 380 One might imagine
circumstances in which an agency genuinely fails to appreciate the
indeed, that is the whole idea of broad delegation. Furthermore, they have available "leg-
islative-like" procedures for this purpose, which should be utilized as important constraints
on the power they possess.
374 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
375 Id. at 653-54 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i) (2000)).
376 Id. at 660.
377 Id. at 661.
378 Assume also that such action constitutes a permissible interpretive method under
Mead; if it does not, then Mead itself might require the use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking to define ambiguous statutory terms more often than the Court seems willing
to admit.
379 See infra Part II1.B.2.c.
380 See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1I), 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (describing
circumstances when use of adjudication rather than rulemaking might be appropriate).
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need for a general standard until the need presents itself in the course
of adjudication or other administrative action. Agencies cannot possi-
bly anticipate every ambiguity that their organic statutes contain. In
such circumstances, an agency might issue general policy as necessary
to resolve its case or execute its action. One might imagine other cir-
cumstances in which notice-and-comment rulemaking is not feasible.
Sometimes an agency lacks the experience with a problem or the in-
formation relevant to a problem to formulate a general standard gov-
erning it. In such circumstances, agencies might elaborate standards
incrementally through formal adjudication or other means. If they
were to engage in rulemaking, they likely would produce a rule that is
too general or indeterminate to achieve any advantage.
But the concern for circumventing notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing is sufficiently grave that agencies should be required to take af-
firmative steps to justify a departure from rulemaking. At a
minimum, they should articulate the reasons for using other proce-
dures. This brings choice of procedure into compliance with the rea-
soned-decisionmaking requirement. Agencies also might go further.
They might project a timeline for revisiting their policy decisions
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, on penalty of losing judicial
deference to future orders or actions that deviate without good reason
from that plan.
What I have just described might be considered a preference for
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Such a preference would require
agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for implementing
broad statutory requirements and interpreting ambiguous statutory
provisions unless they offer an explanation for their choice of adjudi-
cation or other administrative action. A reviewing court would defer
to this explanation if reasonable, much as it defers to an agency's ex-
planation of the substantive basis for its policy decision under the rea-
soned-decisionmaking requirement. And, as with the reasoned-
decisionmaking requirement, a court should not supply its own expla-
nation if the agency fails to provide one. Rather, it should remand the
issue to the agency for further consideration. 381
381 Mead introduces certain complications in the application of a preference for notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Applying a preference for rulemaking would be straightfor-
ward only in cases involving a choice between rulemaking and formal adjudication where
Congress authorizes both. An agency that selects adjudication simply would have to artic-
ulate an explanation for so doing. A reviewing court would defer to that explanation if
reasonable.
When an agency chooses a method other than adjudication, the issue would be more
complex. An agency still would have to articulate an explanation for using that method.
But a reviewing court first would have to determine whether Congress had authorized the
use of that method before it could consider whether the agency had offered an adequate
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c. Practical Objections
It is worthwhile to step aside for a moment and address some
possible objections to a preference for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing. This Subsection and the following Subsection take up that task.
By their nature, these subsections at times digress from the central
point about the role of a preference for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing in preventing arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.
Some may argue that a preference for notice-and-comment
rulemaking would only increase the ossification that plagues agencies
saddled with rulemaking. Agencies, facing the prospect of countless
iterations of rulemaking and review or conflicting commands about
what factors to consider on remand, decline to issue regulations or to
revise existing ones. 382 On this view, the move to informal interpre-
tive methods is an understandable, even welcomed, reaction to a tor-
pid administrative process.
A further point is that the move to informal interpretive methods
is an appropriate response to today's regulatory problems, particularly
those involving scientific or technological uncertainty. Not only is
rulemaking stultifying because of agencies' inability to compile a re-
cord sufficiently precise to survive unrealistic judicial expectations, it
is simply wrong-headed. It requires agencies to set achievable levels
of compliance based on speculation when they more fruitfully might
experiment with proposed levels. It invites agencies to produce rules
that, by the time they are final, already have outlived their usefulness
justification for using it. The agency explanation might prove helpful on the congressional
authorization issue. An agency might assert that it was making generally applicable, bind-
ing policy, and that it did so through an individualized enforcement action because it
lacked the information to make policy through notice-and-comment rulemaking or belat-
edly discovered the need to make such policy. The court would have to make an indepen-
dent determination as to the first half of the agency's explanation (concerning
congressional authorization), and, if satisfied, defer to the second half of the agency's ex-
planation (concerning choice of procedures).
Another complication would arise when an agency lacks express notice-and-comment
rulemaking authority but nonetheless claims Chevron deference for another policymaking
method. Mead itself was one such case. Such cases would not involve a choice-of-proce-
dures question, whose answer depends on the reasoned judgment of the agency, but merely
a congressional authorization question, whose answer depends on the independent judg-
ment of the court. A court would have to ascertain whether the method is capable of
binding and whether the agency treats it as binding. If so, the court could infer a congres-
sional justification for its use. But, with Mead as an indication, these cases might be rare.
Courts might decline more often than not to find congressional authorization for agencies
to make general policy with the force of law when they lack notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing power. Indeed, the Mead Court could find only one example of congressional authori-
zation outside the rulemaking and adjudication context. See United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 231 & n.13 (2001) (citing case involving Comptroller of Currency, who pos-
sessed congressional authorization to make binding policy without specified procedures).
382 The ossification literature is legion. See supra note 109.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
May 20031
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 545 2003
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
because technological or scientific advances have superseded them.
And it prohibits agencies from negotiating policy directly with af-
fected parties, as they might through settlement negotiations in an en-
forcement action. The Court, if anything, should applaud agencies
that elaborate policy in areas of uncertainty on an informal basis. The
response to these objections proceeds in five parts.
First, a preference for rulemaking would be just that-a prefer-
ence or, perhaps more accurately, a presumption. It would shift the
burden to agencies to justify their use of other methods for formulat-
ing general terms and standards. It would not deny them the flexibil-
ity to choose particular procedures when circumstances warrant.
Rather, it would encourage agencies to deliberate on a question of
importance to producing the type of policy decisions that will narrow
broad delegations consistent with the constitutional structure-that is,
the choice-of-procedures question.
But perhaps this initial response avoids the hard issue of whether
we want a rule that discourages agencies from using informal methods
for developing general policy, even where efficient. Why not allow
agencies to use interpretive rules or guidance documents, for example,
to push the law along when notice-and-comment rulemaking would
produce rules that, by the time they are final, not only have consumed
an inordinate amount of resources (both public and private) but have
outlived their usefulness? 383 The reason is that allowing agencies to
use interpretive rules and guidance documents in this fashion, while
improving efficiency in particular instances, comes at too high a price
overall. It jeopardizes administrative legitimacy. If we are to succeed
in legitimizing the administrative state, we cannot prioritize efficiency
above all else. That is not to minimize the importance of efficiency,
because an inefficient administrative state is, as Justice Breyer might
383 The APA prohibits the use of interpretive rules and policy statement to formulate
general policy. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (excluding interpretive rules and policy state-
ments from notice-and-comment requirements applicable to rules that generate binding
policy). But there is much confusion among courts as to when interpretive rules and policy
statements transgress that line. A court might utilize this confusion to permit an agency to
formulate general policy through an interpretive rule or policy statement by determining
that the interpretive rule or policy statement merely clarifies existing law rather than
makes new law. For excellent discussions of the use of "nonlegislative" rules, see generally
Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311 (1992);
Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53
Admin. L. Rev. 1313 (2001); Anthony, supra note 360; Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules
in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Ad-
min. L. Rev. 803 (2001).
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say, a "game not worth the candle. '384 We must seek efficiency at
every level of the administrative process: by improving agency consid-
eration and public participation and judicial review and political over-
sight. But we cannot, in the alternative, dispense with agency
procedures.
Second, any preference for rulemaking would not entail the more
burdensome requirement that agencies issue superstatutory regula-
tions constraining their discretion. While agencies would be wise to
issue such regulations if they could, 385 they often cannot. The stakes
and information relevant to most policy decisions only emerge in the
course of concrete administrative action. Moreover, the volume of
statutory ambiguities and required judgments realistically may pre-
clude an agency from engaging in an initial, roving rulemaking. Be-
cause we might expect this to be the norm rather than the exception
given the nature of modern delegation, we should not call agencies to
account for failure to issue a governing regulation defining all terms
and standards. Rather, we should expect agencies to define terms and
standards in the course of focused rulemakings. Agencies engaged in
particular rulemakings ought to define all relevant terms and stan-
dards in the course of such rulemakings. Moreover, agencies antici-
pating adjudication or other administrative action on particular issues
should aim to undertake rulemaking ex ante on those issues to the
extent possible, or as soon as the issues sufficiently crystallize.
Third, a preference for rulemaking would not prevent agencies
from issuing different definitions or standards to fit different aspects
of a regulatory problem. Nothing in a preference for rulemaking re-
quires agencies to issue definitions or standards in a one-size-fits-all
manner. To the contrary, uniform rules might produce arbitrariness
when a regulatory problem demands individualized attention. 386
Fourth, a preference for rulemaking would not prevent agencies
from changing their positions if circumstances so warrant. If a statu-
tory term allows more than one permissible meaning, agencies should
have the freedom to choose a different meaning as long as they ob-
serve the same requirements that applied to their initial choice. Thus,
agencies must change their positions through notice-and-comment
384 AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 430 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
385 See Davis, supra note 19, at 42-44.
386 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415,422-26 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remand-
ing to FCC uniform national carrier access rule on theory that absence of access would
"impair" competition within meaning of Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(d)(2) (2000), because it would provide access "in circumstances where there is little
or no reason to think that its absence will genuinely impair competition that might other-
wise occur").
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rulemaking. Current principles of administrative law already facilitate
this result, requiring agencies to amend notice-and-comment rules
with notice-and-comment rules.387
Finally, courts play a role in reducing ossification. Many have
characterized the use of the hard look doctrine as an excuse for courts
to substitute their generalist judgment for the specialized judgment of
agencies. To be sure, a preference for notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing would afford courts even more opportunities for overly aggressive
judicial review. More than ever, courts would have to employ a rule
of restraint. 388 Courts would have to restrict themselves to ensuring
that agencies do their homework, not that agencies arrive at the cor-
rect answer.
d. Analytical Objections
A separate objection to establishing a presumption of rulemaking
is that it would complicate Chevron analysis with yet another consid-
eration. Justice Scalia has already raised a vociferous objection to
Mead's force-of-law requirement as demanding "affirmative legisla-
tive intent" for Chevron deference. 38 9 A preference for rulemaking
would not require any more from Congress, however. It would seek
from agencies an assurance that they have exercised their interpretive
power in ways both congressionally authorized and demonstrably law-
like. This approach, while undoubtedly more complex than an
"agency wins" rule, would ensure that agencies win only when they
should.
A stronger objection is that a preference for notice-and-comment
rulemaking would draw Chevron ever closer to Skidmore, and negate
the reason for maintaining two separate tests. After Mead, further
overlap (and confusion) between Chevron and Skidmore unquestion-
ably exists. Chevron step two includes a reasoned-decisionmaking re-
quirement that tracks many of the Skidmore factors.390 Chevron
deference and Skidmore deference occur with similar frequency, sug-
gesting that courts approach the two analyses with equal agency solici-
tude. And Skidmore sometimes applies in cases where Chevron might
instead.
387 See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932)
(holding that agency must follow its own rules until officially changed).
388 See Leventhal, supra note 62, at 511-12 (conceiving of hard look doctrine as "'judi-
cial supervision with a salutary principle of judicial restraint'" (quoting Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970))).
389 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
390 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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Consider a case that followed closely after Mead. In Edelman v.
Lynchburg College,39' Justice Souter, writing for the Court, enter-
tained the question of whether Chevron deference might apply to an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation is-
sued without notice-and-comment rulemaking, but ultimately declined
to resolve the question. 392 In a most remarkable footnote, Justice
Souter explained: "[N]ot all deference is deference under Chevron,
and there is no need to resolve deference issues when there is no need
for deference. '393 The Court upheld the interpretation as "not only a
reasonable one, but the position we would adopt even if there were no
formal rule and we were interpreting the statute from scratch. '394
Thus, it apparently upheld the EEOC regulation under Skidmore.395
Regardless of whether a preference for notice-and-comment
rulemaking or a choice-of-procedures analysis would further narrow
the space between Chevron and Skidmore, it would not negate the
reason for maintaining two tests.396 Chevron deference, unlike Skid-
more deference, rests on a theory of congressional delegation. As
long as an agency acts within the scope of its delegated authority, in-
terpreting statutory ambiguity through a law-like method, it merits
deference. That basis will make a difference in cases of ambiguity
where the court finds the interpretation unpersuasive. 397 It is in pre-
cisely such cases that Chevron directs the court to set aside its own
391 535 U.S. 106 (2002).
392 Id. at 1150.
393 Id. at 1150 n.8 (internal citation omitted).
394 Id. at 1150.
395 The Court never expressly stated that it was upholding the interpretation under Skid-
more, however. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, took issue with the Court's
analysis in a concurring opinion. See id. at 1153-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She would
have deferred to the EEOC regulations under Chevron. See id. at 1154-55. She deter-
mined that Chevron could apply to the EEOC regulation through a tortuous route: Al-
though Title VII does not give the EEOC authority to promulgate substantive regulations,
these were procedural regulations. Id. at 1153-55. And although Title VII does not require
notice-and-comment procedures for procedural regulations, and although the agency origi-
nally promulgated the regulations at issue without such procedures, the agency later
repromulgated them with those procedures. Id. Furthermore, it published them in the
Code of Federal Regulations and made them binding on all the parties before the EEOC.
See id. at 1155.
396 For a general discussion of the reasons for maintaining two distinct tests, see Merrill
& Hickman, supra note 364, at 858-63.
397 Commentators and Justices have observed the ability of reviewing courts to displace
agency interpretations at Chevron step one by refusing to find statutory ambiguity. See
Bressman, supra note 260, at 1411-12.
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judgment and defer to the agency's judgment. Under Skidmore, how-
ever, the court may reject the agency's judgment as unpersuasive.3 98
In addition, maintaining two distinct tests may make a difference
in cases like Edelman where the court agrees with the agency inter-
pretation. A finding of Chevron deference does not preclude the
agency from changing its position, while a finding of Skidmore defer-
ence effectively might. Once an agency receives a congressional dele-
gation of power under Chevron, it retains the power to select a
different interpretation as long as reasonable. Such flexibility, en-
dorsed in Chevron itself, allows the agency reasonably to adapt open-
ended statutory terms to changing circumstances. Skidmore compli-
cates the issue. It may allocate final interpretive say to courts rather
than agencies, precluding changes even through congressionally ap-
proved methods. Even if it accords final interpretive say to agencies,
it may make changes more difficult and less likely. An agency that
earns deference under Skidmore may be more reluctant to change its
position if the analysis in which the court engages tends to suggest not
only that the agency selected a permissible interpretation but the cor-
rect one. When a court refuses to decide whether an agency is entitled
to deference under Chevron or has earned deference under Skidmore,
it further complicates the issue. 399 It asks the agency to bet on which
analysis the court applied before that agency decides to change its
interpretation. 4 100
Of course, retaining Chevron as a distinct test does not prevent a
court from using Skidmore to give agencies such a bittersweet victory.
And, if Justice Souter's opinion in Edelman is any indication, courts
may use Skidmore more often than they probably should. 40 1 In many
cases, applying the Skidmore framework simply is easier for courts
than determining whether Congress intended the interpretive method
to carry the force of law, and it achieves the same result from their
perspective. But the inclination of courts to take the easy route, per-
haps exacerbated by Mead (as well as a preference for notice-and-
398 As the lower court, on remand, did in Mead itself. See Mead Corp. v. United States,
283 F.3d 1342, 1345-50 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (refusing to accord Skidmore deference to tariff
classification ruling letter).
399 See, e.g., Springfield, Inc. v. Buckles, 292 F.3d 813, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (refusing
to determine whether Chevron or Skidmore applies to agency study because either line of
authority would support statutory interpretation contained therein).
400 A similar argument might be made about the relationship between Chevron step one
and step two. When courts refuse to decide whether a statute requires an agency interpre-
tation (step one) or merely permits it (step two), they ask agencies inclined to change their
position to bet. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 703-04 (1995) (upholding agency interpretation without deciding whether statute
compels it under Chevron step one, or it is merely permissible under Chevron step two).
401 See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
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comment rulemaking), does not argue for an abandonment of Chev-
ron or Skidmore. It simply suggests that courts should be sensitive to
the differences of the two in both theoretical justification and practical
effect.
3. Choice of Procedures Reprised
As a brief postscript to the preceding choice-of-procedures dis-
cussion, it is worth considering a principle in administrative law that
accords agencies unqualified discretion to choose the method for in-
terpreting ambiguities in their own regulations (as opposed to ambigu-
ities in congressional statutes). In the 1945 case of Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co.,402 the Court held that an agency's interpretation of
its own regulation is "of controlling weight unless [that interpretation]
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. '40 3 In a sense,
Seminole Rock does for agencies' interpretations of their own regula-
tions what Chevron does for agencies' interpretations of their author-
izing statutes: it accords judicial deference to them. In Christensen v.
Harris County404 and Auer v. Robbins,40 5 the Court confirmed that
Seminole Rock accords deference to administrative interpretations of
ambiguous regulations. 40 6
Commentators and Justices have criticized Seminole Rock as en-
couraging agencies to write ambiguous regulations and interpret them
later. 40 7 Skidmore enables agencies to avoid "the relative rigors of
notice-and-comment rulemaking" by issuing the bare minimum
through that process and reserving the hard policy decisions "until the
relatively less demanding implementation stage. ' '408 In so doing, Sem-
inole Rock defeats the purpose of delegation-which is to have agen-
cies resolve ambiguous statutes, not replace them with equally
402 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
403 Id. at 414.
404 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
405 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
406 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588; Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. The Court never has explicitly
incorporated the Chevron two-step test for deference into Seminole Rock.
407 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); Anthony, supra note 44, at 11-12; John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 616
(1996). For another view, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Adminis-
trative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural
Role, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 103 (2000) (arguing that Seminole Rock allows agencies to make
law, whether through rulemaking or adjudication, without significant structural check of
"impending judicial interpretation").
408 Manning, supra note 407, at 616.
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ambiguous regulations. 40 9 Moreover, Seminole Rock undermines the
rule of law by depriving parties of regulations containing concrete gui-
dance.410 Unless agencies face a penalty for issuing ambiguous regula-
tions, they will not seek to avoid them.
In the main, these objections to Seminole Rock are not rooted in
majoritarianism. Indeed, majoritarianism would seem to support
Seminole Rock, as it supports Chevron. It is better to vest interpretive
authority in the actors subject to presidential control (the agencies)
than in the actors who are not (the courts).411 Majoritarianism is con-
sistent with the notion that agencies are in the best position to resolve
ambiguities in statutes, and the ambiguities that inevitably arise in
their own regulations.
The problem with Seminole Rock, as its critics acknowledge, lies
in the arbitrariness that unfettered choice of procedures creates. Sem-
inole Rock permits agencies to act opportunistically, issuing shell or
sham regulations. It allows agencies to issue vague regulations only to
make the actual policy at the implementation stage through other
means, such as case-by-case adjudication.412 Worse, it allows agencies
effectively to make the actual policy through nonbinding means, such
as guidance documents, interpretative rules, and other creatures-
even though such means are exempt from notice-and-comment
rulemaking under the APA precisely because they do not purport to
make policy. 413 Thus, the problem might be understood as an end-run
around rulemaking in the extreme.
409 See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Manning, supra
note 407, at 616.
410 See Manning, supra note 407, at 616.
411 Unless, of course, it is better still to vest such authority in Congress, through a revi-
talized nondelegation doctrine or some other strategy that would require Congress to de-
fine significant statutory ambiguities. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,
486-87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that nondelegation doctrine should require
more than meager intelligible principle).
412 See Manning, supra note 407, at 660-80 (arguing that problem with Seminole Rock is
that it allows agencies to subvert notice-and-comment rulemaking, making policy largely
through adjudication, which contradicts purpose of delegation and requirements of APA,
"disserves the due process objectives of giving notice of the law to those who must comply
with it and of constraining those who enforce it," and makes agency policymaking more
susceptible to influence of narrow interest groups). It bears noting that resolving ambigui-
ties in regulations is different from applying regulations to specific circumstances. See, e.g.,
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 358-59 (1989) (deferring to
Forest Service determination that its regulations do not extend to certain actions that might
be taken by Okanogan County or State of Washington to ameliorate off-site effects of
Early Winters project on air quality and mule deer herd).
413 See Anthony, supra note 44, at 6-12 (arguing that problem with Seminole Rock is
that it accords Chevron-style deference to interpretative rules, which are exempt from no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of APA, and often contain positions that are
"institutionally self-interested and are intended to impose adverse consequences on private
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By linking this problem to Chenery II and Mead, a solution
emerges. It is possible here, as there, to introduce a preference for
notice-and-comment rulemaking to the choice of procedures. This so-
lution would demand that an agency fill any residual or subsidiary
gaps in their regulations the same way it issued the regulation-
through rulemaking-unless it justifies the use of other interpretive
means. As there are good reasons to use adjudication rather than
rulemaking in the Mead context, there are good reasons to use adjudi-
cation here as well. Note, however, that as in the Mead context, there
would be no good reason to use nonbinding methods for interpreting
rules. Such methods would only qualify for Skidmore-style deference,
if anything. 414
In a sense, the solution would be to read a preference for
rulemaking to qualify Seminole Rock deference as it qualifies Chev-
ron deference. This qualification would not change the result in Semi-
nole Rock, which accorded deference to a regulation adopted through
notice-and-comment rulemaking interpreting a prior regulation (al-
beit supported by interpretations contained in various agency bulle-
tins, reports, and statements). 415 Nor would it change the result in
Christensen, which refused to accord deference to an agency opinion
letter purporting to interpret a regulation that was not ambiguous but
merely permissive.41 6 However, it would contradict Auer, which ex-
tended Seminole Rock deference to an agency interpretation issued
through another means-in particular, an agency litigating position.417
As Auer stands, it does not adequately ensure that agencies make and
interpret policy in fair, deliberative, law-like ways.
CONCLUSION
What is old is new. Beyond the current model of the administra-
tive state is the promise of an account with extraordinary explanatory
power for constitutional and administrative law. This account seeks to
address the concern for arbitrary administrative decisionmaking. That
this account has the power to erase some of the confusion in constitu-
tional and administrative law is hardly surprising. It has never really
gone away.
persons," including "favoring the agency over its private adversaries in litigation, strength-
ening the agency's regulatory hand, or limiting its distribution of largesse").
414 See id. at 11 (suggesting, long before Mead, that agencies should not receive Chev-
ron-style deference for interpretative rules).
415 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413, 417 (1945).
416 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
417 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997).
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This account initially built and justified the administrative state in
the 1930s. It made some missteps along the way, characterizing agen-
cies and their mandates in an unrealistic, inadequate fashion. But
rather than correct those missteps, we replaced the account with (or
subordinated it to) one that might solve a feature of agency decision-
making never before given such prominence-the "countermajori-
tarian" quality of agency decisionmaking. We reacted, implicitly, to
Alexander Bickel's challenge in the 1960s to defend judicial review.
After Bickel's famous "countermajoritarian difficulty," all unelected
and therefore unaccountable institutions were subject to question as
never before. Constitutional theorists confirmed the dominance of
the majoritarian paradigm in their analyses of the Supreme Court. We
followed suit in our assessments of the administrative state, though we
never talked about the paradigm the way those evaluating the Court
did.
At first, we responded by looking to remake the administrative
state in the legislature's image. In the 1970s, we opened the adminis-
trative process to all affected parties with the aim of creating an ideal-
ized legislative process. But we were not able to succeed well enough
to justify the ample costs and complexities that we introduced. We
soon realized that agencies were not as responsive to relevant inter-
ests as we might have hoped. And, they still were not accountable for
that result.
While foundering over how to proceed, we discovered the presi-
dency-or rather, the presidency discovered us. In the 1980s, Ronald
Reagan assumed control of the bureaucracy and thereby fit it into the
constitutional structure. President Reagan issued executive orders re-
quiring agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis and advance plan-
ning. He positioned the Office of Management and Budget to review
regulations for consistency with administration priorities. Subsequent
presidents preserved these practices. Bill Clinton, by maintaining
them, demonstrated that they were not tied to conservative ideology.
But he did more than that. President Clinton strengthened executive
control by asserting a kind of direct and official "ownership" of partic-
ular administrative policies. In so doing, he perfected the model that
made agencies responsive to public preferences through the one per-
son accountable to the entire nation-and, not insignificantly, men-
tioned in the constitutional document. That model continues today.
The difficulty is that the presidential control model, for all its ele-
gance, fails to address a concern that we always have worried about in
the administrative state. The concern is for arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking-precisely where we began. That we started there
shows good judgment. The constitutional structure can be understood
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law
[Vol. 78:461
HeinOnline  -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 554 2003
BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY
in a variety of respects to address an analogous concern for arbitrary
legislative, executive, and judicial decisionmaking. But somewhere in
the 1960s and 1970s, we lost track of the concern for arbitrary admin-
istrative decisionmaking. As a result, the models that have recently
emerged, including the presidential control model, can make sense of
the administrative state only by ignoring, or at least leaving un-
resolved, a concern arguably at the heart of the constitutional struc-
ture. In addition, they must leave unresolved many of the
conventional puzzles of constitutional and administrative law.
Some advocates of the presidential control model have recog-
nized that they can no longer avoid the concern for administrative
arbitrariness and must justify their model as consistent with the dic-
tates of good government, as well as majoritarian government. One
such advocate, Elena Kagan, has even taken steps to ensure this re-
sult. In the end, those steps cannot work. The presidential control
model, even in its most sophisticated form, must fall back on majori-
tarianism. It cannot adequately account for the concern for arbitrari-
ness. At the same time, the universally shared impulse to address the
concern for arbitrariness-the very worry over it-shows that we can-
not go back.
I have suggested that we move forward by examining more di-
rectly the concern for arbitrariness. Once we do, we can begin to re-
solve the conventional puzzles of constitutional and administrative
law that the majoritarian models cannot explain. Furthermore, we po-
sition ourselves to see the outlines of a new theory of the administra-
tive state. The absence of precise contours prevents the theory from
assuming, for now, the status of a full-fledged model. Nor is it certain
how exactly this model will blend the prevention of administrative ar-
bitrariness with the promotion of political accountability.
Two general lessons are certain, however. First, the new theory
will require some new administrative law principles-such as a re-
quirement that agencies supply the standards that guide and limit
their discretion, and a requirement that they do so generally through
notice-and-comment rulemaking in advance of applying those stan-
dards to particular facts. Since the ascendancy of the majoritarian
paradigm in administrative law, these requirements have seemed illog-
ical or ill-advised. But they are neither when viewed through the al-
ternative paradigm of arbitrariness. That is not to claim that these
requirements are without costs, for example to agency flexibility.
Rather, it is to contend that they are worth the price if the return is
agency legitimacy.
Second, the new theory will rely more than ever on "ordinary"
administrative law principles. For some time, reliance on "ordinary"
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administrative law to legitimate (as opposed to proceduralize or ra-
tionalize) administrative power has seemed incomprehensible. Many
have viewed administrative law principles either as authorizing court
intervention or agency self-help, neither of which seemed justified or
useful. It is now possible to see this perception as just the type of
majoritarian thinking that we must move beyond. Others have viewed
administrative law as inferior to constitutional law, as addressing none
of the "big" questions of agency legitimacy. It is now possible to see
this perception as simply wrong. It rests on a false dichotomy between
the quantity and quality of administrative policymaking authority.
More specifically, it considers separately the delegation question (i.e.,
how much authority Congress may grant to agencies), which is a ques-
tion for "constitutional" administrative law, and the exercise question
(i.e., how may agencies exercise the power they receive from Con-
gress), which is a question for "ordinary" administrative law. For pur-
poses of legitimating the administrative state, the questions are
intertwined. Agencies legitimately possess only so much authority as
Congress grants them and as they exercise consistent with principles
of fairness, rationality, and predictability. "Ordinary" administrative
law, whatever else it accomplishes, tends to ensure that agencies act
consistently with the broad public purposes of the statutes they imple-
ment and in other ways that promote good government.
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